

THE RAMBLER.

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PART XIX.

ENLARGEMENT OF THE "RAMBLER."

THE *Rambler* was commenced on the 1st of January 1848, as a weekly Magazine of "home and foreign literature, politics, science, and art." Its aim was to unite an intelligent and hearty acceptance of the Catholic dogma with free inquiry and discussion on questions which the Church has left open to debate; and while avoiding, as far as possible, the domain of technical theology, to provide a medium for the expression of independent opinion on subjects of the day, whether interesting to the general public, or specially affecting Catholics. In this attempt we were supported beyond our hopes. It soon became evident that our design responded to a very serious need in the Catholic body; and, in order to meet the wishes of our friends, and to present with less interruption the important papers with which we were supplied, we found it necessary, before a year was over, to increase the size of the Magazine, and to issue it in a monthly form.

It continued to be published as a monthly serial from the 1st of September 1848 to the 1st of February 1859. During this period of ten years and a half, we at first endeavoured to restrict it to topics of social and literary interest, without entering directly into the graver problems of moral or political philosophy. But the events of the time, and

the circumstances of English Catholicism, gradually modified our position in this respect, compelling us more and more to open our pages to investigations of a deeper and more complex nature; and as the *Rambler* thus, by degrees, assumed a less ephemeral character than ordinarily belongs to a monthly periodical, there ceased to be any doubt that its objects would be best attained by still further increasing the amount of matter in each number, and diminishing, in a like degree, the frequency of publication. We were anxious to effect this change in such a manner as to raise no obstacle to our continued coöperation with any Catholic periodical of higher pretensions than our own; and instead, therefore, of adopting the form of a Quarterly Review, we determined to issue our Magazine at intervals of two months, while we doubled its size accordingly. We began the two-monthly series on the 1st of May 1859, and to-day we bring it to a close.

For the time appears to have now arrived when, without antagonism to any existing interest, we may allow the *Rambler* to proceed in its natural development; and we intend, therefore, to publish it henceforward as a Quarterly Review, the first Number of which will appear on the 1st of next July. Each quarterly number will be twice the size of the present two-monthly one; and an addition of one-third will thus be made to the total amount of matter published in the year. The contents of each number will be disposed under four heads, viz.—1. Editorial Articles. 2. Communicated Articles. 3. Contemporary Literature. 4. Current Events. All papers coming under the first, third, or fourth head will have our full sanction; but with regard to the representations and opinions advanced in the Communicated Articles, we are not to be understood as engaging our own responsibility further than the fact of our being parties to the publication involves.

We trust that the history of the *Rambler* affords a sufficient guarantee for its continued maintenance of those principles to which it owes its distinctive character, its past difficulties, and the success it has finally attained. In its

new form, it will abstain from direct theological discussion, as far as external circumstances will allow : and in dealing with those mixed questions into which theology indirectly enters, its aim will still be to combine devotion to the Church with discrimination and candour in the treatment of her opponents; to reconcile freedom of inquiry with implicit faith ; and to discountenance what is untenable and unreal, without forgetting the tenderness due to the weak, or the reverence rightly claimed for what is sacred. Submitting without reserve to infallible authority, it will encourage a habit of manly investigation on subjects of scientific interest. It will assert the just claims of social progress ; and, in opposition to the revolutionary theory, it will every where uphold the validity of political right, and the harmonious development of the nation and the State on the basis of their historical traditions. It will investigate the past in order to discover and establish facts, not to secure the triumph of any given opinion. On the events and literature of the day it will endeavour to exercise a thoughtful criticism, free alike from prejudice and partiality. And by maintaining the supremacy of principle over interest, in every department of human thought and action, it will seek, as it has done hitherto, not only to enlarge and refine the intellect, but to strengthen and elevate the moral sense, in the educated classes of society.

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CORPORATION, AND THE STATE.

CIVIL society is made up of three factors or elements, the various conditions and combinations of which determine its political character. These are, the individual, the corporation, and the state.

We can imagine men aggregated, not in civil society, but in herds, in an unorganised atomic condition, bound by no common laws, each doing what he pleases, each claiming absolute freedom and independence, recognising no authority over him in any one or in any number of his fellow-men, and only restrained by fear of superior power, and of pains which that power would inflict upon him for acts displeasing to it. This is the state of absolute personal liberty, or of anarchy limited solely by terror; an ideal state only to be found as a transitory phase of some radical revolution in a community, or perhaps in some hordes of savages whose reason is degraded beneath the higher levels of instinct among gregarious animals.

Again, we can imagine men organised into families or clans, where the individual person counts for nothing, but only the household which he represents as patriarch. This is the earliest political condition which legal antiquarians have discovered. Society was at first, not a collection of individuals, but an aggregation of families. As the individual is the unit of modern society, the family was the unit of patriarchal society. The political system was one of small independent corporations, and its common law was scanty, because the despotic commands of the heads of households were in the place of laws. These households were as isolated from each other as separate nations are now, and their communication was as indirect and ceremonious as international communication in the present system of Europe. The family group may be supposed to have enlarged by a series of concentric growths into the house, the phratria, the tribe, the clan, till at last it merged into a commonwealth, by the association of these distinct groups into a unity. But a commonwealth thus formed would always be based on the patriarchal principle of a real or fictitious community of descent among all the members of it. And in fact the history of political ideas begins with the assumption that kinship, real or adoptive, is the sole possible ground of community in political functions. The fiction of adoption, by which aliens in blood were acknow-

ledged to be descendants of a common ancestor, is connected with the primitive ideas of paternity. An inventor was the mythical ancestor of all who used his invention ; musicians and metal-workers were reckoned to be descended respectively from the first musician and the first worker in metals. This was not altogether a fiction. In the patriarchal society, when families were isolated, the tradition of inventions and the secrets of art must have remained long in single families. For the family is the original educator, the school is only its substitute for the function of education ; and knowledge was a precious possession, inherited like other valuables. Moreover, the imperfection of arts and sciences, the labour of learning what there was no one to teach, the limited experience of mankind, the monotonous life, inveterate custom, the sanction of religion, reverence, and superstition,—all aided the family law, and helped to keep each man in his own class or caste. The son of the Egyptian carpenter followed his father's trade, not because he inherited any instinctive aptitude for it, but because the family law forbade the father to teach a stranger the secrets of his craft ; while, on the other hand, the art laboriously acquired, through generations of patient workers, could not grow up suddenly elsewhere, or be invented afresh in another family without traditions and without tools, and it could not be directly learned without adoption into the family. Thus necessity, custom, law, interest, and religion, all contributed to make crafts hereditary, to found monopolies of knowledge, and to make single families the depositaries of secrets and mysteries. Thus Tubal became physically, adoptively, and traditionally—that is, as the originator of the tradition—the father of blacksmiths, and Jubal of harpists. Mankind became separated into defined classes and castes ; and it was the class, not the person, that was looked upon as the element of society, the undying unit for whose security customs grew up and laws were sanctioned. Thus musicians, builders, carpenters, and the like, must every where have formed castes, where the blood must have determined the trade before the trade came to be reckoned determinative of the blood. And, in fact, we find that in the dawn of history the constituent element or factor of society is the family or tribe. But from the very first we find the clan or house determined rather by community of religious rites, and of traditions (or of trades in the sense in which our old writers use the word), than by real community of blood. Hence the corporation has become the embodiment of custom and tradition. The family is its type. It is founded

on paternity,—on paternity, not only of blood, but of mind ; on paternity of religion, tradition, trade, knowledge, art, usage ; and the commonwealth founded on the corporation is that wherein hereditary customs of classes, the privileges of the hierarchy of ranks, and the multiplied centres of various traditional usages, have always dominated over the abstract rights of individuals voluntarily associated, or associated solely according to local contiguity, community of language, or sameness of nationality.

The state is the third political element. Growing up from the amalgamation of corporations, it assumes two distinct characters according to the way in which it treats the corporations of which it is composed. If it assumes to itself all corporate functions, it sets itself gradually to obliterate all corporate distinctions, and to reduce all its subjects to individuals independent of all authority but its own, and thus verges through democracy to despotism. If, on the contrary, it only assumes the supreme guidance of the corporations of which it is composed, and confines its action upon its individual subjects to those few political ends and aims which are proper to it,—military defence, the administration of justice, and taxation,—while in all other things it fosters and protects corporate independence as the very life of the state, then it verges to constitutionalism, to the true commonwealth, to the political ideal.

Thus states naturally divide themselves into despotic and constitutional. Characteristic of the one is a condition of society more or less atomic, that is, more or less divested of corporate organisation. The other is characterised by being founded on corporations retaining their franchises and immunities, that is, independent of the supreme government in all matters except those directly belonging to the state. One recognises the supremacy of the lawgiver, the other the supremacy of law. Men in their atomic, individual, unconnected existence can have no customs. Customs arise with the corporation, and are preserved by it alone. Hence the democratic destruction of corporations involves the destruction of customary law, and assigns the direction of the masses to a discretionary power, first of all supposed to reside in the masses themselves, and thence by easy gradations transferred to the demagogue and to the despot.

We may look at the state either absolutely, as a logical development of its fundamental idea, or historically, as the actual growth of an association of real men. Theorists assign two great external formative principles to states—

the constant discretionary power of a living lawgiver, and the constant obligation of a written law. An endless and unprofitable controversy has been waged between the patrons of each of the two principles, each side claiming the superiority for the theory which it patronised. But in reality neither theory has ever yet been realised. No despot has ever yet been able to mould a people to any shape he chose; no absolute law has ever been imposed on a people according to the abstract theory of a legislator. Despots can only govern when they represent the will of the people; laws are efficacious only when they are customs. Yet the absolutist theories have at certain periods of history exercised great power, and the notions of the divine right of the prince, and of the abstract and religious obligation of social law, have at different times done much to reconcile nations to arbitrary changes, or to the fetters of a misapplied rule. But no such notion has ever preserved lawgivers or laws that were really out of harmony with the nation which was called upon to obey them. The real despot has ever been what he is now reckoned to be, namely, a representative and organ of the democracy; and law, however absolute in its formulas, has ever been more or less forced into conformity with custom by means of legal fictions.

But the pure constitutional state is a political corporation, including many subordinate, social, religious, or trafficking corporations. It is the great circle within whose circumference the smaller concentrics,—the family, the tribe, the race,—and the excentrics,—the church, the school, the guild, the trading company,—all have their independent existence. It is a corporation compounded of other corporations, which submit to it, not that it may do their proper work, but that it may do those works which are equally necessary for all, may defend all, and administer justice to all, while it leaves each to mind its own particular business.

The democratic atomic state, and the state consisting of organised corporations, both arise from the same primitive source. Both begin from the corporation, the tribe, or the clan. When two tribes unite, they may either amalgamate and become one, the weaker assuming the descent, the religion, the customs, and the name of the stronger; or they may remain distinct, each keeping its own descent, religion, customs, and name, and only uniting with the other for certain purposes, which thus become the political objects of the new state. When the two tribes amalgamate, there is no distinction between the social and the political objects. There is the same unity of customs and of religion as there

is of defence and of justice. But when the tribes only form a political federation, then there is merely a political unity, while the social duality or multiplicity remains. Questions are at once divided into two classes, subject to different jurisdictions. Some are political, belonging to the federal jurisdiction; others are social, belonging to the corporations out of which the state was composed. But in the amalgamated state this distinction is not supposed to exist. There is but one jurisdiction, that of the single enlarged corporation, which has eaten up and assimilated all the smaller corporations of which it was composed. In this democratic state the constant tendency is to simplification. It gradually suppresses all the relations which unite men into corporations, and strives to unite them to the state, not by the patriarchal or corporate bonds of blood, or religion, or customs, but by the political bonds of geographical contiguity and of national aggrandisement.

We are now in a position to define the three elements of political society with which we began. The absolute person is the individual man, out of all relationship, except that of force and fear, with any other man. The absolute corporation is the family, or the association formed after the model of the family upon the primitive conception of paternity and filiation, such association having as a whole, or through its head, absolute power over all its members, and not being responsible to any higher and more comprehensive association. And the absolute state is an amalgamation of such associations generalised and assimilated till all remembrance of family likeness, or of their primitive foundation of paternity and filiation, is lost; till state unity comes to recognise its foundation in local contiguity, in identity of language, nationality, or the like, and the state acknowledges no rights of persons or of corporations except on the ground that it chooses to permit them.

But it is plain that these absolute liberties of person, corporation, and state, are most imperfect and barbarous forms of civil life. Absolute personal liberty is no liberty at all, by reason of the ever-present sense of insecurity and terror which the isolation of the pretended "state of nature" involves. The absolutism of the corporation or its representative, exemplified in the *patria potestas* of the old Romans, was as fatal to personal freedom. It gave the father power of life and death, and uncontrolled corporal chastisement, over his children; it allowed him to modify their condition at pleasure,—to marry and divorce them, to transfer them to other families by adoption, and to sell them as

slaves. And the absolute liberty, or absolutism, of the state is fatal to the freedom both of the person and of the corporation. The despot, as Samuel told the Israelites, takes his subjects for slaves, and uses their possessions as his own. The absolute power of the state, whether committed to the discretion of a monarch, or summed up in an unchangeable code, checks the liberty of society, and is as hurtful to the community as to the persons who compose it.

It is clear that personal freedom is the chief end of society. It is absurd entirely to sacrifice the essential and permanent part, the person, to the temporary and fleeting combination of persons in society, or in the civil state. The man is always more and greater than his work, and to sacrifice the man to the work is an inversion of the order of nature. The universal myth of a primitive golden age of pastoral innocence, and Rousseau's imagination of the state of nature, bear witness to the universal feeling of the irksomeness of the bonds of association, and to the aspiration for personal liberty. Some poetical politicians descant on the delights of the primitive simplicity of manners, when equality was the rule, when each family was a republic, and manners were rude, sincere, and innocent; when no tyranny, no ambition oppressed the masses; when no war or sedition was a propaganda of discord; when law and the breakers of it were equally unknown. In our society, they tell us, each one of our laws imposes on us a separate slavery. Instead of bettering us, each teaches us a new way to evade it. Corruption spreads with refinement; and if we want to have an idea of what virtue is, we must leave the towns, and go and live in the country with the peasants, the children of nature. States have their origin in the dregs of Romulus. Finance is only organised pillage. History tells of nothing but war, conquests, and massacres. "O happy golden age!" they say; "we ought to fly to thee from this gloomy and savage beast which is called the state, and bury ourselves in the country, where we may enjoy a life conformable to nature." The only historical importance of this mythical and poetical view of life consists in its having furnished an ideal aim which has prevented our sacrificing our whole liberty to the corporation and to the state. And it is controversially important only in so far as it is the logical contradiction of the absolutist theories of politicians, who give to the state the power to say and unsay, to make and repeal laws, to dispose without control of the lives and property of the citizens, and who set its authority above that of the moral law.

The virtue of this mythical view of a primitive state of nature is, that it sets before us a worthy aim of our political and social life. Its error is, that it assumes personal freedom to have been historically the primitive condition of our race. Its practical tendency is backwards towards barbarism, instead of forwards. For personal liberty is the last flower and fruit of the tree of political life. The independence of the savage, who has no wealth, no leisure, and no security, but is at all moments the prey of an all-pervading sense of fear, has in it not one of the elements of real freedom. Wealth, leisure, and thought first became possible in the nomadic patriarchal state, when families, under the despotic power of the head of the house, wandered with their flocks over the boundless pastures of Asia. In these associations man did not by any social contract surrender part of his independence to purchase wealth, leisure, and security; but the natural subordination of children to parents worked out, by a kind of organic growth, the primitive types of corporate associations, which gave the first conditions of personal security and freedom. Out of these associations the state gradually arose, either by the confederation of several of them, or by the destruction of all others before the universal pretensions of one. Where this latter step has been taken, it has generally been done under the influence of a theory as false and unpractical as that which takes the personal independence of the savage for the original datum and starting-point of politics. This theory of state absolutism supposes the state to be prior to all associations; it assumes that they must all ask its leave to exist before they have any right to be; and, therefore, that it has a continual right of inspection and supreme control over them. Hence it would follow that freedom is no general right, but a collection of liberties and immunities granted as concessions and compromises by the absolute power.

On the contrary, individual liberty grew up from corporate absolutism; and the process by which it may have done so is not difficult to imagine. When the warrior has established himself in his castle, with his crowd of serfs around him, though he has the personal independence of the savage, yet those who are grouped around him are dependent on him. Among these soon arises the old corporate sentiment of the family or group, with its natural feeling of the immobility of conditions, and the fixity of classes. But partly through the example of the lord, partly through the extended culture in the group, the individual members of it gradually inherit more and more of the tradi-

tions and rights that formerly belonged only to the group, till at last every individual has become in his own person the inheritor of all the varied conditions formerly only found in dispersion, parted amongst the various members of the group. Thus the person has become what is called many-sided; his experience more varied; his faculties more versatile; and his condition less fixed. Man now "sips and goes;" the multiplicity of occasions leaves but a short time for each experience, and the states of life in one and the same person succeed each other rapidly. This variation is found not only in the upper classes, the heirs of the feudal lord, but also in the lower classes, the heirs of the group of serfs. The same man may be successively an artisan, a navigator, a sailor, a soldier, an emigrant: he may enjoy a brief gleam of riotous wealth at Ballarat; lose his luck; work his passage home again; turn his hand again to gardening or carting, but with an acquired amount of acuteness that he never dreamed of at first, and which he is anxious to hand down to his children. This is the fundamental idea of modern culture;—versatility as opposed to the ancient fixity, individualism as opposed to the generalities of the caste. This idea holds good for the culture proper to both classes of modern states,—to the subject of the constitutional state, and the citizen of the democratic state.

However the difference has arisen, it is clear that the progress of politics has impressed upon states a general distinction into two great classes. One of these is federation, wherein the original associations out of which the state grew are preserved; where the chief power is the law, not a dead code imposed once for all, but a living expression of the habits and customs of the corporations, furnished with some constitutional means of continually adapting itself to the changes and requirements of the times. The other is imperial or democratic, where the constituent associations are more or less obliterated, where the masses verge towards an atomic condition, and where the chief authority is discretionary and personal above all law, and vested in the hands either of a monarch, an oligarchy, or a democratic assembly. The law is the natural expression of the habits of a confederation of associations, as the discretionary power of a monarch or democratic assembly is the only possible expression of the will of an atomic mass.

The law by which different races and different assemblages of men have adopted one or the other of the fundamental forms of civil existence is derived partly from local contrasts and imitations, partly from the innate and per-

manent difference of the various races of men, and partly from the accidents of the first amalgamation of the particular state. But whichever form of civil aggregation is adopted, it is always made the instrument of its corresponding kind of personal independence. For there are different kinds of freedom, different feelings of personal liberty,—one kind more akin to the liberty of the corporation, the other to that of the state. Many a man who kicks hardest against the social compulsion of custom, against the tyranny which forces him to do what his next neighbours do, admires a strong government, and thinks France happier under its despotism than England with its constitution. Such a man is comfortable in Paris or Petersburg, in spite of the spies that dog him, because he is not tied down to social observances as he is in London. The greatest admirer of free manners may be also the greatest admirer of the omnipotence of the state; and conversely, the greatest enemy of political despotism may be the greatest slave of social conventionalism.

Moreover, the two tempers are as near akin, and run into each other as easily, as great wit and madness. Witness the manner in which the social slavery of the English middle classes has developed into political subserviency to the mob in New England. Dr. Channing described Boston in 1836 as an intolerant place, where the heavy yoke of opinion often crushed individuality of judgment and action; where a censorship, unfriendly to free creation, was exercised over pulpit and hall alike. "No city in the world is governed so little by police, and so much by mutual inspection, and what is called public sentiment. We stand more in awe of one another than most people. Opinion is less individual, or runs more into masses, and often rules with a rod of iron." This is just the character that Prussians and Frenchmen give the English. In its moral aspect alone, perhaps there is very little difference between the servility and baseness of the American citizen before the imperial will of the sovereign mob, and the social servility of the English middle classes to the society which surrounds them. It is only when looked at in relation to the different political frames in which they are set, that the difference of the two tempers becomes manifest. As personal habits they are near akin, and the social servility of the Englishman becomes the political servility of the American, by the mere locomotion which transfers the person from the shadow of English institutions to that of the American mob.

A sensible observer, Varnhagen von Ense, said that Eng-

lish manners and customs were a good school to teach a man to force his way through them to real freedom. But he preferred French manners and customs, because, he said, they gave without trouble something of that freedom which must be the result of a victory in England. He only half saw that our servitude was the necessary sacrifice to liberty, whereas the French freedom consisted, as an excellent French writer says, in "*des franchises anarchiques, qui sanctionnent la servitude en la rendant inévitable.*" Mr. Mill accurately states the difference when he says that French manners tend to individualism, English to social subordination. "Foreigners generally set down as one of our distinctions the awe in which we stand of opinion; the want of freedom of speech; the predominance of caution and calculation over impulse." Such a complaint sounds strange in the mouths of men who in their own country can only talk politics with closed doors, and who fear the spy under every companion's spectacles. But the charge is true. Opinions which in France neither government nor society cares about are here made party questions, and create for themselves associations to support them; thus we get, besides our political parties, parties in religion, literature, art, and social questions. And though we are free to choose our party, and free to migrate from one to another, we are not altogether at liberty to be independent of all. We are expected always to belong to some party, and to be more or less faithful to it while we belong to it. The independent member of Parliament is a very proverb of isolated weakness and eccentric whimsicality; so it is with the independent member of society. Respectability looks askance at him; critics point their pens to prick him. He is a voluntary outcast, a self-banished wanderer, who refuses to obey the customs of his class.

Thus the Englishman, free in the face of government, is not free in the face of society. And he is free in the face of government precisely because he is not free in the face of society. Government can only be absolute in proportion as all subordinate corporations are broken up; and as these are destroyed, men are freed from their yoke, and society becomes resolved into atoms, into individuals not organised into corporations. Society protects itself against the absolutism of the state by insisting that no man shall stand by himself, but that each subject shall belong to his own group. Thus our English parties are the badge of our political liberty, as our right to change our party whenever we choose is the badge of our personal liberty. While we are in a

party, we owe allegiance to it, and are bound to keep within its limits, and to sacrifice part of our freedom to it. This often involves considerable hardship. Many a man, without any vocation to turn reformer, or remodeller of his party, only belongs to it because there is no better party to choose; if he could have his choice, he would abjure many of its strait-laced maxims and effete traditions. But he is obliged to put up with them, or the tyranny of party makes itself felt in a way that cannot be conceived by those who dwell in the atomic agglomerations of Continental despotisms.

We can trace this custom in the old English frank-pledge, or free promise,—a rule by which all neighbours became mutually bound to one another for good behaviour. This universal bail was strictly observed; and thus the severity of the social police supplied for the laxity and imperfection of the law, and for the weakness of the magistrates and kings. The rule was, that every man in the kingdom must belong to some thane's court, or enter himself into some tithing, to which he became attached, so that he could not leave it without license from the head of the tithing. Then, if any man committed a crime, his district was obliged either to produce him, or else to pay his fine. Thus the whole nation was under sureties, and every man was bound for and to his neighbours.

This system, more favourable in its crude form to security than to liberty, has left its mark on our laws, and still more on our manners. The whole system of bail, by which sureties make themselves responsible for another person's performing or abstaining from all kinds of acts, is a case in point. In obedience to this social bond, the debtor surrenders his body to prison; the ruffian keeps the peace towards his wife, whom he has hitherto been in the habit of beating, or towards his friend, whom he has threatened; the disappointed man, tired of life, and having failed once to finish it, does not attempt to do so again because he has bound himself in ten pounds, and two friends have bound themselves in five pounds each, that he shall not. He is taken out of the hand of the law and committed to that of society, which has so mysterious a power over him that he puts up with life rather than break his promise to his sureties.

The frank-pledge is an institution which can only thrive where society is strong and government weak, where the people will not let their governors do all for them, but will associate together to do much for themselves. And this old jealousy of strong governments still remains among us; we

change our rulers from time to time, lest they should become too used to rule; we keep in our own hands as much power as we can manage. We do not commit the peace of society simply to the police. We make every man a policeman against the felon and law-breaker; the officer may claim the assistance of any bystander; all are bound to join in a hue and cry. One of our oldest laws obliges all Englishmen to join in repelling an invasion. The defence of the law of the kingdom is not exclusively intrusted to its official administrators. The people are the normal and rightful executors of the law, and the police are merely their servants and lieutenants *ad hoc*.

Perhaps this is true of all societies; but it makes a great difference whether the consciousness of the fact is ever living and present as a motive of action, or whether it is a mere antiquarian theory of the origin of power. In the latter case, people soon become used to accept laws imposed on them from without, which it is the duty of the lawgiver, and not theirs, to see kept. However just and disinterested the lawgiver may be,—however devoted he may be to the interests of the people and oblivious of his own, he must always in such a case seem a stranger to them, and his laws must appear like a formal rule, which it is no one's duty but his to see observed. Such a people may receive liberty as a gift from their legislator, but they are not a free people, because they have not the well-spring of liberty in themselves. Those alone are really free who deserve liberty by creating, developing, preserving it, who look at the law as an emanation from their own consciences, an expression of their own habits and customs, of their interests, their needs, and their moral judgments. Here each person is bound to his neighbour to keep the law, and to see it kept; there the legislator alone is accountable both for the making and the keeping of the law. Hence in constitutional society, where habits and customs have the force of law, the license for individuals cannot be so large as in an atomic democracy, where no law has any force except under the eye and hand of the supreme power of the state.

There are, then, two different sentiments of personal independence,—one more fitted for constitutional, the other for democratic states. As an example, we may mention the difference between the English and the American ideas of liberty. With the Americans it is not security, but strength; not self-government, but participation in the government of others; power, not independence; aggression, not safety. Their state is absolute, their sovereign despotic and irre-

sistible. There is no immunity, no exemption from supreme control, no matter so private but that the state has a right to interfere in it. American liberty is not so much impatient of control as eager to exercise it. Whereas the English idea of liberty is independence, jealousy of interference, and the security of certain spheres and conditions of life from all public inquiry and interference of government.

The reason of this is, that in England each class has its own separate duties and privileges, which it is anxious to secure against the encroachments of the state; and it has the power, in the corporate machinery of the polity, to effect this security. But in atomic societies the state is the only corporation, the only authority, the only aggregate of forces. There is no machinery at hand for limiting or resisting its power; and the only consolation or protection men can devise for themselves consists in sharing in the exercise of the power to which they cannot set bounds. In other words, the participation of power becomes their only security for freedom. In such societies, therefore, men do not claim privileges, or *privatæ leges*, laws peculiar to the several groups or classes, nor definite liberties, but sovereignty, or abstract liberty. Thus sovereignty of the people, ending in despotism, is a postulate and a characteristic of atomic society.

The feeling in America has grown up from the mechanism of the society and government; but in other nations the same sentiment seems inherent in the race. From the earliest periods of history the Celts have been represented to us as a people with many qualities which are solid, and more which are brilliant, but as deficient in those which make nations really great. Unattached to their native soil, they despised a country life, and from the first congregated in towns and villages; but in spite of this association, their political constitution was imperfect. Without any deep recognition of national unity, the individual communities were deficient in singleness of purpose and steady control, in earnest public spirit and consistency of aim. The only organisation to which they were suited was a military one, in which the bonds of discipline relieved the person from the troublesome necessity of self-control. Their personal bravery was unimpeachable; their impetuous temperament was accessible to every impression; their great intelligence was dissipated by their volatility; their boundless vanity led them to ostentation, to perpetual discord, to aversion from discipline and order, and to an utter want of perseverance. Good soldiers, but bad citizens, the Celts have shaken all states and founded none. Every where ready to march; pre-

ferring movable property to landed estate, and gold to every thing else; soldiers by profession, even were it only for pillage or hire, and constantly occupied in fighting and in their so-called feats of heroism,—they dispersed themselves from Ireland to Asia Minor. But all their enterprises melted away like snow in spring; they nowhere created a great state, or developed a distinctive culture of their own. Willing to accept culture as a discipline from without, and destitute of internal organisation, they have ever presented the right materials for a democratic despotism, such as they are now suffering in France.

M. Gobineau seeks for the cause of the difference between constitutional and despotic states solely in blood and in race. The Italian historian Ferrari, with still less reason, seeks for it solely in the geographical and polemical relations of states. He holds that states which spring up round a preponderating capital become democratic, while those where there is no such preponderating town become federative and constitutional. Moreover, he thinks that the neighbourhood of a democratic state necessarily determines the next state to be federative. For instance, the neighbourhood of democratic and despotic France will always force Italy to be federative, and to refuse preponderance to any one capital; and the neighbourhood of the Russian despotism will always have the same effect upon Germany, and will prevent both Berlin and Vienna from ever becoming the capitals of a democratic empire. Wherever two men contend, he says, one attacks tradition in the interest of democracy, the other defends it as a contract. And where two nations contend, one always verges to the democratic, the other to the federative form. Thus contraries always provoke the existence of contraries. A strong federation calls into being an empire to oppose it, and an empire calls into being a federation.

There is no more exclusive truth in Ferrari's system of mechanical counteractions than in Gobineau's theory of blood. A much more probable account of the differences between the two kinds of state is to be found in the original circumstances of its formation. The mediæval European state, from which we derive our feeling of personal liberty, is founded on feudalism, and feudalism on conquest. Without feudalism no such state has ever come to be. Poland was never organised; Russia is still "Asiatic;" Hungary, because it was founded on conquest, though the conquerors were not of Teutonic race, became at once assimilated to the Teutonic societies. These conquests did not at once found states; they broke up society into independent groups around the

feudal castle. There was no notion of a supreme, all-comprehensive sovereignty. The feudal lord was the highest authority, and *feuds* between lords became the highest expression of the antagonisms of feudal life. The functions which are now assumed by the state were then performed by every family and group for itself. Taxation was as local as the police; there was no imperial organisation either for the defence or for the government of the country. The history of the first crusade exhibits Europe as a continent destitute of state-government. There was no authority above the local lords. The king was only a noble among the nobles, with no authority over them, and only able to interfere with them by feud. His power was like theirs, and extended only over his own domain and over his own dependents. Hence the Arragonese could say to their king: "We, each of us being as good as you are altogether better than you." Thus the society out of which modern European states have grown consisted of independent corporations, all of which had their own rights before the sovereign state came into existence. When they coalesced to form a state, they relinquished nothing of their individuality, none of their immunities, but only gave up to the central authority those functions which were common to all the corporations alike. Thus these states were originally constitutional, and would have remained so but for accidental and external influences.

The Church first favoured the development of the sovereign states as a remedy against the lawless pugnacity of the feudal groups. She accepted from the Jews the notion of an anointed king, and thus elevated by a divine sanction a power which the fragmentary society of the time was not able to develop out of itself. But as the newly-formed sovereign power gained strength, it set its heart on independence, and welcomed the discovery of the Roman law, which at the best would have been an alien custom, imposed from outside, but in fact taught the kings that the state was the first thing; that law was a code to be imposed upon the people, not to be the expression of the people's customs; that the ruler was the master and moulder of his people, and his people the wax or the clay in his hands.

It is true that the Roman law had originally sprung from a people among whom corporations were the original element of the state; but Rome, in opposition to Greece, was from the first the great ancient example of the neutralisation of the corporation by the state. Both in Greece and Italy, the clan or community of common descendants was based on the household, and out of the clan the state was

formed. But while under the weaker political development of Greece the clan maintained itself against the state as a corporate power far down into historical times, the state in Italy made its appearance at once in complete efficiency. In its presence the clans were neutralised. The community was one not of clans but of citizens. And conversely, the individual attained, relatively to the clan, an inward independence and freedom of personal development far earlier and more completely in Greece than in Rome. But still political freedom, even in Rome, was attained through the corporation. The Italian resolutely surrendered his own personal will for the sake of freedom, and learned to obey his father, that he might know how to obey the state. If his subjection marred individual development, it gave a patriotism such as the Greek never knew, and worked out a national unity, and a constitution based on self-government, which at last gained supremacy over the Greek and barbarian world. But the Roman legislation, which was imposed from without on the new European kingdoms, was not the old law of their republican federation, but the more modern law of their imperial subjection. The original Roman immunities had been crushed out by the preponderance of the foreign elements admitted into the state; the original distinctions of the Roman classes and corporations had been ground to atoms under the wheels of revolution, and the elements of Roman society were no longer social aggregations, but individual men, with no more permanent relations to each other than those of the dry grains of sand in the desert. But European society was still organised in corporations at the period when the legists of Bologna told Frederic that by this law all the property of the people was his, and that he might take what he liked; and that what he left them, either of property or of liberty, was a concession from him, not a right of theirs. Hence the European populations were slow in learning to see through the spectacles of the civil law. They have, however, learnt at last. France is Roman, that is, imperial and democratic; Italy follows the Celto-Roman France of 1789. In Germany the two principles are at war. England alone maintains the ground of the original federative or corporate state of mediæval Europe.

Besides these causes of the choice of form of government, we must also reckon the principle of imitation. Governments seek to propagate their kind. England patronises attempts to constitutionalise, however absurd they may be. The French revolutionary wars have been justly called a propaganda of armed doctrines, as their object was to provoke

each state to dissolve into a democratic despotism like that of France. But politics are imitated, not only by those friendly to them, but frequently also by those opposed to them; and this from the nature of the case. The symmetry of Ferrari's doctrine of the *raison d'état* required him to say, that in all cases opposition of interests caused opposition both in the form and spirit of states; that not only does democratic unity in one provoke federative multiplicity in its neighbour, but that dissimulation and secrecy in one government force the government that opposes it to fight with the contrary weapons of openness and truth. This is clearly against the nature of things: dissimulation provokes dissimulation, and only occasionally elicits truth, not for its own sake, but as the most successful species of dissimulation. The falsehood of Philip II. of Spain never elicited any notable amount of truth from the cabinets which he was always trying to deceive. Secrecy also naturally provokes secrecy; a secret government makes a secret opposition inevitable. So well was this truth known to Machiavelli, the typical legislator of despotism, that though he gave his government unity, secrecy, irresistible power, and the right of interfering in all cases, he made an exception in favour of a tribunician power, and permitted the tribunes of the people to attack the government in order to point out its defects. All governments imply an opposition; it is the natural and inevitable balance of our wills and minds. The government that would destroy all opposition cannot succeed in doing so any more than it can change the fundamental laws of thought. All that repression can do is to force the opposition to assume the shape of a secret association. On the 11th of March last, the French minister of foreign affairs explained to the Diplomatic Corps the causes of the recent tumults among the students of Paris. Among other things, he said that the secret societies, of which so much was said, existed under all governments. This was very unjust to governments differing in idea from the democratic despotism of France, which admits of no free opposition, and therefore compels such opposition, right or wrong, to be secret. The government of England, where the opposition is as public as the executive, has nothing to fear from secret societies. The whole justification of secrecy is taken away, and associations can only remain secret either from a puerile love of mystery, or from a criminal intention. But the secret form which the legitimate opposition to a despotic government is obliged to assume is in itself neither puerile nor criminal, but a necessary result of the secrecy and the omnipotence of the govern-

ment. No doubt such secrecy is in the highest degree morally dangerous and evil to the members of the secret society ; but in itself, without reference to the temptations which it may occasion, the secret opposition is every bit as legal, as moral, and as necessary, as the secret despotism which it opposes.

Such, then, are the chief causes which determine nations to choose between the two forms of corporate federation with legality, and democratic aggregation with discretionary power. Both are chosen ultimately with a view to secure a certain personal independence,—the corporate independence of differentiated ranks, or the envious individual independence of democratic equality. It is clear, then, that both the corporate state and state-unity contribute, each in its own way, to personal independence ; and hence it follows that the true aim of politics is to harmonise the three elements of the state,—the free individual, the free corporation, and the free state,—in such stability of equilibrium as shall leave to each the greatest amount of free scope that is possible without injury to the others. There must be some combination of the absolute corporation, the absolute state, and the absolute person, from the harmony of which the truest personal freedom arises. Taken singly by itself, each of these elements characterises a barbarous kind of existence. The absolute individual is only found in savage life ; the absolute corporation in primitive patriarchal society ; the absolute state in Oriental despotisms. The same elements, taken two and two together, present forms little favourable to ideal liberty. An absolute corporation that becomes a state, like the East India Company ; an absolute corporation that sums up its power in its personal head, like a secret society, or the Roman republic under a dictator ; an absolute state merging in a corporation, like the Venetian aristocracy ; an absolute state merging into a personal executive power, or democratic despotism, like that of France or America ; an absolute person pretending to merge himself in a corporation, such as we see in the *octroyé* constitutions of despotic governments ; or an absolute person surrounding himself with the appliances of state, like Augustus veiled behind the republican forms of Rome ;—all are most imperfect forms of government, when viewed in relation to their effects upon personal freedom.

In the ideal state, personal liberty becomes an element, not as the original datum from which the organisation arises, but as the aspiration, sometimes taking the form of a reminiscence, to which it tends. The corporation comes in, not merely as an aggregation tolerated in the social department,

like the mercantile firms and religious orders tolerated in despotic countries, but as a fundamental element of state, as the historical datum out of which the state arose, and as the kind of part into which the whole is still divisible. Here, in consequence, the corporation has not merely a social, but also a political significance and weight, like the various "interests" which have influence in the English constitution. And lastly, in the ideal state, the state itself is neither the original datum nor the ultimate end, but the great instrument *sine quâ non* for the security both of corporate and of personal freedom.

Among corporations the Church is the most ideally perfect. It is founded, like the family, on the ideas of paternity and filiation. It is a brotherhood, united by common religious rites, like the *φρατρία* of the Greeks, or the *gens* of the Latins. It is a guild, like that of the metal-workers or musicians, who claimed descent from Tubal or Jubal. It is a school of philosophy, like any of those which traced their descent from Pythagoras, Plato, or Aristotle; and it contains under it a multitude of subordinate corporations, in its dioceses and parishes, its orders, its religious houses, its hospitals, and associations of beneficence. The Church is also, but in a secondary and imitative sense, a state, because of its unity, because of the political ascendancy it has often acquired, and because of the political position of its head as sovereign of an independent state. And both as corporation and as state it has experienced the action of those laws which determine the relations between states and corporations. The law of opposition has led it to favour the formation of monarchies, that it might get rid of the anarchy of the feudal lords, and to ally itself with independent and federative municipalities, that it might deliver itself from the danger of an encroaching monarchy. The law of imitation has led it to copy the system of the states from which the danger came; and from Boniface VIII., himself a lawyer, to Leo X., it claimed the same absolutism for itself that the civilians claimed for the emperor. Again, the same division holds good in the elements of the Church and in those of the State. There is the individual, the corporation in the Bishops and parishes, and the state in the Papal supremacy. The freedom of the individual is a reminiscence of primitive times, when all offices were elective, and all important acts were transacted in common; and it is also an aspiration for the future, in such ecclesiastical politicians as Rosmini and Gioberti. The ecclesiastical corporation and the ecclesiastical monarchy have also their parties, and their recog-

nised position in the Church. And perhaps, as in the ideal state, so in the Church also, the best temporal condition of Christendom is to be found in the due balance and harmony of the freedom of individual, of corporation, and of monarchy. The partisans and defenders of the exclusive preponderance of either element may be within their rights as Christians, without being in the right as ecclesiastical politicians. It is only in the harmony and in the stable equilibrium of the three elements,—the absolute individual, the absolute corporation, and the absolute state,—that government can be reconciled with liberty, either in ecclesiastical or in civil society.

DANTE'S PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE.

RATIONALISM and superstition are alike in this, that they confound the natural and the supernatural. Rationalism explains supernatural influences as effects of obscure natural laws. Superstition elevates the effects of these obscure natural laws into manifestations of a supernatural order. Religion occupies the place between, and is neither superstitious nor rationalist. The Christian accepts with faith the revelation that a certain washing, with certain ceremonies, is a sacrament, and is the channel of supernatural grace. For him the fact is an isolated one, and has no further results. It does not lead him to attribute any sacred character to his usual ablutions, except so far as they may serve subjectively to remind him of his baptism, and the duties that follow from it. The superstitious man, on the contrary, as soon as he hears that one washing has this supernatural force, goes on to attribute a similar power to other washings, makes laws about washing the hands and feet and face, about respecting the purity of rivers, about ceremonies to be used in drinking, and so on, as if water were the most sacred thing in the world, and as if there had been implanted in it from the Creation a spiritual as well as material force of ablution ; while the rationalist explains

away the whole doctrine of baptism as a misapprehension, as a confusion between a type and a reality, and as a supposition that because clean hands might be a good symbol of a clean heart, therefore cleanliness of hands has become an efficient cause of cleanliness of heart.

Rationalism has its proper function as the rightful opponent of the superstitious generalisation of the sacramental parts of religion. There is a certain number of formulas, partly verbal, partly material, which God has appointed to be the vehicles of certain supernatural graces; these formulas are arbitrarily selected, and the operation which they are forced to accomplish is one that is wholly beside their own nature. If these formulas were naturally vehicles of the grace, a half formula would convey a half grace, and similar formulas might be expected to convey similar graces. New sacraments might be discovered with the same facility as new machinery is invented. But when once it is understood that the sacraments are isolated facts, having no parallels in nature, "without father, without mother, without descent," then we can easily see why the least alteration in the formula does not alter, but annihilates, the grace. Thus the sacramental tradition of the Church, when rightly understood, gives no ground whatever for the superstitious generalisation which has often been made of it. At one time the power of the priest over the sacramental elements of bread and wine was supposed to be only one example of the inherent powers of the human voice; and the wizard expected by his magical words to operate changes in nature like those which the sacramental words of the priest operated in the elements. Physical science was deeply tinged with this superstitious generalisation of an isolated sacramental fact, when even Roger Bacon, cautious experimentalist though he was, could say that "words have the greatest power; and all miracles have been performed by words. The word is the chief operation of the rational soul; therefore, when words are uttered with profound thought, and great desire, and right intention, and strong confidence, they have great power, . . . for nature obeys the thoughts of the soul; . . . and the power of the soul is strongly impressed and incorporated in the voice. And the air, shaped by the voice, and having a strong impress of the rational soul, may itself be altered by this power, and may go on to alter the things it touches. . . . The four elements of power are, the voice that gives shape to the air, the rational soul, the body, and the constellation; by these four an unspeakable quantity of change may be produced in the

air, and the things it contains, if we choose the season of a fitting constellation, and strongly direct our intention, our desire, and our hope." Then he explains the folly of magic, which, according to him, expects to perform its wonders "by a mere verbal formula casually uttered, out of the season of the right constellation, without any strong thought of the soul, or confident desire, or certain intention, but at the will of the speaker." This, he says, is "folly, magic, old woman's fable, not worth the consideration of the wise, and can do nothing, except the devil work hiddenly. But if the four powers aforesaid (word, soul, body, and star) concur with the five conditions of soul (deep thought, vehement desire, fixed intention, firm hope, and good or bad will), and with good or bad complexion of body, then certainly an alteration will take place, whatever we call it, fascination or any other name."*

It would be easy to prove that this superstitious physical science was much supported by its supposed analogy with the doctrine of the Eucharist. The common conjuring formula, *hocus pocus*, which we have seen in a book of the fourteenth century, though we cannot put our hands on the reference, is clearly a corruption of the sacred words of consecration, and Wiclyffe blasphemously identifies the two formulas. Thus the sacramental doctrine, inassailable in itself, became assailable through the superstitious generalisation which it suffered; though this generalisation probably began with the best intentions, with the notion of conforming all thoughts, all principles, and all science to religion, and was therefore carried on with bland confidence and with pious enthusiasm, till it became bound up with the faith of the sacraments. Then came the rationalists, led on by Francis Bacon, first with halting and hesitating steps in his *Century X.* of observations on natural history, then with greater security and confidence in the *Novum Organum* (lib. i. aph. lxxxv. and lxxxvii.) and the *Parasceve ad Historiam naturalem et experimentalem*, where he utterly and finally rejected all the superstitious tales of ceremonial magic as old woman's fables, and warned his readers to examine the pretensions even of natural magic with the greatest severity. He made short work of Roger Bacon's impressions and alterations of the air, influences of the stars, or sympathetic motion. He demonstrated that the sacramental generalisation which issued in the magical theory of physical science was a mere delusion and misapprehension, and thus he succeeded not only in destroying

* *Opus tertium*, c. xxvi. pp. 96-98.

the false science which he directly attacked, but also in obscuring for a time the true doctrine which was regarded as the parent of that science, and which he therefore indirectly combated. But, in truth, the seven sacraments, taken as seven isolated facts, selected by the free choice of God to be raised above nature, and to become the vehicles of forces which nature knows not of, have nothing whatever to do with physical science, are not only out of its sphere, but also out of analogy with it. They can stand better alone than with the false support of the magical theories of physical science.

But the ethical sciences stand on a different footing. Our moral powers are incomplete without religion; and therefore, if a religion is not given to them, they are forced to make a religion for themselves, which almost by necessity issues in superstition. The great want in ethics is a better means of suddenly changing evil habits. Ethical science only recognises one way of doing this, and tells us that habits can only be supplanted and conquered by contrary habits. But the good habit which is to supplant the evil one is generally more difficult to form than the original bad habit was. The man is older and more rigid, the soul is already occupied; and therefore, in nine cases out of ten, the natural changes of character are not brought about through the gradual formation of contrary habits by a constant attention and an intense act of will, but through the gradual dying out of the passions upon which the old habits were founded. But the soul is not content with this; it sighs for some power that can effect a sudden change; and such a power is religion. One or two so-called religious sects, like the Stoics or the Pelagians, might have been content to cast aside all hopes of changing the moral habits of mankind, except naturally, by the patient reformation of manners. But in general all religions put forward a claim to the possession of a short way of getting at their great object, the sudden and complete eradication of evil habits. They all preach some initiation, some new birth, some sacrament, which confers a supernatural power, and renders that easy which is so difficult to nature. Christianity has the true means, while the pretences of other religions are false. And the great evidence of the truth of Christianity in early ages was its superiority to all other religions in this respect. When its converts were all adults, its power to change the character suddenly was a matter of daily experience. Other religions made the same claims, and could go some way in establishing them; but the superiority of Christianity was

overwhelming. The Egyptian magicians also turned their rods to serpents, but the serpent of Moses devoured them all.

Physical science is complete in itself, and has no true or natural relation with the sacramental idea; yet, in spite of the alien nature of the two things, the philosopher's stone was to be a sacrament of chemical force, and the elixir of life was to be a sacrament of health and longevity. Ethical science, on the other hand, is weak till it is completed by the supplement of religious force. It needs a sacrament to effect that sudden reformation of character which nature wants to have done, but has no means of doing. Hence the sacramental idea has a true relation and a close connexion with all branches of ethical science, and in all of them men are naturally driven to seek for shorter roads and more compendious methods of reformation and change than nature affords them.

Among the more obscure parts of ethics, we may class the chivalrous philosophy of love, of which Dante is the great hierophant. The aim of this philosophy is not to produce a good man, but a gentleman. Its object is the reformation of habits with which Christianity, as such, does not meddle, because they sin not against morals, but against manners, and do not make a man wicked, but only make him a boor. On these defects of culture Christianity has little direct influence, for it was not intended to correct them: it leaves the barbarian in his barbarism; it leads him to heaven, not to the courts of princes or the schools of philosophers. Still these defects of culture are defects which ought to be corrected. In the age of Dante, when society was emerging from barbarism, these rough habits, though felt to be detestable, were yet so ingrained in men's nature, that it was the most difficult thing possible to cast them off. Hence men sought some philosopher's stone, some elixir, that would act upon them with sacramental force, and would change them from boors to gentlemen, from rude wretches to civil and polished citizens, without needing that gradual and patient self-education which is the natural but tiresome means of working the change.

For this purpose Dante must have carefully studied the psychological resources of the old philosophers, who were the theologians of antiquity. It is uncertain whether he ever read Plato. But he certainly must have heard of Plato's two treatises upon love,—the youthful and fiery *Phædrus*, and the more mature *Banquet*; for he has evidently copied, not the form or the details, but the intentions, of the two

treatises in his *Vita Nuova* and his *Convito*. In the former treatise, the object of the poet is to point out a new and short road to a transformation of character; to effect an alteration in the soul by means of external applications, and to perform without labour, or with less labour, a task which by the ordinary methods of self-education we should find impossible, or only possible with immense exertion. In the latter treatise, the poet, matured in intellect, and undeceived concerning the degree of change that can be worked in the man by the means recommended in the former book, does not so much seek a medicine that shall transform the soul, as an external complement of the incompleteness and want which the soul still experiences. The *Convito* is the philosophy of the end, and of the means of becoming united to the end.

But the philosophy of the *Vita Nuova* is youthful and ardent, and seeks to work a mystic transformation in the soul, by means which have thus much in common with the ecclesiastical sacraments, that their operation is obscure and inexplicable. It is a philosophy that leads us to shut our eyes, and try any means that can be proved to have an irresistible effect on the soul, in hopes that what is so mighty in immediate effect may also have a lasting influence, and may work an abiding change. The philosophy of the *Convito*, on the contrary, is mature, peaceful, contemplative, leading to the ecstasy, not of passion, but of thought, and tending to wrap the man not in himself, but in love of art, of philosophy, and of politics.

The Phædrus of Plato is in the main a treatise upon the transforming power of ecstasy or madness. According to Plato, there are four kinds of divine mania,—that of Apollo, who gives prophetic inspiration; that of Bacchus, who gives mystic ecstasy; that of the Muses, who inspire the poet; and that of Aphrodite and Eros, who give the ecstasy of love. Of these the last is the highest and mightiest in its effects. From all of these manias, “when granted by Divine bounty,” the greatest blessings arise. Tradition testifies that such a madness is more noble than sound sense, as that which comes from God is more noble than that which proceeds from men. The proof which Plato finds of the beneficial effect of the ecstasy of love is derived simply from its mighty effects. When a man properly initiated, he says, sees a beautiful form, he at first shudders, and terrors come over him; then, as he looks steadfastly, he reverences it as a god. And when he has beheld it, after shuddering, a change, a sweating, and unusual heat come over him. For having received the ema-

nation of beauty through his eyes, he has become heated, and the wings of his soul are refreshed, their pores are opened, and the places where they grow are softened, and the feathers begin to burst forth again. The whole soul boils and throbs violently; it is relieved from pain and filled with joy; or, at other times, it is tormented by the strangeness of the affection, and becomes frenzied, frantic, and sleepless, and wanders about, longing to see once more the beautiful object, the sight of which presently cures all these pains. Hence the beautiful being becomes not only the soul's god, but the physician of its deepest griefs. In the presence of this beauty, the vicious part of the soul is humbled and lays aside its insolence; and it swoons through fear whenever the beautiful object is perceived. Thus from that time the soul of the lover serves the beautiful thing with simple reverence and awe. Plato's doctrine was founded on the double nature of love. The bitter-sweet compound,—of which a mediæval poet sang,

“An amor dolor sit,
An dolor amor sit,
Utrumque nescio :
Hoc unum sentio,
Jucundus dolor est,
Si dolor amor est,”—

was attributed to the double soul;—the pleasure which beauty gave, to the good part,—the awe and fear which it inspired, to the bad. And the encouragement of both these parts of love, the pleasure and the pain, was supposed to be equally necessary for the soul; the pleasure to develop the good, the pain to repress the evil.

This doctrine of Plato's *Phædrus*, which is founded on the natural mysticism and the sacramental theory of the psychological parts of the old Pagan religions, is also the recipe given by Dante in the *Vita Nuova* for the genesis of the gentleman.

Plato's doctrine of divine mania is clearly that of the orgies of the Pagan mysteries. The orgies were of three kinds,—those of Bacchus, those of the Bona Dea, and those of Eros: the excitement of wine, the excitement of nervous and muscular agitation, and the excitement of passion. The earliest traces of this doctrine that we have found are in the earliest extant religious books of Paganism. In the *Sama Veda*, Soma, the chief god, is in one aspect simply a vast ocean of glorified rum. When the earliest Brahmins took the stalks of the moon-plant (*Asclepias*—sugar-cane would have done as well), pressed out the juice, left it to

ferment, and then drank it, its effects were a marvel to them. When, in the first stage of tipsiness, it exhilarated them, and gave them a fresh flow of thought, they imagined that they had found an intelligence akin to their own in the liquid they were draining off, and they sang, "The radiance of the moon-plant upholds the intellect, which has been distilled from it."* And when they recovered from the overpowering effects of the further stages of drunkenness, they recognised in Soma a might superior to their own,—the might of the supreme intelligence, the lord, ruler, and maker of the world; and they sang, "Soma is the father of intelligences, the father of heaven, of fire, of the sun, of Indra and of Vishnu. The great overflowing indestructible sea of moon-plant juice proceeded forth in the beginning, creating and producing all beings. It is the lord of the world—the purifying spirit."† It is the "supporter of the heavens, the strengthener of the gods, the intoxicator—the green fugacious herb."‡ "With vibrating motion he inspires songs and hymns, sending forth a flood of sound. He sees the inward soul, and is the rainer of felicity."§ It does not seem difficult to comprehend the childish wonder of the first Brahmins at the might of the intoxicating draught, nor the steps by which it was made the symbol and impersonation of the great soul of the world, which to the pantheistic Brahmin was the chief and universal deity—the all-victorious Indian Bacchus. It was by this draught that the mystic communion between the human soul and the great Pan was established; drunkenness was made a religious work; and from that time the language of drinking has continued to be the secret language of Oriental mystical theology. Grave pundits still comment upon the Anacreontics of Hafiz, and extract out of the most roaring couplets the deepest mystical allusions to the union of the soul with the great spirit of the universe. The second orgiastic ecstasy is that of nervous and muscular excitement. This was the mania of the self-flagellating, self-mutilating votaries of Baal and Cybele, and still exists in the dancing dervishes of the East, and in the swooning, barking, shaking, roaring revivalists of the West. We have it in the table-turners and rappers, and in all the epileptic degradations of the American spiritualists. And the third, the mania of passion and affection, still exists as a religious ceremony, in various degrees of impurity, in India, and Africa, and the islands of the Pacific. In a finer form, it still lies at the root of the mysticism of the Arabs, who teach that the degrees of

* Sama Veda, Prapathaka vi. Dasati 7.

† Ibid. Das. 7.

‡ Ibid. Prap. vi. Das. 4.

§ Ibid. Adhyaya 5.

divine love are friendship, love, desire, ardour, ecstasy, enthusiasm, fury. Its language finds highest expression in the Song of Solomon, and in the Christian commentators on that book, who make it the foundation of the Christian view of religious ecstasy, as St. Thomas, 1^{ma} 2^æ, q. 28, art. iii. But the Christian view of ecstasy must not for an instant be confounded, or even too closely compared, with that of the Pagans. The Pagan valued his intoxication because it completely absorbed the mind, took away its self-mastery, and handed it over to the supremacy of some external power, from which he expected a lasting effect upon the soul. The Christian, on the contrary, curses all such intoxication because it is in effect a voluntary surrender of the helm of the soul into the hands of some external power, which may be good, but is more probably evil. Nevertheless there is some distant analogy between the Pagan doctrine which seeks some unknown and magical power of transformation behind the terrible force of such a mania, and the Christian doctrine which discovers the real transforming power in the secret, quiet, and peaceful operation of the sacraments.

Now it was a mania like that of Plato's Phædrus, and having some analogy to the Pagan orgies, that was the magical means recommended by Dante in his *Vita Nuova* to bring about the transformation of the barbarian into the gentleman. It is absurd to look at the *Vita Nuova*, as Mr. Martin does, as a mere record of an unsuccessful courtship. A tale of disappointed love, in which the writer passes over, without the slightest allusion, the lady's marriage to another, as a matter wholly irrelevant to the subject in hand, would be a moral as well as a literary monstrosity. Yet Dante was so far from allowing Beatrice's marriage to Bardi to alter his tone towards her, that the most fastidious critic finds it impossible to guess at what particular period of the pretended courtship it took place. In the whole book there is not a trace of the sentimental grief which speaks in the old ballad, "her heart it is another's; it never can be mine." Nowhere is there the trace of a wish of Dante's to appropriate Beatrice's heart to himself. If, then, the *Vita Nuova* is not an idealised version of a courtship, what is it? It is Dante's version of Plato's Phædrus, and the adaptation of Plato's doctrine to the new philosophy of life which had been first proclaimed, thirty years before, by Guido Guinicelli, "Love and the gentle heart are all one thing;" "Before the gentle heart in nature's scheme love was not, nor the gentle heart ere love." On these texts Dante founded his treatise of the new philosophy of chivalry, which taught how, through a

course of Platonic mania, the rough soldier or uncourteous citizen might be transformed, as if by magic, into a "gentleman."

Like Plato, Dante's system required a mania that should intoxicate souls, and exhibit its power by its mastery over minds. Dante did not recommend the madness for any pleasure that might be found in it, but simply for its purifying effect upon the soul. The Sapphic thrill that he describes is only valuable in his system because it is the evidence that the heart is being transformed through love from churlishness to gentleness. He only looks within; he does not pause to consider how to gain the beloved object. It is not the possession of that object, but the transfiguration of his own soul, that he seeks. The object itself counts for nothing, except so far as it works this effect. Hence the object may be either real or imaginary, either lent or given, either one's own or another's; for it does not signify whether we light our lamp at our own fire or at some one else's. No matter whence we borrow the flame, so long as it burns. As soon as the fire is kindled within us, the source where we kindled it is of no further use, and may be dispensed with.

"God gives us love; something to love
He lends us; but when love is grown
To ripeness, that on which it throve
Falls off, and love is left alone."

So far from Dante seeking the possession of Beatrice, he tells us, in the early part of his book, that the mere sight of her was too much for him. The ladies who witnessed his confusion in her presence marvelled what his meaning might be, and asked him, "Unto what end lovest thou this lady, seeing her mere presence overwhelms thee? Tell us; for of a surety the end and aim of such a love must be of the strangest." Dante replied that hitherto he had aimed at being saluted by her; but that now he had got beyond that; that he need no longer behold her; and that he placed all his happiness in something that could not fail him,—probably the influence which the thought of her had on his mind. Then he tells us what her influence was. In the first place, she was the frost and blight of passion. No unworthy thought could enter the mind occupied with her image. And he thus describes the magical force of her salutation: "Whenever and wherever she appeared, in the hope of that most priceless salute, I had no longer an enemy in the world, such a flame of charity was kindled within me, making me to forgive every one that had offended me; and had I then been asked for any favour upon earth, I

should, with looks clothed with humility, have answered naught but 'love.'" The salute, he says elsewhere, gave him such "intolerable bliss," that his body became "like a heavy dead thing;" "whereby," he says, quite in the spirit of Plato, or of a mystic pagan, "most clear it is that in her salutation was centred all my bliss,—a bliss which was oftentimes greater than I could bear." To him the awe, the trembling, the impotence of speech, the involuntary sighs and blushes, the pallid cheek, the sunken eye and feverish pulse, were the outward sign and token of the might of the love that was working within him; seeing how it shook and prostrated the frame, he could not doubt that it was energising as mightily in the soul, and gradually turning the man into a gentleman. For do not its effects on the body prove it to be for the soul

"a medicine
That's able to breathe life into a stone,
Quicken a rock"?

The part, therefore, played by Beatrice in Dante's philosophy was not the part of a woman whom he sought in marriage, to share his joys and sorrows, and after her death to be idealised into an angel, and made the recipient of all his ideas of feminine perfection. Nor was it merely the aimless "woman worship," or feminine embodiment of philosophy, the result of some primitive harmony of human thought, which compelled Plato to make Diotime the prophetess of the love-lore of the Banquet; which made Hermas Pastor, Methodius, and Macrobius introduce the ideal woman as the mouthpiece of their doctrine; which made Augustine discourse concerning the *vita beata* through the mouth of Monica; and which made Boethius fancy himself visited in prison by Philosophy herself under a feminine form.

In the *Vita Nuova* Beatrice is not a mere ideal, not a mere mouthpiece adapted to the doctrine she has to utter, but a real force, a kind of sacramental power, operating mightily on the body and mind of Dante, and effecting within him a magical transformation of character;—taking out of him his wild barbaric heart, and giving him instead the *cuor gentil* of chivalry.

The man who thus attached himself to a woman whom he made, as it were, the guardian-angel of his knighthood, was called her *servente*: the word implied that he professed to owe her military service, to be faithful to her as the soldier to his flag, and to let her star conduct him towards gentleness of heart, as the star of glory conducted the soldier towards bravery and deeds of daring. It is curious to note how different this relation was from that of lovers or of mar-

ried people. The awe and tremor which the *servente* was always expected to exhibit in presence of his mistress could scarcely be even conventionally displayed between husband and wife. Fouqué's picture of the French knight and his wife in *Sintram* must strike every one as absurd. Yet it is a good sketch of the relations of the *servente* and his mistress. The mistake lies in marrying them. The *servente* made his mistress the ideal of a kind of celestial force; and he treated her as an image to be looked at, and to be addressed only mentally; to embody all his imaginations of what a gentlewoman should be, but not to be spoken to, scarcely to be gazed upon. Marriage would be quite inconsistent with a relation like this; familiarity would mar it; the domestic subjection of the wife would annihilate it. Hence the knight generally chose a woman who was another's wife to embody his ideal. Thus Dante chose Beatrice, Petrarch chose Laura, and Bayard chose the wife of one of the officers of the Duchess of Savoy.

Thus, even in the chivalrous relation of the sexes there was little of that daily and domestic intercourse between men and women which gives its delicacy to our civilisation. The one chosen woman was distantly venerated as a goddess, but not communed with as an intelligent being, while all the rest were probably treated with but scanty honour. For in the chivalrous period the wife was certainly not in her present advantageous position. The man who married sought a mother for his children, a housekeeper, a stewardess, but not a companion to share his joys and sorrows, or a friend to commune with his thoughts. So little was the mutual adaptation of man and wife considered, that in 1198 the highest authority in Christendom was able to recommend that, as an act of charity, wives should be chosen from a class which it would be now reckoned folly, if not wickedness, to choose them from.*

In the society of the thirteenth century the two elements which now combine to secure the happiness of home are found in a state of separation. The wife, bought and sold

* Innocent. III. Regest. lib. i. ep. cxii.

"Universis Christi fidelibus, ad quos literæ istæ pervenient.

"Inter opera charitatis quæ imitanda nobis auctoritate sacræ pagine proponuntur, sicut evangelica testatur auctoritas, non minimum est errantem ab erroris sui semita revocare—ac præsertim mulieres voluptuose viventes et admittentes indifferenter quoslibet ad commercium carnis, ut caste vivant, ad legitimi tori consortium invitare. Hoc igitur attendentes, præsentium auctoritate statuimus, ut omnibus, qui publicas mulieres de lupanaribus extraxerint et duxerint in uxores, quod agunt in remissionem proficiat peccatorum.

"Datum Romæ, apud Sem. Petrum, 3 Kal. Mai. Pont. nostri aº. 1."

like a cow, and treated as a savage might treat his squaw, or chosen, not through motives of affection, but for reasons of interest or charity, had to bear most of the inconveniences of domestic servitude. The mistress, distantly venerated as a goddess, absorbed all the chivalrous sentiments of the *servente* without being a bit the better off for them. Her adorer paid her only a distant worship—a worship that she knew and cared as little about as Dulcinea for Don Quixote's. He did not venture too near, lest he should be disenchanted by the view of her quarrelling with her husband, or scolding her dirty children. And, indeed, the relation of *servente* and mistress could only be kept within moral bounds by distance. A near approach would introduce into it all the vice that Lord Byron paints in his *Beppo*, and describes in his Italian letters. But there can be little doubt that in its original purity, as Dante imagined it, this chivalrous relation between the sexes was the medium through which the Catholic veneration for the Madonna gradually raised the condition of women. The Blessed Virgin was the Madonna, or Lady of grace and salvation. The mistress was an inferior "madonna," or lady of gentleness and honour, of humbleness and truth. The two things were kept quite distinct, in spite of Wieland, who maintains that chivalry was a jumble of gallantry and Mary-worship. And this ideal elevation of the woman, though it did not at the moment confer upon her any advantage of position, did her at last great service. Dante first gave her the idea of her equality, or of her superiority in certain respects, to men. And as soon as she had this idea she strove to show that it was not a mere imagination of Dante's, but a serious truth. Thus from his happy thought there arose the reality of the civilising influence of the woman's heart over the man's hand and brain; and the gentleness, the refinement, the intellectual and moral harmony of Christian marriage owe much of their happy development to his chivalrous philosophy.

The immediate popularity which Dante's writings gained among women proved how happy had already been the results of the new reverence which chivalry professed for them. A few years before, neither the knight nor the husband had treated woman seriously as an intelligent being. Marriage had made her a slave, chivalrous love had only erected her into an image and a symbol which might be worshiped at a distance, but which had no real interest in the man's heart. But in a very short time the new custom of treating woman as the image and symbol of all virtue had suggested the question, why she might not be that which she signified.

And this question received an emphatic reply in the teaching of the Church, which, in declaring a Woman to be set above every creature that is only creature, taught woman that she was called upon to be that which the knight had hitherto supposed her only to typify—the model and manifestation of intelligence and virtue.

And then was seen the possibility of amalgamating the two characters of *servente* and husband, or of mistress and wife, not without some loss of a dangerous, high-flying, and Quixotic romance, but with great gain to domestic happiness and security. Then it was seen that the adoration of the “gentle heart” might well be the forerunner of marriage, instead of extinguishing all hope of a domestic union. Thus it came to be understood, that an affection between young people might be not only a safeguard of virtue, but a better initiative than interest, or even charity, to the tender friendship between husband and wife.

But this is only a development of Dante's doctrine, not his doctrine as he taught it and practised it. For him mistress and wife were different, and the affection for Beatrice, which he faithfully preserved from his boyhood, never even prompted him to seek her hand. His countrymen still profess the doctrine that he taught and practised, not that which has been developed from it by northern nations. The Italians still make marriages “of convenience.” Among their upper classes the genuine love-match, preceded and followed by a chivalrous tenderness, is either unknown or unvalued; the *cavalier servente* is still, or was in the beginning of the century, a recognised institution, however demoralised and fallen from the Dantesque ideal to the level of the old Provençal practice. But whatever may be its present corruption, we should recognise in it an institution which began in an honest desire for purity and refinement, and not condemn its present guilt without recognising the extenuating circumstances of its beginnings.

Neither must it be supposed that the philosophy of Dante, in its northern developments, is entirely opposed to the marriage “of convenience.” Such a union may be contrary to the youthful fire of the *Vita Nuova*, which makes the thrill of love the great purifying influence of the soul; but it need not be inconsistent with the maturer and less passionate philosophy of the *Convito*, which values the end for what it is in itself, and not simply for its effect on the soul, and weighs the worth of the woman against the fire of fancy, knowing that one is a positive and fixed quantity, the other a variable and uncertain quality.

Communicated Articles.

DR. WARD ON INTELLECT.*

DR. WARD begins his essays on intellect by taking Dr. Brownson as his text. I will do the same. "In our historical reading," says the American reviewer, "we have found no epoch in which the directors of the Catholic world seem to have had so great a dread of intellect as our own. There seems to be almost universally the conviction expressed by Rousseau, that 'the man who thinks is a depraved animal.' There is a wide-spread fear that he who thinks will think heretically. The study, therefore, of our times is to keep men orthodox by cultivating their pious affections with as little exercise of intelligence as possible. . . . The true policy, in our judgment, would be, not to yield up thought and intelligence to Satan, but to redouble our efforts to bring them back to the side of the Church, so as to restore her to her rightful spiritual and intellectual supremacy. Instead of foregoing thought and intelligence, and contenting ourselves with pious affection, which, when divorced from thought, becomes a mere weak and watery sentimentality, we should grapple with them, master the age precisely in that in which it regards itself as strongest, increase our efforts to enlighten the people, and gain for them the superiority, not merely in faith and piety, but in secular knowledge and science. Intelligence can be mastered only by intelligence, thought can be overcome only by thought."

In a subsequent publication I find a still more valuable remark by the same author: "We do not refute false doctrines," he says, "simply by pointing out their falsehood; we must do it by distinguishing between the true and the false, and showing that we accept the true and integrate it in a higher unity."

In proportion as any one is inclined to sympathise with the views thus expressed by Dr. Brownson, he will regard with disfavour Dr. Ward's essays on the intellect. Even those who agree with them in the abstract must own them to be singularly ill-timed, and their mode of procedure to be a mistake. For what, upon Dr. Ward's own showing, is the great error of those whom he opposes with respect to the Church? "They hate her," he says, "as teaching principles which fetter the intellect and enslave the soul" (p. 3). And

* The Relation of Intellectual Power to Man's True Perfection considered in two Essays. By W. G. Ward, D.P. London: Burns and Lamport.

how should so monstrous a notion be corrected? One would suppose, by bringing forward every thing we can to show that the Church recognises to the full the dignity of the intellect; that the only fetters she imposes are the fetters of God's Word; that she holds out for man a higher degree of intellectual excellence than the schools of the world,—even the knowledge of things as they are in the Divine Essence.

But how does Dr. Ward go to work? how does he attempt to gain a favourable hearing? He begins by laying down a thesis which, on the face of it, justifies the error. I say on the face of it; for it seems to do so, not more than it does, but more than Dr. Ward means it should. It seems to say, and really does say, that the Church teaches that intellect, one of God's most glorious gifts in the natural order, in virtue of which man rises to the top of creation, only a little lower than the angels, is no part of the man at all, but is merely an instrument, superior to the muscles only as one tool may excel another. I repeat, this may not fairly represent Dr. Ward's intention, but it does the fullest justice to his assertion. His defenders must at least admit that if the truth be in his thesis, it is there in a very questionable shape, disguised in so paradoxical a form that its friends may well mistake it for error. For some time I could not quite make up my mind whether he was contending for a truism, or delivering himself of a fallacy; I never doubted his unhappiness of expression.

But the Essays seem to me to be still more glaringly opposed to the second passage I have cited from Dr. Brownson. Dr. Ward, instead of seeking points of agreement, and common principles to start from,—instead of pointing out to his non-Catholic countrymen that we acknowledge all the truth which their several systems mean,—instead of showing that he is alive to the fact that all error is founded on truth,—seems to take a delight in discovering and exaggerating differences, and in making out his opponents to be mere fools. Because Lord Brougham speaks in a somewhat extravagant tone about Newton and Laplace, he is brought in guilty of foul and degrading idolatry, and represented as maintaining that genius is in itself a title to heaven. Sir William Hamilton, in lecturing on philosophy, points out to his hearers the obvious truth, that its main end is not so much the acquisition of facts as the development of the mind. He insists, as Dr. Newman so ably does in his 'Discourses' on University Education, that a man is educated, not precisely as he possesses greater knowledge, but as he acquires the power of gaining such knowledge. He takes for granted, as Dr. Ward does in his book on Nature and

Grace, that most men, in fact, pursue things that please them, that they are incapable of sustained activity from which they derive no gratification; and he remarks that truth, when gained, ceases to interest, and therefore to draw out the mental faculties. Dr. Ward represents him as saying, "that what men are to seek is not truth which shall benefit mankind, but an intellectual excitement and titillation which shall make their own lives pass with less weariness and monotony" (p. 56). A more unfair interpretation of an author it seldom falls to one's lot to see. Does Dr. Ward think Sir William Hamilton imagined that St. Thomas and Scotus, Catholic theologians, could hold such a view? The fact of Hamilton's referring to them ought to have warned him how little he understood the man he ridicules. Sir William Hamilton says that the end of man is the accomplishment of his perfection for the glory of God; and he advocates intellectual excitement as a means to this end. Observe that when he says, "the search after truth is better than the truth," he is not speaking of supernatural truth. "He is speaking of man *exclusively* in his natural capacity and temporal relations" (p. 5). He is not speaking of practical knowledge, not of moral, political, or *religious* truth. "In practical knowledge," he says, "it is evident that truth is not the ultimate end; for in that case knowledge is *ex hypothesi* for the sake of application. The knowledge of a moral, of a political, of a religious truth is of value only as it affords the preliminary or condition of its exercise" (pp. 9, 10). He is speaking solely of speculative truth of the natural order, and he maintains that it is only valuable as a means of intellectual activity. Dr. Ward argues in his last appendix that Sir William Hamilton must include all philosophy, not merely speculative as distinguished from practical, since he "regards the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical as unsound." In the place referred to, Sir William Hamilton says that all philosophy, as such, is cognitive, *i.e.* has truth for its object; but that the highest end of all philosophy, *i.e.* its advantage, is $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$. And here he says that the practical value of *certain truths* lies in the process of their acquisition rather than in their possession. Is there any thing false in this? What does Dr. Ward suppose is the use of truths which are not supernatural, not political, not moral, not religious? He shall answer for himself. "The love of knowledge may be more suitably called love of intellectual exertion. The first benefit, and surely an inappreciable one, conferred by this propension is, that it gives the leisured classes the moral power of consistently obeying God." How? "Because of its singular power of receiving long-continued

and protracted gratification," which is a substitute to the leisured classes for that which labour supplies to the active.* The pursuit of knowledge, then, is the pursuit of intellectual excitement. Such excitement is useful for the gratification it affords. After all, the hunt is the great thing, not the game.

We see, then, at once that Dr. Ward's Essays are injudicious, not to say unfair, and calculated rather to deter than persuade an opponent. But I go further, and contend that their main position is a fallacy and utterly untenable. "The perfection of man," says Dr. Ward, "consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence forming no part of it whatever. This is the one Catholic doctrine." The first proposition is aggravating enough, the second is intolerable. Certain as I am that I can prove the unsoundness of the one, I am still more confident I can show the unwarranted dogmatism of the other. I will endeavour to justify my strictures; but first Dr. Ward must explain what he means by intellect, and what by perfection.

"I must beg you to observe that this word 'intellect' is used in two most different senses. And it is the more important that we fully understand this, as from a confusion of these two senses has arisen what seems to me the most mischievous possible misapprehension of one prominent particular in St. Thomas's theology. In the theological and strict philosophical sense of the term, a man exercises his intellect precisely so far as he contemplates real or apparent truth; in the ordinary and popular sense, in which I am here using the word, he exercises his intellect so far only as he busies his mind with philosophical and scientific processes. Now how widely divergent are these two senses one single illustration will abundantly show.

Let me suppose, *e. g.*, a man in the lower ranks of society who has received, as we should say, no intellectual cultivation whatever, but who is deeply pious and interior; who fixes his thoughts throughout the day on the invisible world, or, as St. Paul would express it, lives by faith. He is constantly eliciting acts of faith; and it is a first principle in Catholic theology that an act of faith is an intellectual act. If we use the word 'intellect,' then, in its theological and strict philosophical sense, this pious rustic is exercising his intellect constantly through the day: nay, he is exercising it in its very highest exercise; for he is contemplating, not apparent, but real truth; not natural truth, but supernatural. Yet it is precisely of such a man as this that every one would say that he has not been exercising his *intellect* at all; that he cultivates his moral and spiritual nature indeed, but not his intellectual. Let me say then, once for all, that throughout this paper I use the word 'intellect' *not* in its theological and strict philosophical sense, but in its ordinary and popular ac-

* On Nature and Grace, book i. pp. 289, 293-5.

ception. I speak of a man using his intellect so far as he is occupied with such processes as these : investigating evidence ; analysing his various convictions, and exploring their grounds ; contemplating scientifically the phenomena, whether of his own mind or of the external world ; carrying premisses forward to their conclusions ; viewing a large field of truth in the mutual relation of its component parts, and the like. . . . And I may here further add, that according to this sense of the term, intellectual excellence will signify that largeness, acuteness, penetration, grasp of mind, which is adapted to the successful performance of such processes as I have stated" (pp. 4, 5, 37).

The authority of Dr. Newman is adduced. "A truly great intellect, such as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of Newton, or of Goethe, . . . is one which possesses knowledge, considered not merely as acquirement, but as philosophy" (p. 36).

Observe, Dr. Ward does not mean by intellect the faculty when employed on any particular kind of subject. He excludes from man's perfection intellectual excellence in theology as well as physics,—the intellect of St. Thomas as well as that of Newton. He does not mean any one process of the intellect, as, for instance, the reflective as contrasted with the intuitive : he means such qualities of mind as belong to all intellectual processes : "largeness, acuteness, penetration, grasp." "Intellectus" is the bare faculty ; "intellect" is the faculty in its excellence, apprehending, grasping, discerning the truth. Mere intellect may form a part of man's perfection, but "its true greatness" never can. It is not contemplation, but *intelligent* contemplation, which Dr. Ward rejects.

"We are said by theologians to exercise our intellectus so far as we contemplate, in any kind of way, real or apparent truth"* (p. 34). But what is meant by contemplating the truth? Can there be such a thing without apprehension, without grasp, without discernment? A little reflection will show that the intellect cannot contemplate without process, nay, without bringing all its forces to bear ; and that such process is one and the same for the philosopher and the rustic. Do we contemplate a thing by looking at it in the fantasy without understanding its nature? Cannot brutes do as much? Do we contemplate the truth that the sum of the angles of a rectilinear triangle is equal to two right angles by saying over the words, or by working out the problem? or the

* Schram, who deals with the intellect from an ascetical point of view, gives as its operations, apprehensio, judicium, ratiocinatio ; and its acts, attentio ; reflexio ; abstractio ; facultas fingendi ; judicium ; ratio ; ingenium ; ingenium heroicum ; acumen ; profunditas ; soliditas ; providentia. Theol. Mys. p. 176.

truth "God is good," by repeating the proposition, or by forming the judgment? Truth is not only reached but also held by processes of thought. It exists for us only as suspended in the active intellect; when the intellect ceases to act, there remains in the mind only a symbolic formula,—the dry husk or dead carcass of the truth. Again, there are not two faculties for truth,—intellectus and intellect,—as Dr. Ward's language would imply, as though the latter were a special endowment, like the poetical or practical talent. These two have distinct objects, and may therefore be regarded as distinct powers; but intellectus and intellect have but one object in common,—truth as such; nor is it possible to conceive the one without the other. Every act of knowledge, if real, is a certain measure of philosophy; and philosophy is but knowledge carried out. The simplest conception requires the same analytical and synthetical powers as the widest generalisation, the subtlest distinction. What is philosophy? "The knowledge of a thing by its causes;" the *γνώσις διότι ἔστι*. But is not all knowledge of a thing knowledge by its causes? Do we know a thing at all until we know its genus and differentia, *i. e.* its material and formal cause. Indeed, what is the bare recognition of a fact, *γνώσις ὅτι ἔστι*, but a judgment? What more than a judgment is the discernment of the ultimate principle of knowledge? What is science but a series of judgments constructed into a system by judgment? The distinction, then, which Dr. Ward seeks to make between "intellect" and "intellectual excellence" does not exist; the difference between the two is in degree, not in kind. Intellect is nothing more or less than a certain measure of intellectual excellence. Whatever arguments may prove that the former is part of man's perfection will *à fortiori* hold good for the latter.

Let us now turn to Dr. Ward's definition of "perfection :"

"Every thing is more perfect in proportion as it more nearly reaches its proper end; or, to put the same thing in other words, in proportion as it more completely accomplishes its proper work, its *ἔργον*, as Aristotle would say. A locomotive engine is more perfect in proportion as it more combines strength, speed, and safety; the art of medicine is more perfect in proportion as it enables the student more successfully to cure disease. And my proposition is this: Our body is more perfect in proportion as we more combine health, strength, speed, and the rest; . . . our intellect is more perfect in proportion as we have a greater power (to use F. Newman's words) of grasping a large multitude of objects in their mutual and true relations. But we, as *persons*, as *men*, are more perfect, have more nearly achieved our proper end, have more completely accom-

plished our proper work, exclusively in proportion as we are more morally and spiritually perfect. This surely is a most definite and intelligible statement, whether you agree with it or no."

Well, scarcely so ; for Dr. Ward begins to be obscure just when one wants a little enlightenment. What does he mean by the "we as persons," the "we as men"? Does the intellect enter into the composition of the "we"? If not, how are the "we" men at all? If it does, since that faculty is more perfect in proportion to its power of grasping truth, how is it that this perfection does not redound to the "we as men"? I suppose Dr. Ward will admit that there is no *real* distinction between "person" and "nature," that personality is not a distinct entity added on to nature, but is simply nature viewed in its completeness, originating its actions in conscious self-dependence. Again, I suppose he will grant that the soul is the *forma* of man ; that intellect and will are constituent elements of the soul ; that there is only a logical distinction between the soul and its faculties ; that the faculties are essentially one with the soul ; and that the soul is intellect, will, and feeling. Now if intellect, will, and feeling, are the soul, and the soul is the man, the perfection of the intellect must be a perfection of the soul, and therefore of the man. It is most true that man as a whole is not perfect because one faculty is perfect. Intellect may be great and yet turned to evil, as it is in the devil, of whom we should say, that he is intellectually great but morally corrupt. For a person to be perfect as a whole, his faculties must be developed harmoniously, each observing its proper relation in the system ; indeed, as the parts of the body depend on one another for their perfection,—“as the eye cannot say to the hand, I need not thy help ; nor, again, the head to the feet, I have no need of you,”—so no one faculty of the soul can attain its perfection alone. The intellect of the devil, even as an intellect, can never be perfect, because its powers can never be exercised on the fullness of truth. The will of the lost can never be perfect, for they can never know the chief good. If, then, Dr. Ward had merely said that the man as a whole is not made perfect by possessing intellectual excellence, he might have remained for ever without an opponent ; but as he maintains that the perfection of the intellect, which is a part of the man, is no part of the man's perfection, he is likely to have his opinion all to himself. His idea seems to be that "man" connotes only a certain element which he calls the spiritual and moral ; that this element is placed in the world as in a kind of workshop ; that it has a definite work to do, and is provided with tools of various kinds, among which is intellect ;—in fact, that

intellect is no more a part of the man than a chisel is a part of a carpenter. He says that we Catholics place our perfection in subordination of all the parts to one, viz. to the moral and spiritual. But he goes further than this: he rejects from the system all parts but one. "Man's perfection consists *exclusively* in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature, intellectual excellence forming *no part of it whatever*." It is necessary to bear this in mind, for the subordination of the intellect is not in question. Those who obey as well as those who govern constitute the State, and those who believe as well as those who teach make up the Church.

But what does Dr. Ward understand by the spiritual element? In lack of a definition, which would have been most acceptable, I must gather his meaning as well as I can from a description here and there. In Appendix A. he quotes a passage from *Loss and Gain*, to the effect that "spirit is the principle of religious faith or obedience," that is, I suppose, the religious sentiment. In page 34 the intellectus and the will are introduced: "In proportion as we grow in perfection of will, we grow in perfection of intellectus, for we apprehend supernatural truth more keenly and vividly." I do not see how any quality of the will as such can render the intellect keener, unless he means that obedience merits grace, and so enlightenment.

"On the other hand, this keener and more vivid apprehension of supernatural truth reacts on the will, and renders its movements still more vigorous and efficacious; and this being the case, viz. that intellectus and will proceed *pari passu* towards perfection, a somewhat interesting scholastic question arises, but one of no practical moment in any shape, and at all events wholly irrelevant to our present theme. It is debated whether intellectus or will be the higher power; for instance, whether it be the higher act to contemplate God or to love Him. One thing, however, is worth briefly mentioning in this scholastic controversy. It is characteristic of St. Thomas's school, as opposed to Scotus's, that they follow Aristotle in regarding intellectus as a higher power than will; yet St. Thomas says, no less expressly than Scotus himself, that, in the case of God and other superhuman objects, it is a less high act to contemplate than to love them."

Mark the self-contradiction of this last paragraph. Dr. Ward begins by saying that it is a matter of debate whether it be the higher act to contemplate God or to love Him, and he ends by saying that the representatives of the two opposite opinions are at one on the question at issue. The fact is, St. Thomas does not say that it is a less high act to contemplate God than to love Him, when the contemplation is real. He says that, in the case of men here below, their knowledge

of God is less perfect than their love, *because such knowledge is not real knowledge.*

By the spiritual and moral element, then, Dr. Ward seems to mean the religious sentiment directed by the will, through the intellect, to the supernatural, under the influence of grace. And his proposition comes to this, that the will and the intellect, as a mere faculty, may be spiritualised by grace so as to enter into man's perfection; but that the excellence of the intellect,—*i. e.* its natural power of grasping, piercing, penetrating the truth,—must be left out.

Against this, then, I argue as follows :

There is no real distinction between "intellect" and "intellectual excellence;" therefore we cannot talk of admitting the one and excluding the other. Again, man's perfection consists in those acts by which he reaches the "True" and the "Good;" but by intellectual excellence he attains the True; therefore intellectual excellence is a part of his perfection. If it be said, that man's perfection is in the supernatural, not in the natural, order, and that the intuition of supernatural truth is quite distinct from that of natural truth; I reply, that the intuition of the supernatural is the result of the intuitive power of the natural, raised by grace. It is a first principle in theology that grace does not destroy, does not ignore, nature, but perfects it, and extends its scope. Nature corresponds by its powers to grace, and coöperates with grace. Nature is the agent. The supernatural act, though elicited by grace, yet proceeds from nature, otherwise it could not be called the man's act, but only the act of grace in the man. The Council of Trent anathematises those who say that "the will under the influence of grace nowise coöperates, but is like a thing inanimate, and does nothing whatever, and is merely passive;" and the same is of course true of the intellect. Frassen lays it down as the Scotist doctrine that the intellect concurs in the beatific vision as the *principal cause*, not as a *mere instrument*, for nothing but the intellect can be said to see God.*

Viva says it is the common opinion of his order, against

* "Intellectus cum lumine gloriæ concurrit ad visionem beatificam *ut causa principalis*. Hæc est communis inter Scotistas. Probatur . . . præter intellectum nihil est quod dici possit videre Deum, ergo nec causa principalis beatitudinis appellari." Tract. i. disp. iii. art. vii. quest. 3.

The following propositions are condemned:

"Via interna sejuncta est a confessione, a confessariis et a casibus conscientie a theologiâ et philosophiâ.

"Theologus minorem dispositionem habet quam homo rudis ad statum contemplativi: primo quia non habet fidem adeo puram, secundo *quia non est adeo humilis*, tertio quia non adeo curat propriam salutem, quarto quia caput refertum habet phantasmatibus, speciebus, opinionibus et speculationibus, et non potest in illum ingredi verum lumen." Propositiones Mich. de Molinos, Denz. 59, 64.

the Thomists, that the *lumen gloriæ* is only in part the cause of the beatific vision; and that the intellect also immediately concurs. He says the same of actual grace and the infused habits, with respect to a supernaturally good act on earth,—that they are only in part its cause.* The same theologian maintains in general that the relation between nature and grace is such that natural virtues facilitate the exercise of supernatural, and that supernatural acts may produce a natural habit.† With special bearing on the present question, he says, “According to St. Austin, the more noble and more excellent genius is *ceteris paribus* under grace better fitted to understand, penetrate, and believe the mysteries of the faith.”‡ “Again,” he says, “the intellect is raised not merely in its obediential power as a creature subject to God, but in its formal character as intellect;”§ that is, the soul is not simply raised to know God by some means, but it is raised in that very capacity of its own by which it knows; and as the soul has no other faculty of knowing save intellectual excellence, such must be the faculty which by grace attains supernatural truth. Man is perfect, according to Dr. Ward, when he has done his *ἔργον*; but man has not accomplished his work until he is united to God in all the parts of his nature, according to the capacity of each. Even the body admits of a supernatural union with God through the body of Christ, from whence it receives a principle of immortality. And theologians contend that the body is to be loved with the love of charity, not merely as the soul’s instrument, but as participating in its glory, as a recipient of beatitude.|| Much more then must that faculty, which, as Dr. Ward says, even in nature

* “Dicendum cum communi contra Thomistas lumen gloriæ esse solum partialem rationem agendi atque adeo etiam intellectum partialiter immediate concurrere ad Dei visionem producendam” (pars i. disp. ii., De Visione Dei, art. 1). “Gratia actualis et habitus infusi solum partialiter influunt in actus salutares” (ibid.).

† Pars iv. disp. iv. q. 2. dico 2.

‡ Ex Augustino de dono perseverantiæ, cap. 4. “Nobilius ac præstantius ingenium cum gratiâ est aptius ceteris paribus ad melius intelligenda penetranda et credenda mysteria fidei.” Pars iii. disp. i., De gratia, q. 8.

§ “Quando intellectus elevatur ad Deum videndum non solum elevatur secundum rationem entis seu per potentiam obedientialem transcendentalem, sed elevatur *formaliter qua intellectus*, seu per potentiam obedientialem prædicamentalem cum transfundat in effectum prædicatum vitalitatis intellectivæ : ergo *si ut potest elevari formaliter, qua intellectus est, ita potest elevari, qua intellectus perfectior, et sic transfundere in effectum vitalitatem intellectivam perfectiorem.*” Pars i. disp. ii., De visione Dei, quest. iv. art. 3.

|| Dico 2°. “Homo debet ex charitate diligere corpus suum non solum ut id quod tanquam bonum vult amico, sed etiam ut id *cui* vult bonum quia, licet corpus nostrum non sit capax æternæ beatitudinis Deus cognoscendo et amando, est tamen capax beatitudinis participatæ quæ ex anima gloriosa in ipsum redundat.” Bill. vol. v. diss. iii. art. 1.

touches God, as having to do with the necessary and the infinite, be supernaturally united to God before man can be deemed supernaturally perfect. We say that because Christ rose with the same body wherein He died, we shall rise with the selfsame bodies wherein we die. Why not, then, argue that, because He has hypostatically united to Himself intellectual excellence, such excellence will form part of our future glory?

Let us see how theological authority stands. Dr. Ward says: "No theologian has been alleged as opposed to me in any passage where he is formally treating of perfection." The fact is, Dr. Ward does not seem to know when theologians are treating of man's true perfection. Is it not most unreasonable to pretend to contrast the opinions of opposite schools on the denotation of one and the same notion, and not keep to the same notion throughout? This is just Dr. Ward's blunder. He compares the non-Catholic view of man's perfection *when complete* with the Catholic view of man's perfection *when incomplete*, in order to show in what each supposes the fulfilment of man's work to consist. The perfection he refers to is not man's true perfection according to his own authorities, it is not man's perfection according to the Foundation of the Exercises of St. Ignatius. In both cases perfection includes man's ultimate end. "A thing is then said to be perfect when it *gains* its proper end," says Sylvius; but man does not completely *gain* his proper end in this life, for in this life he is *in viâ*, which is opposed to his being *in termino*. "Our perfection consists in union with God," says Suarez: but we are not *perfectly* united to God in this life. St. Ignatius makes man's end the salvation of his soul; but a man is not saved, in the full meaning of the term, till he reaches the beatific vision. And this fact is most fully recognised by those writers who treat of the *perfectio vitæ*. They warn us that they are using the word in a special sense, that in its absolute signification it applies only to a future state. Thus Scaramelli begins his Treatise on Ascetics by proving that no one can be absolutely perfect in this life. Bail, in his *Théologie Affective de l'Etat de Perfection*, says: "La troisième perfection est celle qui consiste dans la félicité éternelle, où l'âme est unie au bien souverain par vision et par amour. Cette perfection est appelée la dernière parce qu'après elle il n'y en a pas de plus grande. Elle est la fin des deux autres perfections, qui ne servent que de voies et de moyens pour arriver à elle. Si bien que s'il fallait parler en toute rigueur de la perfection, il n'y aurait que cette troisième qui mériterait d'en porter le nom; car c'est vraiment la perfection que d'être uni parfaitement au bien très-parfait, au

souverain bien. Il n'y a point de tache et de défauts en cette perfection, tout y est exact et accompli.”*

If, then, we wish to hear what theologians have to say on man's perfection, we must turn to the treatise *De Beatitudine*. I suppose, with Suarez, that man's beatitude, and therefore true perfection, consists in those acts of the intellect and will by which he knows and loves God as He is in Himself. Now is it true that theologians unanimously exclude intellectual excellence from the beatific vision? So far from it, one of the oldest and best approved schools in the Church distinctly and in express terms contends that it enters to such an extent into that vision, that if two men have unequal intellectual powers and are equal in other respects, the one with the greater intellect will see God for all eternity more perfectly than the other.

Thus Frassen: “Inequality in the beatific vision proceeds not only from unequal ‘lumen gloriæ,’ but also from unequal perfection, as well specific as individual, in the intellect of the blest soul.”†

Observe his argument: “Either the intellect is raised in some grades of its activity, or in none, or in all. Not in some, for there is no reason why it should be raised in two grades rather than three, or four, or five. Besides, grace does not destroy, but perfects, nature; therefore glory, which is the consummation of grace, ought not to destroy the excellence and activity of the intellect. Now, it would be doing so, by stupefying the intellect, were it to raise the intellect only in a certain degree, for the faculty would in that case not be acting as much as it could. Further, as our opponents admit, there is only a virtual distinction between different grades of intellectual activity, and therefore one grade cannot be raised alone. The same reasoning holds good against the second alternative; therefore it must be owned that the beatified intellect is raised in every grade of its excellence and activity.”‡ He takes for granted throughout that there is no real distinction between intellectus and intellectual ex-

* Vol. iii. p. 430.

† “Inæqualitas visionis beatificæ provenit physice nedum ex inæqualitate luminis gloriæ; sed etiam ex inæquali perfectione tam specificâ quam individuali intellectus beati. Hæc est Doctoris Subtilis.” Tract. i. disp. iii. art. vii. sect. iv. q. 2.

‡ “Vel intellectus elevatur tantum secundum aliquos gradus activitatis, vel secundum nullos, vel secundum omnes. Non primum, quia non est potior ratio cur elevatur secundum duos gradus, quam secundum tres, aut quatuor, aut quinque, &c. Tum quia naturam gratia non destruit sed perficit: ergo gloria quæ est gratia consummata virtutem et activitatem non debet destruere: destrueret autem et eam sopiret, si tantum elevaretur intellectus secundum aliquos gradus activitatis quia non in tantum ageret in quantum agere posset. Tum denique quia ut fatentur adversarii gradus activitatis non distinguuntur realiter sed solum virtualiter: adeoque non potest unus realiter

cellence, and therefore that the elevation of the one necessitates the elevation of the other.

Viva, who advocates this doctrine most strongly, says: "A more excellent intellect, with *lumen* equivalent to two, can effect an act of vision with a perfection equal to three. So that two grades of vision may correspond to the *lumen*, and the third to the greater natural excellence of the intellect."* And he denies that it could be otherwise without a miracle. If this is not saying that natural intellectual excellence is a part of man's perfection, I am at a loss to know what would be. I need not multiply witnesses, as Dr. Ward himself admits that this is the view of a large number of theologians, and is held universally in the Scotist school. His difficulty lies in seeing how it tells against his thesis. I will therefore draw out the argument in form, according to the theologians in question:

The beatific vision is a part of man's perfection.

Intellectual excellence is a part of the beatific vision.

Therefore intellectual excellence is a part of man's perfection.

This conclusion is the contradictory of Dr. Ward's proposition, that intellectual excellence is not a part of man's perfection.

Certain theologians, I believe very few, who are not Scotists, suppose that, in fact, where there is equal merit, God will preserve equality by giving less *lumen gloriæ* to the greater intellect. But these are quite as much opposed to Dr. Ward as those just cited; for they suppose that the intellect in the one case is acting the part of the *lumen* in the other; *e. g.* suppose A has more intellectual excellence than B, and both have accumulated equal merits, B would receive more *lumen* than A to restore the balance. Then A's superiority of intellect would be doing for A what the greater amount of *lumen* is doing for B.

This view, as evidently as the former, admits intellectual excellence into the scope of man's perfection, and therefore furnishes quite as strong an argument against the thesis which excludes such excellence. For the question is, not what is the ground of relative perfection in heaven, but what is the absolute character of that perfection. I cannot understand how Dr. Ward can say it has not even the ap-

elevari, quin pariter alii eleventur. Non etiam secundum, propter easdem rationes: ergo fatendum est intellectum beatum elevari secundum omnes gradus suæ perfectionis et activitatis." Tract. i. disp. iii. sect. iv. q. 2.

* "Poterit intellectus perfectior sub lumine ut duo, ponere visionem perfectam ut tria, ita ut duo gradus respondeant lumini, et tertius majori perfectioni naturali intellectus." Pars i. disp. ii. q. iv. art. 3.

pearance of an objection against him. He admits that every Catholic has the fullest liberty to embrace what he calls the Scotist doctrine in this shape. I am quite satisfied: he grants all I want. But it is worth while to see what he has to say against what I believe to be the genuine Scotist doctrine, viz. "That where inequality of intellect exists with equal merits, such inequality is actually allowed to operate in favour of the one who has the greater intellect." This is unquestionably the view of Frassen, Henno, and Mastrius, amongst the Scotists, and the one Viva adopts. It is, then, well supported. But Dr. Ward does not hesitate to pronounce it "theologically unsound, if it do not deserve a still severer censure." And his reason for this dogmatic assertion is a decree of the Council of Florence.

"My direct reason for this statement is the singularly clear and unequivocal decree put forth by the Council of Florence. That council teaches that those men who gain heaven *intueri clare Ipsum Deum Unum et Trinum sicuti est: pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius*" (i.e. clearly see God Himself as He is in Unity and Trinity, yet one more perfectly than another, according to diversity of merits), p. 88.

So far from being clear and unequivocal, in Dr. Ward's sense, this decree is singularly the reverse. It certainly does not say what he requires. All it says is, "distinction of vision is according to merit." Dr. Ward makes it say, "distinction of vision is according to merit '*and nothing else* ;'" a very different proposition. There are no words in the decree equivalent to "and nothing else." Nor is there any reason for supposing that the Council meant more than it says. It probably had before its eyes the error of those who maintained an absolute equality of reward in heaven, and only intended to define against them, as Henno says, that greater or less glory is due to greater or less merit.* The Scotists do not for a moment deny that men see God more or less perfectly according to their merits, but they say that where merits are equal, and one has greater capacity for the vision than the other, each receives the full reward he deserves in the *lumen gloriæ*, though one can make a better use of his *lumen* than the other; just as Dr. Ward with strange inconsistency admits, that of two men on earth, equally pious, the one with greater intellect will be, as a rule, the more spiritual (p. 53).

"The vision," says Viva, "so far as it answers to the

* "*Nihil faciebat ad ejus intentum quod erat ostendere majoribus meritis majorem reddi gloriam: quod et stat in nostrâ sententiâ.*" Trac. de Deo, disp. iv. q. 9.

lumen, corresponds to merit, and is equal with equal merit; but so far as it answers to the intellect, it will vary according to the greater or less perfection of the intellect. So that though the vision, formally considered as a reward *quâ præmium*, be equal, yet in real fact the thing given is not the same, because the subject in one case can make more of it than in the other. If to two persons two equally magnificent dresses were given, and one person had a better figure than the other, we might say each had received an equal reward; yet, in point of fact, it would not be so, for the man with the best figure would make more of his reward than the other, *quatenus ex tali præmio majus lucrum reportaret*. If an equally good sword were given to two men unequal in strength and military attainments, the one with most strength and skill would *in fact*, though not formally, receive the greater reward.”*

Absolute position in heaven certainly does not depend solely on merit; it is a condemned proposition to say that it does.† And as to even relative position, the Holy Innocents, strictly speaking, did not merit at all, for they died before they could perform free acts; and yet I suppose their place in heaven, as martyrs, is higher than that of thousands who have accumulated vast stores of merit. To the servant who had received power over ten cities was given the talent which the wicked servant had neglected to use; and he thereby had an additional superiority *beyond his merits* over the servant who had received power over five cities (St. Luke xix. 24). At any rate, Dr. Ward has no right to censure others for not accepting an interpretation which is not in the letter of a decree, and which he cannot prove to be the true one. It is a principle in theology, that dogmatic decisions are not to be pressed beyond the necessary force of their words; were it otherwise, it is not too much to say that there would be as many dogmas in the Church as there are dogmatising theologians.

The appeal to the *sensus fidelium* scarcely merits notice. I believe that Viva's is eminently the common-sense view, and would be readily accepted by those *fideles* who might be able to understand its meaning.

Dr. Ward endeavours further to diminish the authority against him by two remarks: first, he says the number of theologians who maintain the thesis in question is extremely

* Viva, pars i. disp. 2, de Visione Dei, q. 4.

† “Opera bona justorum non accipient in die judicii extremi mercedem ampliorem, quam justo Dei judicio mereantur accipere.” Prop. 14, Mich. Bai. (Denz. Enchir. 894).

small; secondly, he insinuates that they hardly maintain the thesis.

1. His ground for the first statement is, that F. Compton Carleton, S. J., speaks of theologians as being unanimously against it. But F. Carleton was evidently not at home in Scotist theology; and Viva, S. J., speaks of the opinion as *recentioribus communius*.* Again, Dr. Ward says that "Mastrius, a very able Scotist, is only able to quote six names in its behalf; not one," he thinks, "of any conspicuous eminence." But can it be fairly concluded that Mastrius exhausted his powers in the list he gives? He possibly thought more highly of these theologians than his critic does, and deemed six sufficient. Now, in reply to Dr. Ward, I would say, that I look upon Henno, Frassen, and Mastrius as weighty authority, not so much as being individually theologians of note, but as the representatives of a great and approved school in the Church. Their agreement proves that they are delivering the Scotist doctrine on the subject, and as such they are entitled to far more consideration than any single theologian can claim for his private opinion. For the opinions of a single theologian may escape notice; but that the distinctive doctrine of a widely-spread and illustrious school, which has been brought forward and made matter of contention with other schools, should not have come to the knowledge of authorities in the Church is simply incredible. Again, Viva's theology is well known at Rome. Can any one doubt that it would have been on the Index long ago had it contained a proposition directly against the faith? The principle for which I contend is this;—that any Catholic has full right of holding any opinion which he thinks true and not opposed to the faith, if such opinion has the support of well-known theologians, has been fairly agitated in the schools of the Church, and has not been censured. And this, I maintain, is the case with the thesis under discussion. Is there the remotest connexion between my principle and that of the condemned proposition Dr. Ward quotes,—“The opinion of a young and modern author ought to be deemed probable so long as it is not certain that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable”?

Dr. Ward says that Suarez and Billuart have had no hesitation in censuring the thesis. The one calls it inconsistent with the principles of faith; the other declares that it leads necessarily to a conclusion worse than Pelagian. But, as Dr. Ward admits, their censure rests on wholly dif-

* P. i. disp. ii. q. 4.

ferent grounds from his. They do not attack the thesis as opposed to the Council of Florence, but because it goes against certain views of their own on the subject of grace. Besides, Billuart's objection certainly embraces that form of the thesis which Dr. Ward allows to be perfectly tenable. *Aliquem gradum gloriæ non correspondere gratiæ* applies as much to Tartaretus's opinion as Henno's. The fact is, that strong language from theologians who are biased in an opposite direction is no argument whatever against a doctrine. Suarez says of Billuart's doctrine, that "it favours the heretics of the day; deserves the Church's censure, or rather should be pronounced as already condemned; for it is so, if not under that name, yet in other terms equivalent, namely, in the condemnation of the proposition, that grace necessitates,—for necessity and predetermination to one thing are identical, as the definition and the thing defined."* Billuart, on his side, insinuates semi-Pelagianism against the Lessian school; on the other hand, the Jesuit Livinus de Meyer neatly remarks, that "egg is not more like egg than Calvinism to Thomism."†

2. Dr. Ward further attempts to weaken opposition by insinuating that Frassen, Henno, and Viva only half hold the thesis, "that they are thinking principally, not of a comparison between one man and another, but between a man and an angel. This," he says, "is obviously true of the three above-named theologians." I do not know what he means by "thinking principally of." They are laying down a principle applicable to all beatified intellects; and it is most obviously false to say that they do not include men as much as angels. On the contrary, their main subject is the *beati* of the Council of Florence, who, Dr. Ward contends, are men. They all object against themselves the decree of the Council; and they never so much as hint at evading it on the ground of its dealing with a different subject. Viva begins with the question, Whether unequal

* "Hinc contendunt Lessius, Molina, Vasques et alii ex his decretis quæ vocant inextricabilia et plusquamadamantina, fatum induci, socordiam, teporem et ignaviam hominibus afferri, studium virtutis retundi, inclinari homines ad dissolutionem vitæ, laudem detrahi bonis operibus, orationes refrigescere et extinguere, exhortationes et correptiones languescere et auferri, &c. 'Hanc doctrinam favere hæreticis hujus temporis, ideoque dignam esse ut per ecclesiæ censuram damnetur vel potius jam damnata declaretur; nam licet non sub eâ voce, sub aliis æquivalentibus jam damnata est, ut quod gratia necessitatem inducat: necessitas enim et prædeterminatio ad unum, idem sunt tanquam definitio et definitum.' Ita Suarez (De verâ Intelligentiâ Auxilii efficaciæ, cap. ultimo); Billuart, De Deo, dissert. viii. art. iv." I am very far from saying all this is not perfectly true.

† "Ovum ovo non esse similis quam doctrinam Calvinianam Thomisticæ." Quoted by Billuart, diss. viii. art. v.

intellects, with the same amount of *lumen*, see God alike? He goes on to say, that no Catholic can doubt the fact of inequality existing in the *beati*, in consequence of the Council of Florence. Having proved this point, he says, the difficulty now is to determine whether the inequality arises solely from difference of *lumen*, or also from difference of intellect; for instance, whether an angel would see God more clearly than a man, if both had equal *lumen gloriæ*?*

It is most evident that the comparison of angel and man is introduced, not as the main question, but simply as an illustration, and so is preserved throughout. Frassen even exemplifies the argument by comparing angel with angel, and man with man, and regards both cases as precisely similar.† Henno, with Viva, merely compares angel with man, to render his statement more intelligible.

Dr. Ward's second remark is as little to the purpose as his first. He has completely failed in proving that the thesis he attacks is against the faith, nor can he weaken the authority on which that thesis rests.

I will now turn to an opposite school of theology. Are the Thomists more favourable to Dr. Ward than the Scotists? As far as the letter of his thesis goes, I admit that they are; for their peculiar theory on the subject of grace virtually puts an end to nature, and therefore to both its moral and intellectual excellence. But if we look to the spirit and principle of their theology on the real question at issue, they and Dr. Ward are at opposite poles to one another. The contrast which Dr. Ward really means is between the intellect and the will. The principle on which his Essays proceed is, that there is no true excellence, nothing worthy of admiration, except in the will; whereas non-Catholics are supposed to give intellect the first place. Now, whether non-Catholics do this or not, there can be no doubt whatever about the Thomists. They, in every case where intellect and will are fairly compared together, give the preference to intellect. When I say "fairly compared," I mean when each faculty has due scope with respect to its object. They

* "Utrum intellectus inæquales cum æquali lumine æqualiter Deum videant?" "Dari de facto in *beatis* visionum inæqualitatem non dubitatur apud Catholicos cum definitum sit in *Florentino*, &c. . . . Difficultas nunc est, utrum visionum et beatitudinis inæqualitas unice oriatur ex inæqualitate luminis elevantis an etiam provenire possit ab inæqualitate intellectuum, ut proinde clarius Deum videat angelus, e.g. quam homo, si uterque æquali lumine eleventur."

† "Item unus homo, *vel* angelus beatus, . . . se discerneret ab alio minus beato, . . . et sic unus homo, *vel* angelus magis beatus per sua naturalia sese discernet ab alio minus beato." Frassen, tract. i. disp. iii. art. vii. sect. iv. q. 2.

begin with God. They say that the most perfect attribute we are able to conceive in God, that which, according to our mode of thinking, is the source of all His other perfections, is (not Goodness, but) Intelligence. Their description of God accordingly is, "a supremely Intelligent Being most completely in act."* And throughout their theology intellect every where has the preëminence. "The most perfect life is the intellectual."† Man's perfection consists essentially, not in beatific love, but in beatific knowledge. "Since formal beatitude," says Billuart, quoting St. Thomas, "is man's ultimate perfection, the attainment of the chief good, it ought to consist in an act of the highest faculty; but the intellect is a nobler and more excellent faculty than the will, both because its object is more abstract and less material, and the faculty itself is more closely connected with the essence of the soul than the will, being the principle of the latter."‡ "In this life, indeed, charity is more perfect than faith, because faith really does not touch its object; but the love of God in the *next* world is not more perfect than the vision of Him."§

Let me draw out this contradiction:

Dr. Ward. "It is plain that this fact—*i. e.* liberty, power of originating acts—confers on the will a dignity and importance quite unmeasurably greater than any other faculty can possess" (p. 23).

Billuart. "Although liberty is formally in the will, it has its origin in the intellect, through the judgment of the reason; and the cause is more noble than the effect, the root than its product. Besides, granting that liberty is more perfect than necessity in moral entity, it is not so in physical, otherwise those operations of God *ad extra*, by which

* "Illud est constitutivum naturæ cujuslibet . . . quod in ea primum concipitur ut quid actualius *et perfectius* unde fit quod sit radix et origo cæterarum perfectionum: atqui inter omnes Dei perfectiones, prima quæ concipitur ut actualior et perfectior non est intelligere radicale seu potentia intelligendi, sed ipsum intelligere actualissimum et perfectissimum." Billuart, de Deo, diss. ii. a. 1.

"Dei descriptio erit hæc, ens summe et actualissime intelligens." Ib. dico. 2.

† "Intelligere sit perfectissimus vitæ gradus." De Deo, diss. vi. art. 7.

‡ Billuart, vol. iv. diss. ii. art. 2.

§ "Ex hoc quod charitas sit perfectior fide tenebris involuta male inferitur quod genus volitivum sit perfectius intellectivo et consequenter quod charitas sit perfectior visione clarâ Dei. . . . Respondeo S. Thomam loqui de amore et cognitione secundum statum viæ in quo amor rerum superiorum secundum quid est perfectior earum cognitione quia amor fertur in res ut sunt in se, earum autem cognitio in viâ non *attingit illas ut sunt in se*, sed per species haustas a materialibus, quæ ideo non repræsentant res superiores ut sunt in se, sed secundum similitudinem materialium a quibus sunt haustæ: *et hac ratione* amor rerum superiorum est perfectior earum cognitione. At vero vi patria intellectus non cognoscit Deum per speciem sed ut est in se." Billuart, vol. iv. diss. ii. art. 2.

He creates, would be more perfect than those *ad intra*, by which He understands and loves Himself; for the former are free, but not the latter.”*

Dr. Ward maintains, that the happiness of the soul does not consist in knowledge, but in the exercise of the affections; and that our real and true bliss is—*not to know*, or to effect, or to pursue, but to love, to hope, to joy, to admire, to revere, to adore.

Billuart maintains, that “Man’s beatitude consists essentially not in many acts, *e.g.* of the intellect and will; not in any act of the will; not in desire; *not in love*; not in fruition; *not in joy*; but *solely in an act of the intellect*.”†

I think it would puzzle Dr. Ward to find a non-Catholic whose statements are more diametrically opposed to his than these, or a school which does more profound homage to the intellect than that of St. Thomas.

The doctrine of the Incarnation furnishes another most powerful argument against Dr. Ward’s thesis.

Every thing is perfect in proportion as it fulfils its ideal, as it approaches the highest type of its species. Man, then, is perfect so far as he realises in himself the ideal of mankind. But who is that Ideal, who is the Pattern Man, who is our Exemplar, save our Blessed Lord? He is the Head of the human race regenerated; the second Adam; in Him we are fulfilled; in Him we find our true perfection. “He,” says St. Paul, “gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors. For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ: until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, *unto a perfect man*, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ: that henceforth we may in all things grow up in Him who is the head, even Christ” (Eph. iv. 11-15). “Ye are *filled* in Him, who is the head of all principality and power” (Col. ii. 10). “Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren” (Rom. viii. 29). The whole of the second part of St. Ignatius’s Exercises is founded on this truth.

Whatever perfection, then, our Blessed Lord has in His human nature is a part of our perfection as men.

Now theologians are, I believe, unanimous in ascribing

* Vol. iv. diss. ii. art. 2.

† “Beatitudo formalis non consistit essentialiter in pluribus actibus scilicet intellectus et voluntatis non consistit essentialiter in actu voluntatis non desiderium non amor non fruitio seu gaudium consistit essentialiter in actu intellectus.” Vol. iv. diss. ii. art. 2. Dico 1, 2, 3.

to our Lord precisely that which Dr. Ward calls intellectual excellence, and this, too, on the ground of its being a part of man's perfection. "Christ," says Billuart, "took perfect human nature; but the perfection of human nature requires that it should understand by a natural intelligence of its own."* It was fitting that all the natural capacity of Christ's soul should be reduced to act; but the soul of Christ has an innate capacity for acquired knowledge (*scientiam*) not less than the souls of other men.† "It belongs to the perfection of Christ's intellect not only to know all things, but to *know all things in every way in which they can be known*."‡ "It befits Christ not only to have all sciences, but to have them in every possible manner suitable and proper to the nature of each;"§ where, observe, he does not say "the nature of Christ," but "Christ." "Because," says St. Thomas, "no perfection which any creature manifests is to be denied to the soul of Christ, the most excellent of creatures, it follows that, besides the knowledge whereby He sees the essence of God and all things in it, three other kinds of knowledge are to be ascribed to Him; one experimental, as in other men, so far as He knew through the senses as human nature ought."|| "Christ, by acquired knowledge (*scientiam*), . . . knew all things which, by the exercise of the active intellect, can be known, because the power of His genius was in the highest degree of excellence."¶

Intellectual excellence, then, is certainly a part of Christ's perfection as man; and, therefore, I say it is indisputably a part of our true perfection.

Dr. Ward's statement in answer to this objection fills

* "Christus assumpsit perfectam humanitatem: atqui ad perfectionem humanitatis requiritur quod actu intelligat intellectione sibi propria et naturali." Vol. iii. diss. x. ad in.

† "Conveniens fuit ut omnis potentialitas animæ. Christi naturalis reduceretur ad actum; atqui anima Christi erat in potentia connaturali ad scientiam per se acquisibilem non minus quam animæ aliorum hominum quibuscum est ejusdem speciei ergo." Diss. xii. art. 1.

‡ "Porro ad perfectionem intellectus Christi spectat non solum omnia cognoscere sed omnia cognoscere omni modo quo sunt cognoscibilia." Ibid.

§ "Christo convenit non solum habere omnes scientias sed eas etiam habere omni modo connaturaliter possibili et convenienti." Ibid.

|| "Id totum et præcedentia docet D. Th. Opus. ii. c. 216, his verbis: 'Quia nulla perfectio creaturis exhibita animæ Christi quæ est creaturarum excellentissima deneganda est, convenienter præter cognitionem qua Dei essentiam videt et omnia in ipsa, triplex alia cognitio est ei attribuenda; una quidem experimentalis sicut aliis hominibus in quantum aliqua per sensus cognovit, ut competit naturæ humanæ.'" Billuart, vol. iii. diss. xi. art. 1.

¶ "Christum per eam scientiam scivisse . . . omnia quæ per actionem intellectus agentis cognosci possunt, quia fuit excellentissima vis ingenii Christi." Ib. diss. xii. art. ii.

one with simple amazement. "Our Blessed Lord," he says, "has and can have no other *personal* perfection excepting His Divine perfection; since He possesses human nature indeed, but no human personality" (Appendix B, p. 86). Our true perfection, then, is not in Christ. He is not our Model, not our Example! Our perfection is not in the fullest sense Christian, since it is not the perfection of Christ! If this is not against Scripture, the Church, theologians, the *sensus fidelium*, the Exercises of St. Ignatius, and every other conceivable source of Catholic doctrine, what is?

The perfections of the Sacred Humanity are not the personal perfections of our Blessed Lord! What can Dr. Ward mean? Of course he attaches to his words an orthodox sense, but their sound would have rejoiced Nestorius. Does he intend to say that the perfections of the Sacred Humanity are not really and truly the perfections of the Person of Christ? Has he forgotten "*actiones sunt suppositorum*," and the *communicatio idiomatum*? What is meant by saying that our Lord has no human personality? * Precisely this: *that the perfections of His Humanity do not terminate in any thing human, but in the person of the Word; that that Nature's actions are not its own, but redound to the second Person of the Blessed Trinity. The Person of Christ, as Billuart says, is not simply the Person of the Word subsisting in the Godhead, but the Person of the Word subsisting in both the Godhead and the Manhood; † so that the perfections of the latter are as truly Christ's personal perfections as those of the former. Hence Christ is spoken of as a *Persona composita*. Hence the attributes of either nature can be alike predicated of the Person of Christ. We can as truly say of Christ as a Person that He was born and suffered, and died, as that He creates and preserves all things, and is omnipotent and eternal. Dr. Ward of course knows all these matters of faith, and far be it from me to*

* "Inter naturam et suppositum non rei sed *ἐπιβολας*, id est rationis, esse discrimen: ac personam vel suppositum *nihil ad naturam aliud addere præter modum existendi*. . . Itaque suppositum nihil aliud est quam natura singularis per se subsistens: *ac tota illius ratio et essentia est natura ipsa modificata et determinata*. Sicut hominis sive sedentis sive stantis essentia et definitio non est sessio vel statio; sed id quod homini in se spectato convenit ut sit animal ratione præditum. Et cum persona quippiam agere vel aliquo modo affici dicitur idem est ac naturam facere aliquid aut pati. Est enim natura motus et quietis principium." Petavius, Theol. Dog. de Incar. lib. viii. cap. 2.

† "Persona Christi est ipsamet persona Verbi non ut subsistens in solâ naturâ divinâ sed ut subsistens in naturâ divinâ et humanâ. Plus ergo dicit persona Christi quam persona Verbi; licet enim sit eadem utriusque entitas tamen post Incarnationem non habet solum officium terminandi naturam divinam sed etiam humanam, unde est simul persona Verbi et hominis." Billuart, vol. ii. diss. iv. art. 2.

insinuate that he means to deny them ; but when they are taken for granted, his argument falls to the ground.

As theologians consider that the ideal of man's perfection requires intellectual excellence in its highest degree, so in proportionate measure we find them attributing it to those who approached nearest to that ideal, the Blessed Virgin and Adam. Dr. Ward denies this, and asserts that Billuart agrees with St. Antoninus in making Mary's *virtutes intellectuales* less than Adam's. Billuart and St. Antoninus do no such thing. On the contrary, they say that though our Blessed Lady knew fewer things in a lower order than Adam, she knew more in a higher, *e.g.* that she was a better theologian than Adam. Is this saying that her intellectual excellence is less than Adam's? If I say that Newton knew less about the art of cookery than Soyer, do I thereby say that Newton was intellectually inferior to Soyer?

Thus far I have stated what appear to me strong reasons for regarding the main position of Dr. Ward's Essays as unsound and un-Catholic. It only remains to examine what he himself has to say in its behalf. He brings forward five arguments : 1, from reason ; 2, from St. Ignatius's Foundation ; 3, from the consent of theologians ; 4, from the doctrine of merit ; 5, from the canonisation of saints.

1. The following is the one from reason :

"Thus let it be assumed there is a God ; that we have been created by an Infinitely Holy Being, to whom we owe absolutely and without exception every thing which we have, every thing which we hope, every thing which we are. The more we ponder on this truth, the more we shall regard it as a self-evident maxim that we reach our perfection in proportion as we are more prompt at every moment of our life to obey His commands and follow His preference. But, as I have already urged in a different connexion, such promptitude is simply the perfection of our moral and spiritual nature ; it is obtained by constant discipline of the will, and cannot possibly be obtained in any other way. Hence man's perfection is the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature" (p. 22).

The fallacy here is most apparent. It consists in assuming that promptitude is perfection because it leads thereto. The argument is : promptitude alone is perfection, and promptitude is only in the will, therefore in the will, not in the intellect, lies our perfection ; but promptitude is not perfection, for perfection means something more than willingness to do ; it means actual performance. It consists not in trying to keep, but in keeping, God's commandments, in truly fulfilling His will. Bearing this in mind, we can form a counter-argument thus :

"We have been created by an Infinitely Wise Being in his image, to reflect his attributes, so far as he has given us the power of so doing. The more we ponder on this truth, the more we shall regard it as a self-evident maxim, that God, having given us intelligence as a part of ourselves, wills that we should attain intellectual as well as moral excellence,—should be wise as well as good."

Dr. Ward contends that because the will is immeasurably higher than any other faculty, being that by which we originate acts, therefore man's perfection is perfection of the will. But is not the freedom of the will due in great measure to the intellect? However that may be, it is not enough to prove that the will is the highest faculty; it must then be proved to be the *only* faculty connoted by the term "man" before we can legitimately infer that it alone constitutes man's perfection. So long as "man" stands for intellect as well as will, logic must persist in concluding that man's perfection is not only perfection of the will, but also of the intellect.

2. Dr. Ward appeals to the Foundation of the Exercises of St. Ignatius:

"'Man has been created that he may praise the Lord his God, and show Him reverence and serve Him, and by means of this save his soul.' Now it will be admitted by all that man arrives at his personal perfection in proportion as he achieves the end for which he has been created. According to St. Ignatius, therefore, he arrives at his personal perfection in proportion as he is more prompt and disposed to praise, reverence, and serve God. But he is more prompt and disposed to do these things in proportion as he has more accustomed himself to live in the constant remembrance of God, or in other words, in proportion as he has more sedulously cultivated his moral and spiritual nature. Hence, according to St. Ignatius, man arrives more nearly to his personal perfection precisely in proportion as he more sedulously cultivates piety and spirituality" (pp. 7, 8).

There is here the same confusion of means and ends as in the last argument. According to St. Ignatius, we are created to save our souls by serving God. But we do serve God in cultivating our intellectual as well as our moral nature, and salvation implies beatific knowledge as well as beatific love. Again,

"Let me suppose any one to admit that we should be indifferent between health and sickness, between wealth and poverty; he certainly will not deny that we should be equally indifferent between great and small intellectual power. Or if any one were to attempt so strange a distinction, St. Ignatius's words would preclude the comment; for he says that in all other things we are to act

similarly, wishing and choosing those which more conduce to our true end. Intellectual power, I say, just as bodily health or temporal well-being, is to be desired just in so much as it may be the means of our spiritual perfection" (p. 8).

There is not the least parallel between mere external goods, accidental states of the body, and an essential faculty of the soul. We may turn intellect to evil, but *of its own nature* it leads to our end, Truth. Besides, the passage is irrelevant; for St. Ignatius is not considering the nature of man's perfection in itself, but the means of its acquirement.

3. Next in order is the argument from St. Thomas and theologians:

"He (*i. e.* St. Thomas) tells us that the perfection of Christian life consists essentially in love for God and man, instrumentally in practising the Evangelical Councils."

St. Thomas is speaking of the Christian life *on earth*, which is not man's truest perfection. Where he considers the latter, he makes it consist essentially in knowledge, and not in love. The same is true of other theologians. Viva says, while we are *in viâ* we ought to know in order to love, because love merits life eternal, and *so* is more perfect and desirable. But love *in viâ* is desirable for the sake of the beatific vision, and the beatific vision is desirable for its own sake.*

4. Next comes the argument from merit:

"It will be admitted (1) that those acts which God most approves in us must be those which most lead to the end for which He created us; and (2) that those to which He has promised a Heavenly Reward must be those which He most approves. Now what are those acts to which He has promised a Heavenly Reward? Free supernatural acts of the will, and none others whatever" (p. 10).

Again means and end are confused together. The question is, not "What is the title to perfection?" but "What is perfection?" Merit is not the same as perfection; for the blessed are perfect in heaven, but cannot merit. God of course only approves *for reward* free acts of the will; for such alone are in our power to give or withhold; but He approves all that He sees in us of good. All His gifts are good; not the least of which is intellectual excellence. Even the unjust steward in the parable is commended because he acted prudently. Here we have an instance of an intel-

* "In via debere nos intelligere ut amemus quia amor est meritorius vitæ æternæ atque ideo perfectior et appetibilior. Sed amor viæ appetibilis est propter visionem beatam; visio autem beata est per se appetibilis." Viva, pars ii. dis. i. de Beatitudine.

lectual virtue, even in the midst of vice, held up as a subject of praise.

5. As Dr. Ward says, the argument from the canonisation of saints is merely a development of the last. And the answer just given will fully meet it. The process of canonisation proposes to ascertain whether a man has so conducted himself on earth as to afford the Church warrant for declaring him a saint in heaven. The constituents of man's ultimate perfection would be wholly beside the scope of such an investigation, though the Church would require that the person should have used all his faculties, whatever they might have been, to the greater glory of God.

These seem to be all the arguments Dr. Ward has supplied in behalf of a thesis which is certainly very far from self-evident. Whether that thesis can stand any the better for such support I must leave others to decide.

Before taking my leave of Dr. Ward, I would submit to his consideration a few quotations which show, I think, that if non-Catholics are alive to the claims of intellect, at least they are not indifferent to those of the will. I have chosen them from authors who are fair representatives of the class against which I conceive he mainly intends to direct his strictures. I will begin with Sir William Hamilton, who says, "Should physiology ever succeed in reducing the facts of intelligence to phenomena of matter, *philosophy would be subverted* in the subversion of *its three great objects*,—God, Free-will, and Immortality. True wisdom would then consist, not in speculation, but in repressing thought during our brief transit from nothingness to nothingness. For why? Philosophy would have become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation; the precept, '*Know thyself*' would have been replaced by the terrific oracle to Œdipus—

‘Mayst thou ne’er know the truth of what thou art;’

and the final recompense of our scientific curiosity would be wailing deeper than Cassandra's for the ignorance that saved us from despair." "The second quotation is from Kant; it finely illustrates the influences of material and mental studies by contrasting them in reference to the *very noblest object* of either, and the passage is worthy of your attention, not only for the soundness of its doctrine, but for the natural and unsought-for sublimity of its expression: 'Two things there are which, the oftener and the more steadfastly we consider, fill the mind with an ever-new, an ever-rising admiration and reverence,—the starry heaven above, *the Moral Law within*. . . . The other elevates my worth as an intelligence even

without limit ; and this through my personality, in which the moral law reveals a faculty of life independent of my animal nature, nay, of the whole material world ;—at least, if it be permitted to infer as much from the regulation of my being which a conformity with that law exacts ; proposing *as it does my moral worth for the absolute end of my activity*, conceding no compromise of its imperative to a necessitation of nature, and spurning in its infinity the conditions and boundaries of my present transitory life.’ ”*

In the first of these quotations Sir William Hamilton distinctly says that the three great objects of philosophy are God, Free-will, and the Immortality of the soul. In the second he speaks of the moral sense as the noblest object of mental philosophy, and quotes with marked approval a sublime passage from Kant on the moral law. Observe, that philosopher speaks of “moral worth” as “the absolute end of my activity.” How, then, can Dr. Ward maintain that Sir William Hamilton’s doctrine is, that the great object and end of philosophy is the pleasure arising from mental excitement ? If it were so, how should materialism subvert philosophy ? Why should ignorance alone prevent us from wailing deeper than Cassandra’s, and be necessary to save us from despair ? On the contrary, “let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,” ought in that case to be in the mouths of intellectual as well as physical gluttons. These quotations quite meet all that Dr. Ward advances in his last appendix.

Dr. Whewell as fairly represents the physical and mathematical school of philosophy as Sir William Hamilton the metaphysical. The following is his notion of intellectual excellence : “In the notion of wisdom we include not only, as in prudence, a right selection of means for an assumed end, but also a right selection of the ends. However prudent a man may be in seeking his interest, he is not wise if in doing this he neglect a truer end of human action. Wisdom is the habit by which we select right means for right ends. We approve and admire prudence *relatively* to its end ; we approve and admire wisdom absolutely. We commend the prudent man as taking the best course for his purpose ; but we do not necessarily agree with him in his estimate of his object. We venerate the wise man as one knowing better than we do the true object of action, as well as the means of approaching it. Wisdom is a cardinal virtue, like benevolence, justice, truth, purity ; and with reference to the first as well as the other four, human dispositions are

* Sir William Hamilton’s Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. ii. 37-39.

good as they partake of the cardinal virtue. *Wisdom is the complete idea of intellectual excellence*, as benevolence, justice, truth, and purity, are of moral excellence.”*

I now turn to a very different kind of author. Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton has just published a novel, with the express object of illustrating the philosophy of Maine de Biran. His point is to show that man’s highest perfection lies in the spiritual and religious element; that, divested of this, man is on a level with the beasts that perish. He says, “ ‘There are not only two principles opposed to each other in man, there are three. For there are in him three lives and three orders of faculties. Though all should be in accord and in harmony between the sensitive and the active faculties which constitute man, there would still be a nature superior, a third life which would not be satisfied; which would make felt (*ferait sentir*) the truth that there is another happiness, another wisdom, another perfection, at once above the greatest human happiness, above the highest wisdom, or intellectual and moral perfection, of which the human being is susceptible.’ . . . ‘Christianity alone embraces the whole man. It dissimulates none of the vices of his nature, and avails itself of his miseries and his weakness, in order to conduct him to his end, in showing him all the want that he has of a succour more exalted.’ In the passages thus quoted I imply one of the objects for which this tale has been written; and I cite them with a wish to acknowledge one of those priceless obligations which writings the lightest and most fantastic often incur to reasoners the most serious and profound.”†

My last quotation shall be one from the *In Memoriam* of Tennyson :

“ Who loves not knowledge ? Who shall rail
Against her beauty ? May she mix
With men and prosper ! Who shall fix
Her pillars ? Let her work prevail.

But on her forehead sits a fire :
She sets her forward countenance
And leaps into the future chance,
Submitting all things to desire.

Half-grown as yet, a child and vain—
She cannot fight the fear of death.
What is she, cut from love and faith,
But some wild Pallas from the brain

Of Demon ? fiery hot to burst
All barriers in her onward race
For power. *Let her know her place ;*
She is the second, not the first.

* Elements of Morality, b. xi. p. 152.

† Preface to *A Strange Story*, by the author of “ Rienzi,” &c.

A higher hand must make her mild,
 If all be not in vain ; and guide
 Her footsteps, moving side by side
 With wisdom, like the younger child :

*For she is earthly of the mind,
 But wisdom heavenly of the soul.*
 O friend, who camest to thy goal
 So early leaving me behind,

I would the great world grew like thee,
 Who grewest not alone in power
 And knowledge, but from hour to hour
 In reverence and in charity." *In Memoriam, cxii.*

Evidence of a like import might, I doubt not, be multiplied to almost any extent ; but the above samples are amply sufficient. I cannot, however, help reminding Dr. Ward that it was probably from the non-Catholic Butler that he first learnt the supremacy of conscience ; at any rate, in no writer is that doctrine more distinctly and forcibly taught.

The sum of what I have said against the thesis of the Essays amounts to this : 1. I regard it as unsound because based on an unreal distinction between intellectus and "intellect." I believe intellectus and intellect are essentially one and the same thing. Dr. Ward, in fact, knows no excellence except that of the will. He cannot, in the face of St. Thomas and his school, quite say that this is the one doctrine of the Church ; so he catches at an apparent distinction between the "intellectus" of theology and the "intellect" of popular language, and thereby proposes to escape many a damning quotation. The distinction being invalid, such mode of evasion is precluded. 2. I look on the thesis as a fallacy, because it deals with the technical and relative perfection of this life, instead of the absolute and true perfection of the next. A man may be called truly perfect in this life, with reference to others ; with reference to himself, at other times ; and as approaching his end ; but perfect absolutely, in the sense of having fulfilled the end of his creation, no man can be called until he has entered the beatific vision. 3. I regard the thesis as unsound, because it is opposed to reason ; to the very notion of man ; to the language of theologians ; to the Catholic doctrine which represents our Blessed Lord as "the Pattern Man"—the ideal of our true perfection. Nor can I discover any force in what Dr. Ward advances in its favour.

Further, although I believe no man strives more—is more "prompt," as he would say,—to do an opponent justice than Dr. Ward, he seems to me very far from having reached "perfection" in that way. He never seems to remember that

the non-assertion of a truth is not the same thing as its denial ; and that marks of interior piety and ascetical directions are scarcely to be expected in a course of lectures on philosophy. Charity presumes good intentions ; the *onus probandi* lies with those who deny them. When we have no reason for suspecting an author's moral character, when he declares the purport of his philosophy to be the maintenance of the great objects of religion, it is scarcely in accordance with charity to choose an interpretation, if another be open to us, which presupposes him a selfish intellectual glutton, who teaches his disciples to place their end in the creature rather than in the Creator.

O. S. F.

GALILEO AND MENDELSSOHN.

GALILEO and Mendelssohn have nothing in common except genius. But the letters of Mendelssohn, lately translated by Lady Wallis, make us acquainted with a man who identified himself with his art so as to make a kind of conscience of it ; and the life of Galileo just published by M. Philarète Chasles exhibits to us a philosopher who so little identified himself with his philosophy as to be ready to abjure it on occasion, to play fast and loose with it, and to have no conscience about it at all. The two together suggest a question, how far earnestness and conscience in art and philosophy are necessary to make a great artist and a great philosopher.

By earnestness I do not mean a severe and serious way of regarding the world, or a lachrymose view of men, such as characterised the crying philosopher of antiquity ; nor by the absence of earnestness do I mean a jocular or ironical manner of treating all events, such as the laughing philosopher exhibited. The earnest poet may be very merry or satirical, and the poet who is not in earnest may be very pathetic. Both may shed tears and smile through them, both may laugh with a sad heart. Singing for grief, as others sing for joy, does not make the difference between earnestness and the absence of it. It is not in the way in which objects affect them that the two kinds of artists differ, but in the way in which they respectively regard their art, and in the consciousness or the unconsciousness with which they put forth their powers.

In the cradle of art and philosophy, this unconsciousness pervades all thought ; men are poets without knowing the

difference between poetry and prose; they are eloquent without having learned a single rule of rhetoric; they reason well, though they never heard of a single law of logic; and they discover and invent without needing the apparatus of Bacon's *Organum*. Man puts forth what is in him, as a tree puts forth its leaves and fruit, not upon theory, not because he has found that there exists a corresponding want in society, but simply because the fire burns within him, and because nature forces him to get rid of the embarrassment of an overflowing exchequer of thought. But when art has grown, its territory is parceled out, all its occupied spaces are drawn upon the map, and discoverers know exactly the limits within which they have to make their discoveries. Rule and line are to some extent substituted for instinct and happy guess. Theory takes the place of inspiration. The two kinds of artistic and philosophic genius which correspond to these two conditions of art and knowledge are found to exist all down the stream of time. Every remarkable man belongs to one or the other of the two classes. In one the genius is rather born than made, in the other made rather than born. In one it comes more by inspiration, in the other more by labour. Hence in one it is a gift, in the other an acquisition. To one, genius seems more like a participation in the common wealth of the world, in the air or the water, or the sunshine, to which all are equally entitled, though all cannot equally use them; to the other, genius seems more like private property, the gain of one's own toil. This seems to be the key to the differences of the conduct of men of either class with regard to their genius and their art. One class is characterised by prodigality, the other by economy. As no one is sparing of air or sunshine, so no man who belongs to the former class economises his genius. Rather he squanders it with the same unconsciousness of its limits as that of the glutton when he squanders his health, or the spendthrift his estate. Or, to use an illustration that implies no moral blame, the genius of the first kind goes forth like the sun, rejoicing in its strength, dropping carelessly its jewels, flinging about its wealth with reckless prodigality or generous profusion, without staying to inquire who picks them up. The genius of the second kind, on the contrary, is economised like an income, which, however great, is soon spent, and is nursed as a man nurses his health when once he has become aware of its ticklish conditions. To such a genius the prodigality of nature is unfit. It must be managed as a wise steward manages a property, its incomings and its out-

goings must be properly balanced, and the law of mine and thine must be rigidly enforced against encroachers. Hence the genius of the first kind is spontaneous, impulsive, original, creative of new laws rather than obedient to old ones; while the genius of the second kind is disciplined, subject to rule, imitative, and a follower of laws that others have discovered, rather than a discoverer of new ones. The first makes things which seem to have grown, the second results in something which has the air of manufacture. The first is more impersonal than the second. The first seems more like a nation's thought speaking through one person's mouth, the second more like a person speaking his own thoughts to a nation. The first is generalised, the second is concentrated. The first has no conscience of personal dignity, the second is wrapped up in it. The first is an arrant thief, the second is scrupulously just in all its dealings. The first, as being impersonal, accommodates itself to the people, the second proudly holds itself aloof, and would sacrifice fortune, and perhaps even life, rather than bow to the mob. The first will strive to please the childishness of children and the folly of fools, the second will only appeal to the judgment of cultivated men. The first is popular, the second refined. The first appropriates all men's thoughts, and uses all the flotsam and jetsam which the waves of public life throw up, without inquiring to whom it belongs; the second stickles for originality, and is particular about picking the mark out of the secondhand clothes before it wears them. Again, as no man sets himself to decorate the elements,—the air, or the waters, or the light,—but only seeks to improve his own property, so the genius of the first kind never regards his art or his science as the ultimate object of his life; the genius of the second kind does so. A man of the first class is actuated by common motives, and does not differ from other men in his estimate of the usual objects of human endeavour; a man of the second class enshrines his genius in the highest place, makes his art the supreme end of life, does not use it as a mere instrument for attaining other ends, but makes it the ideal, the arbiter, and the rule of action. Hence the first does not mind exhibiting art or science in unworthy and ridiculous positions, while the second is careful of the dignity both of art and artist. The first strives to make a family, a house, or a name; the second strives to advance art or science. Hence the first has no artistic or scientific conscience, but sacrifices art to every whim; he keeps art widely apart from morals, and sees no right or wrong in it, but only fitness or unfitness, beauty or deformity. But the

second makes art a conscience, confounds it with ethics, and looks upon things artistically or scientifically bad or untrue as morally degrading also. Hence the first is characterised by artistic humility, or at least by thoughtlessness and unselfishness that easily does duty for humility; while the second is characterised by artistic pride and intense self-consciousness.

And the two kinds of genius are not only unlike in themselves, but in the influence which they have on the ruck of followers who have no genius, but only seek to pass for having it. The first called into being the rough German-student type of the storm-and-stress commotion that followed the publication of Schiller's *Robbers*. The affectation of fastness and idleness is the evident way of showing that one's acquirements are due to nature, and not to art. Hence the slouched-hat school of slovenly, unwashed, bearded, smoking, rollicking, genial, tipsy, quarrelsome, and passionate students, who think it more important to show that their works cost them little labour than to show any excellence in their works. But the hangers-on of the second kind of genius are in every way more respectable; cleanly, shaved, gentleman-like, industrious, pedantic, squeamish, and touchy, they devote themselves to the perfecting of an infinitesimal portion of the mass of knowledge or art; they live like respectable members of society; and if in an inner shrine they sacrifice to some deity of their own, some private Apollo that no one else ever heard of or cares for, their enthusiasm is a harmless flame, which amuses them and does not burn others, and is far from threatening to set the Thames on fire. They may be amateurs without *amour*, and connoisseurs without *connaissance*, but their worst fault is their tediousness and affectation; and this is a good exchange for the bellowing brutality of the other school. Not that the two kinds of genius can be estimated by their followers. Both kinds are real, both produce sublime and profound effects. One produces a natural, the other an artificial sublimity. The followers of the two agree in counterfeiting the sublimity or the depth, in inventing something that sounds like it, or that conventionally passes for it. But they can neither counterfeit the nature of one, nor the art of the other. Nature, purity, perspicuity, and simplicity cannot be affected; they do not walk in the clouds, or mask themselves in impenetrable disguise; where they are present they are evident to all, and where they are not evident they do not exist. The affectation of art is equally self-contradictory. The tendency of true art is to conceal itself;

the tendency of affected art is only to pretend to conceal itself with a sort of modesty, like that of Camilla, which, "*se cupit ante videri*," or like the coy charity which has invented the publicity of subscription-lists in order to prevent the left hand from knowing what the right hand gives.

Mendelssohn was an instance of a genius of the second kind, all the more striking from the freshness and youthfulness of his character. He had all the precocity of the Hebrew race; he was the son of a literary father, and had enjoyed all the advantages of the education of a literary and observant domestic circle; he was an accomplished gentleman; and, even in his teens, he was a great composer, a musician almost of the highest order. Nature had been prodigal of her gifts to him, and he improved nature by economising her bounty. He did not let his talents run to seed, and scatter their fruit at haphazard, but he diligently surveyed his ground, and determined what parts to cultivate, and what to leave wild. He clearly intended to begin where Beethoven left off, and expected that Cherubini, who sneezed at Beethoven's later works, would sneeze at his too. He was imitative, and chose his models with precision and decision. Bach was his great storehouse of subjects and forms. If he wanted a religious theme, he would go to Bach's corale-book; but he was not musical pre-Raphaelite enough to go back to the sources whence the corale-makers drew their inspiration. The old unmeasured church-melodies had not music for him. Some of them which had been used by Bach, such as the intonation of the *Credo* at Mass, he liked; these he seems to have valued highly as subjects for counterpoint, without having much appreciation of their melodic worth. After noting some antiphons, and some fragments of the chants of the Passion (which he writes with incorrect accentuation), he says, "I cannot help it, but I own it does irritate me to hear such holy and touching words sung to such dull, drawling music. They say it is *canto fermo*, Gregorian, &c.; no matter. If at that period there was neither the feeling nor the capability to write in a different style, at all events we have now the power to do so. . . . Why make the words sound a mere formula? . . . There is no false expression in it, because there is none of any kind. . . . A hundred times during the ceremony I was driven wild by such things as these; and then came people in a state of ecstasy, saying how splendid it had all been."

Here was an exclusiveness only inferior to that of the exclusive admirers of the Gregorian chant. Mendelssohn

rejected its forms as the products of a barbarous age of the art; but he seems to have forgotten that art generally requires some slight reminiscence of barbarism, some touch of nature, to prove our kindred with unsophisticated man. There are many lessons in melody and musical declamation to be learned from the old hymns and antiphons; and Mendelssohn might have been a better melodist if he had studied them with more patience. They are the real foundations of the corales he so much admired. But he did not dig lower than the stratum immediately above them, and thought he had gone low enough for the foundations of his art when he came to Martin Luther's measured hymn-tunes.

Besides his exact knowledge of the place he was to occupy in the field of his art, Mendelssohn had most of the other characteristics of the self-conscious artist. He looked upon his art with such earnestness that he failed to distinguish between moral baseness and defective artistic expression; or, at best, considered the two to be intimately connected as cause and effect. The moral degeneracy of the Italians fully explained to him the faults in their music. "It would indeed be marvellous," he said, "if any music could exist where there is no solid principle." He had a musical conscience; and he confessed, "I take music in a very serious light, and I consider it quite inadmissible to compose any thing that I do not thoroughly feel. It is just as if I were to utter a falsehood. For notes have as distinct a meaning as words, perhaps even a more definite sense." His ear heard the meaning of musical phrases as clearly as Ruskin's eye reads the character of pillars and porticoes. As Mr. Ruskin finds classical architecture to be "licentious, meretricious, mocking, scoffing, profane, pagan, and diabolical," so Mendelssohn found Auber's music to contain nothing but "braggadocio, degrading sensuality, pedantry, epicurism, and parodies of foreign nationality." Those who were not in earnest about politics and religion, he thought, could not be in earnest about art; and art was a nullity to any one who was not in earnest about it. I cannot fancy Mendelssohn writing slight waltzes for a tea-garden, like Beethoven, or perpetrating such a monstrous imbecility as the Wellington Symphony. Nor can I fancy him, like Handel, laying his contemporaries under contribution, and coolly transcribing other men's compositions into his scores. He had not the consciousness that justified the thefts of Handel and Shakespeare, who appropriated other men's fancies, "as the osprey takes the fish, by sovereignty of nature." I cannot fancy Mendelssohn announcing, as Beethoven did, after

listening to Cherubini's *Requiem*, "I intend to write a requiem, and I shall take that for my model."

Mendelssohn's genius also manifests itself clearly in his sympathies and antipathies. He liked the followers and affecters of artificial genius, but the affected naturalists he could not endure. One of his chief friends at Rome was a pedantic collector of scores, a man who had not much ear for music, or much intelligence for the art, but who knew a great deal of its bibliography. Mendelssohn found him a "quiet, zealous collector," sometimes fatiguing, sometimes irritable; but a man who adopted and persevered in one pursuit, prosecuting it to the best of his ability, and endeavouring to perfect it for the benefit of mankind. Such people Mendelssohn loved and esteemed. But he hated the young artists of the *Café Greco*, smoking in their den, with slouched hats over their eyes, and huge mastiffs swarming with vermin beside them, without coats or neck-ties, saying rude things to each other, hiding their eyes behind spectacles, sipping coffee, and speaking with the most irreverent familiarity of Titian and Pordenone. These "infernal critics" are Mendelssohn's blackest beasts, whom he vows and swears to annihilate, so far as harsh and cutting words will do it. Not that I suppose even a natural genius would find much satisfaction in the company of these caricatures of naturalists. Still the men which such a genius attracts, and among whom it finds most sympathy and appreciation, belong more or less to this school; while the men which a genius like Mendelssohn's attracts are of the measured and artificial kind.

As in music I contrast Mendelssohn with the great unconscious creators — Handel, Mozart, Beethoven, — so in poetry I should contrast Milton with Shakespeare, Wordsworth with Byron, Virgil with Homer, as the respective models of natural and artificial, unconscious and conscious art. In natural philosophy I find the same contrast between Galileo and Copernicus. The two men were equally convinced of the truth of the Heliocentric system. Yet of this truth one was utterly careless, equally ready to affirm or deny it, as if it signified no more than wearing a beard, or dressing in a particular colour; as if it was of no more importance than a particular sequence of chords might be to a composer, or a particular effect of light and shade to a painter. Copernicus, on the other hand, looked upon his discovery in a more serious light. He concealed it for years, for fear of the contradictions it would have to encounter; and when at last he published it, it was with a preface,

which declared that no authority upon earth should make him renounce it. If perchance, he said, some babbler, setting himself up as a judge of mathematics, about which he knows nothing, but grounding himself upon some distorted text of Scripture, dares to condemn my work, I have not a word to say to him, so long as I am allowed to despise his censure as rash. Mathematics must be left to mathematicians. For Copernicus there were inferior orders of truth which might be concealed, but there were no orders of truth which might be denied in the interests of a higher truth. Some were necessary, others unnecessary to be known; but, once known, all were equal as truths. Science became as much matter of conscience as religion. The least truth could not be sacrificed to the greatest. Both had their rights, and it was better to die than to betray them. But for Galileo the case was very different. Life and the solid aims of life were one thing, the mere ornaments of life were another. Scientific truth was but a matter of taste, not for a moment to be brought into competition with the real or supposed interests of religion, politics, or domestic economy. It has been said that there were two Galileos; one the unconscious genius hurried on by the uncontrollable impulses of his inspiration, and the other the subtle, pliant courtier, the sensual lover of ease, and sociable conventionalist. It might as wisely be said that there were two Shakespeares—one the poet, the other the man of the world. I don't mean to say that Galileo's was a perfect character; but I maintain that it was consistent, that its unity is perfectly intelligible, and that he was by no means so base a coward as M. Chasles has chosen to paint him. Galileo had not that consciousness of the personality of genius which alone gives a man an idea of his dignity as an artist or discoverer. His discoveries were his amusement, not his end. Newton thought the value of his scientific investigations was far below that of his inquiries into prophecy. Galileo did not for a moment allow his theories to come into competition with his religion. M. Chasles wonders why Galileo did not fly to Venice, and call upon all Europe to support him in his conflict with the theologians. He forgets that this would have made Galileo inconsistent,—would have shown that science was the ultimate aim and object of his life, instead of a mere accidental adjunct and ornament, which grew out of him like the hair from his head; so that he could with equal grace submit the one to the barber's razor, and the other to the shears of the Barberini.

Galileo, instead of being an unprincipled coward, as M. Chasles tries to make him out to be, in order by the contrast to show how much more unprincipled his ecclesiastical enemies were, seems to me to have acted on principle throughout. Thus his example becomes a significant lesson to faithful Christians who are also philosophers, when their philosophy crosses the supposed interests of the Church, and incurs the censure of theologians. Certain of their faith, in a different order of certainty and intimate conviction from that in which they are certain of their scientific theories, they cannot for a moment think of resigning their faith to their science, but determine to sacrifice the latter when the two come into competition. And so they continue till in the order of sense they find the power of the will to be null in presence of that of the intellect, and that the *e pur si muove* must always lie hidden behind the most determined resolution to say that the earth does not move. "I am determined," Galileo may have said, "to keep my faith intact. If the faith teaches that the earth stands still, and the sun moves, then there is some sense in which they do so. Authority does not give understanding; our understanding must find the way of reconciling what authority tells with the postulates of reason. I can believe that the earth is founded and stands for ever on its bases without denying it all motion; I can say that the sun is the centre of our system without making it entirely fixed. Thus, taken absolutely, I can say that the Copernican system is false; but this does not prevent me from saying that the Ptolemaic system is much more false. There is some defect in the Copernican system which prevents its being absolutely true. There is a radical subversion of truth in that of Ptolemy which makes it absurd." In some such way Galileo could remain for sixteen years contented under the definition of the Congregation of the Index in 1616, and could bring himself to recant his opinions in 1632.

The whole transaction is most painful; and M. Chasles has made it more so by his treating it as a mere personal question of envy, hatred, and malice on one side, and pliant cowardice on the other. It was, on the contrary, a question, on one side, of the apparent interests of Christendom, and, on the other, of submission to authority in matters over which that authority had no jurisdiction, in order not to break with it in those matters over which it was the rightful judge. The question was one of terrible difficulties on both sides; and before those difficulties can be made to render up all the doctrine which they involve, they must be

studied in a spirit very different from that of M. Philarète Chasles.

Almost every event of this magnitude has its comic side, and its buffoons. The chief buffoons of Galileo's controversy were a Dominican friar, who preached upon the sun's standing still at Joshua's bidding, and began his sermon, "*Viri Galilæi, quid statis aspicientes in cœlum?*" and a certain Father Inchofer, whose holy indignation led him to take a curious view of Galileo's "errors" in relation to Christian dogma. In his *tractatus syllepticus* he maintains that "the movement of the earth is of all heresies the most abominable, the most pernicious, the most scandalous; that a man had better bring forward in the lecture room, in societies, in public discussions, and in printed books, all the arguments against the principal articles of faith, against the immortality of the soul, against the creation and incarnation, than against the dogma of the stability of the earth; that this article of faith is so preëminently sacred that no disputes can be allowed concerning it, were they even only for the purpose of proving its falsity."

In all periods when opinions in themselves harmless and true are mixed up with ecclesiastical interests in such a manner as to become the watchwords of parties, and badges of agreement or disagreement with authorities, there are always weak-minded people who elevate these opinions to a sphere where they have no place, who make them dogmas of faith or heretical paradoxes, and who, to save themselves the trouble of judgment and discrimination, would rather see a man fall into known heresy or into open sin than see him embrace an opinion of which they know not whether it is true or false, but only know that it is rejected by the ecclesiastical party to which they belong. Christians like Galileo would be far less tempted to misbelief if they were not tempted by such unwise defenders of the faith. But not even these could make him go astray. They might compel him to renounce an opinion which he still held to be true, but they could never make him belie his profession. "No man in the world can call in question my exemplary piety, and my blind obedience to the commands of holy Church."

If Galileo had been a genius of the second kind, with a dominant idea of the dignity of genius, and a conscience in matters of science, he might have avoided all collision with authority by his silence; but he could scarcely have escaped with the same supple agility which the historical Galileo exhibited. I wonder what Mendelssohn would have done, if he had been ordered to record his conviction of the supe-

riority of the Gregorian chant to all later developments of music. At any rate, the absence of earnest devotion to art or science has one convenience. It obviates all chance of one's ever being called on to suffer martyrdom in its cause.

G. P.

EDMUND CAMPION.—No. VIII.

AFTER Hilary Term 1580 was over, Campion and Parsons found London emptied of friends and swarming with spies. Further stay there had become both useless and perilous, and they determined, with the other priests, to go forth on their appointed missions into the shires. Each Jesuit Father was furnished with two horses and a servant, two suits of apparel for travelling, sixty pounds in money, books, vestments, and all needful furniture for the church or for the road, by George Gilbert, who also promised to supply whatever more might be needful for him. Gilbert* was the founder and the soul of the young men's club, the origin of which I described in my last chapter. Not only did their peculiar position force these young laymen into such an association, but the various difficulties of the missionary priests made the coöperation of some such body absolutely necessary. The penal laws were already very severe, and held out strong inducements to the layman to betray the missionaries. Prudence, therefore, forbade them to compromise themselves, or the person whom they visited, before they knew that their visits at his house would be safe to themselves and acceptable to him. It was for this reason that the Jesuits were ordered to be very careful whom they conversed with; to prefer the gentleman, because of his greater influence when converted, his greater power to protect them, as well as the greater unlikelihood of his betraying their secret. But the Jesuits were on no account to have any personal dealings with the Protestant till his Catholic friends had sounded his disposition, secured his impartiality, and ascertained that the priests might speak with him without fear of being betrayed.† And all this required an extensive organisation among the Catholic gentry.

Further, as the safety of the priests required that they should know to whom they were going to trust themselves,

* Matthew Tanner, *Apost. S.J.*, p. 180.

† Instructions given to the first Jesuits sent on the English mission, art. xi.; Archives du Royaume, Brussels; Inventaire des Archives du Province des Jésuites, no. 1085.

and should be protected and conducted on their way from house to house, so did the safety of their host require that he should know whom he was receiving. Missionaries could not carry about with them the certificates of their priesthood, still less the proofs of their honesty. Unknown strangers might be spies or false brothers, or fallen priests, as easily as honest men. It was necessary, then, that missionaries should be conducted by some well-known and trustworthy person, who could answer for their identity and their honesty at the houses where they were introduced. Hence this conductor had to be a gentleman well known and respected throughout the country.

The members of the association bound themselves to perform the two functions of preparing Protestants and conducting the priests, and besides to procure alms for the common fund, out of which the priests were supplied. Their promise entailed upon them great sacrifices; they determined "to imitate the lives of apostles, and devote themselves wholly to the salvation of souls and conversion of heretics." They promised "to content themselves with food and clothing and the bare necessities of their state, and to bestow all the rest for the good of the Catholic cause." And their association was solemnly blessed by Gregory XIII., April 14, 1580.* These men soon became known as "subseminaries;" "conductors, companions, and comforters of priests;" "lay brothers;" out of whom the Jesuits were accused of getting "either all or most part of their riches," before turning them into their officers and solicitors; "inferior agents," "lay assistants," to "straggle abroad and bring in game," whose business it was, "not to argue, but to pry in corners, to get men to entertain conference of the priest, or inveigle youths to fly over sea to the seminaries."†

The association, as we may imagine, consisted "of young gentlemen of great zeal and forwardness in religion;" men of birth and property, without wives or office, and thus free to devote themselves to the cause. They entered on their dangerous and difficult path with "extraordinary joy and alacrity, every man offering himself, his person, his ability, his friends, and whatever God had lent him besides." Gilbert was the first; others were, Henry Vaux, Campion's old pupil; and Vaux's brother-in-law, Brooks; Charles Arun-

* Faculties granted to Parsons and Campion, State-Paper Office, Dom. Eliz., vol. cxxxvii., nos. 26-28.

† Watson, *Quodlibets*, pp. 89 and 113; John Gee, *Foot out of the Snare*, p. 66.

del; Charles Basset, great-grandson of Sir Thomas More; Edward and Francis Throgmorton; William Brooksby; Richard and William Griffen; Arthur Creswell; Edward Fitton; Stephen Brinkly; Gervase and Henry Pierrepont; Nicholas Roscarock; Anthony Babington; Chideock Titchbourne; Charles Tilney; Edward Abingdon; Thomas Salisbury; Jerome Bellamy; William Tresham; Thomas Fitzherbert; John Stonor; James Hall; Richard Stanihurst, another of Campion's pupils; Godfrey Fuljambe, who afterwards did very little credit to the society, and many others whom Parsons will not name for fear of compromising them. Among them must have been, at one time, Lord Oxford, Lord Henry Howard, Mr. Southwell, Lord Paget, and Thomas Pounce. It will be seen by the above list that the young men not only belonged to the chief Catholic families of the land, but that the society also furnished the principals of many of the real or pretended plots of the last twenty years of Elizabeth and the first few years of James I. So difficult must it ever be to keep a secret organisation long faithful to a purely religious and ecclesiastical purpose.

Equipped by this society, Parsons and Campion rode forth; the first accompanied by George Gilbert, the second by Gervase Pierrepont. They agreed to meet to take leave of each other at Hogsdon, at the house of a gentleman,—I think, Sir William Catesby,—whose wife, a Throgmorton, was a Catholic. He himself was not yet converted; and for this reason the true names of his guests were not told to him.

Just before the Jesuits left Hogsdon, there came to them in hot haste Thomas Pounce, who was a prisoner in the Marshalsea, but who had found means to blind the gaoler to his temporary absence. He told them that a meeting of the associates, prisoners and others, had been held at the prison, to discuss the means of counteracting the rumours which the council was encouraging.

It was believed that the Jesuits had come into England for political purposes. The story, said Pounce, would grow during their absence from London, and would gain fresh strength with every fresh report of the conversions which they were about to make in the shires; the council would be exasperated, and if either of the fathers ever fell into its hands, he would be guilefully put out of the way or openly slaughtered, and then books would be published to deface him, according to the usual fashion of the day; hereby well-meaning people would be deceived, and the Catholic cause not a little slandered. But much of this, he went on to declare, would be remedied if each of the fathers would

write a brief declaration of the true causes of his coming, and would leave it, properly signed and sealed, with some sure friends until the day he might be taken or put to death. And then, if the enemy should falsely defame him, his friends might publish the declaration to justify his memory before God and man. Hence Pounce begged both of them to write their declarations, as if they were writing their last will.

The proposition seemed to proceed from zeal and mature discretion, and it was accepted by both the fathers. Parsons's paper is still preserved among the Mss. at Stonyhurst. And Campion, says Parsons, being a man of singular good-nature, and easy to be persuaded to whatever religion or piety inclined towards, rose from the company, took a pen, and seated himself at the end of the table, where in less than half an hour he wrote the declaration which was soon to be so famous. It was written without preparation, and in the hurry of starting; yet it was so "pithy in substance and style" that it was a triumph to one party and poison to the other. It was addressed to the Lords of the Council, before whom he expected to be examined when he should be apprehended. It runs thus:

"RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Whereas I have, out of Germany and Boeme-land, being sent by my superiors, adventured myself into this noble realm, my dear country, for the glory of God and benefit of souls, I thought it like enough that, in this busy, watchful, and suspicious world, I should, either sooner or later, be interrupted and stopped of my course. Wherefore, providing for all events, and uncertain what may become of me when God shall haply deliver my body into durance, I supposed it needful to put this writing in a readiness, desiring your good lordships to give it the reading, and to know my cause. This doing, I trust I shall ease you of some labour, for that which otherwise you must have sought by practice of wit, I do now lay into your hands by plain confession. And to the intent this whole matter may be conceived in order, and so the better both understood and remembered, I make thereof these nine points or articles, directly, truly, and resolutely opening my full enterprise and purpose.

1. I confess that I am, albeit unworthy, a priest of the Catholic Church, and, through the great mercies of God, vowed now these eight years into the religion of the Society of Jesus; and thereby have taken upon me a special kind of warfare under the banner of obedience, and eke resigned all my interest and possibility of wealth, honour, pleasures, and other worldly felicities.

2. At the voice of our General Provost, which is to me a warrant from Heaven and an oracle of Christ, I took my voyage from Prague to Rome, where our said General Father is alway resident, and from Rome to England, as I might and would have done joy-

ously into any part of Christendom or Heathenesse, had I been thereto assigned.

3. My charge is, of free cost to preach the Gospel, to minister the sacraments, to instruct the simple, to reform sinners, to confute errors, and, in brief, to cry alarm spiritual against foul vice and proud ignorance, wherewith many my dear countrymen are abused.

4. I never had mind, and am straitly forbid by our fathers that sent me, to deal in any respects with matters of state or policy of this realm, as those things which appertain not to my vocation, and from which I do gladly estrange and sequester my thoughts.

5. I ask, to the glory of God, with all humility, and under your correction, three sorts of indifferent and quiet audience. The first before your honours; wherein I shall discourse of religion so far as it toucheth the commonwealth and your nobilities. The second, whereof I make most account, before the doctors and masters and chosen men of both universities; wherein I undertake to avow the faith of our Catholic Church by proofs invincible, scriptures, councils, fathers, histories, natural and moral reason. The third, before the lawyers spiritual and temporal; wherein I will justify the said faith by the common wisdom of the laws standing yet in force and practice.

6. I would be loth to speak any thing that might sound of an insolent brag or challenge,* especially being now as a dead man to this world, and willing to cast my head under every man's foot, and to kiss the ground he treads upon. Yet have I such a courage in advancing the majesty of Jesus my King, and such affiance in His gracious favour, and such assurance in my quarrel, and my evidence so impregnable, because I know perfectly that none of the Protestants, nor all the Protestants living, nor any sect of our adversaries (howsoever they face men down in pulpits, and overrule us in their kingdom of grammarians and unlearned ears), can maintain their cause in disputation. I am to sue most humbly and instantly for the combat with all and every of them, or with the principal that may be found of them; protesting that in this trial the better furnished they come, the better welcome they shall be to me.

7. And because it hath pleased God to enrich the queen my sovereign lady with noble gifts of nature, learning, and princely education, I do verily trust, that if her highness would vouchsafe her royal person and good attention to such a conference as in the second part of my fifth article I have mentioned and requested, or to a few sermons which in her or your hearing I am to utter, such a manifest and fair light, by good method and plain dealing, may

* Of course this document, when published, became known by this title; the first reply to it was entitled:

"The great Bragge and Challenge of M. Champion a Jesuite, commonlye called Edmunde Campion, latelye arrived in Englande, contayninge nyne articles, here seuerallye laide downe, directed by him to the Lordes of the Counsaile, confuted and aunswered by Meredith Hanmer, M. of Art and Student in Divinitie. Imprinted at London, in Fletstreate, nere unto Sayncte Dunston's Church, by Thomas Marsh. 1581."

be cast upon those controversies, that possibly her zeal of truth and love of her people shall incline her noble grace to disfavour some proceedings hurtful to the realm, and procure towards us oppressed more equity.

8. Moreover, I doubt not but you, her honourable council, being of such wisdom and drift in cases most important, when you shall have heard these questions of religion opened faithfully which many times by our adversaries are huddled up and confounded, will see upon what substantial grounds our Catholic faith is builded, and how feeble that side is which by sway of the time prevaileth against us; and so at last, for your own souls, and for many thousand souls that depend upon your government, will discountenance error when it is bewrayed, and hearken to those which would spend the best blood in their bodies for your salvation. Many innocent hands are lifted up unto heaven for you daily and hourly, by those English students whose posterity shall not die, which, beyond the seas, gathering virtue and sufficient knowledge for the purpose, are determined never to give you over, but either to win you to Heaven or to die upon your pikes. And touching our Society, be it known unto you, that we have made a league—all the Jesuits in the world, whose succession and multitude must overreach all the practices of England—cheerfully to carry the cross that you shall lay upon us, and never to despair your recovery while we have a man left to enjoy your Tyburn, or to be racked with your torments, or to be consumed with your prisons. The expense is reckoned, the enterprise is begun; it is of God, it cannot be withstood. So the faith was planted, so it must be restored.

9. If these my offers be refused, and my endeavours can take no place, and I, having run thousands of miles to do you good, shall be rewarded with rigour,—I have no more to say, but to recommend your case and mine to Almighty God, the Searcher of hearts, who send us of His grace, and set us at accord before the day of payment, to the intent we may at last be friends in heaven, where all injuries shall be forgotten."

Campion wrote his triple challenge with more confidence in his cause, and more trust in the good-will of his opponents, than knowledge of their views. To reconcile the Catholicism which he came to preach with the designs of the politicians of the council was a task beyond all the powers of reason.

Elizabeth, had she been disposed to tolerate Catholics at all, would only have tolerated them on condition of their abjuring obedience to the Pope in matters which pertained to the state or affected the queen. But Campion could not even deny the validity of the Bull by which the queen was deprived of her crown, and could only show that he and the Catholics were for the present dispensed from attempting to enforce it, and from the penalties of its non-observance. The question of political reconciliation never advanced beyond this knot; and till this

was untied, the very terms of his challenge seemed to absolve his opponents from listening to his arguments upon the two remaining topics. His challenges to the politicians and to the lawyers were calculated to thwart him in his attempts to get a fair hearing from the divines, and were at first sight inconsistent with his profession of not meddling in matters of state. When he came to pen his seventh article, he had already recognised that the second part of his fifth article contained the pith of his challenge, and that the rest was superfluous. But there was no time to remodel it. He wrote it in haste, and gave a copy to Pounce, keeping the original himself. He desired that it might not be published till there was necessity for so doing; but he forgot to seal it, as had been proposed, and as the more wary Parsons took care to do. Pounce, therefore, went back to prison and read it, and was thrown by it into such a dithyrambic state of mind that, though he had no intention of imparting it to his friends, still less of giving them, or allowing them to take, copies of it, he was resolved not to hide its light altogether under a bushel.

The Marshalsea in Southwark, which was one of the chief prisons for recusant Catholics, was at that time infested by two Puritan ministers,—Mr. Tripp and Mr. Crowley,—who, under the protection of the authorities, visited the poorer prisoners in their cells, and urged them to “abide some conference” with them, “offering, like vain men, in angles, to the uncharitable vexation of the poor prisoners,” that disputation which they obstinately refused to abide in public. Pounce then, bursting with the secret of Campion’s challenge, which he carried in his bosom, was inspired by it himself to make a public challenge to Tripp and Crowley, and to back it up (Sept. 8) with petitions to the Council and to the Bishop of London, in which he discovered the universal wish of the Catholics for public conferences, and challenged a discussion, four to four, or six to six, on each side, adding, that he knew two or three who would challenge all the Protestant divines together, and give them Beza and all his brethren in. “Let this petition,” he concluded, “made in the name of all the Catholic fathers of our nation, remain for a perpetual record and testimony, even to our enemies, of our indifferency and their insufficiency. Muse not, my lords, at this challenge, with a counterbuff, as the soldier saith, for it is made in the further behalf (as it may be presumed) of a perpetual corporation and succession of most learned fathers, as any without comparison in the world;* with the aid of another good race besides, which cannot die,† who have all vowed, as cha-

* The Jesuits.

† The seminary priests.

city hath inflamed them, either to win this realm again to the Catholic faith, and that without any bloodshed except their own, at God's permission, or else to die all upon the pikes of your sharpest laws, and win heaven, as they hope, for themselves." Much of this, it will be seen, is copied closely from the eighth article of Campion's declaration.

Parsons had once before found that Campion could not be safely intrusted to the custody of the young associates of the Society,—a set of youths, as Bartoli writes, "*santa invero e degna d'ogni spirituale consolazione, ma per l'età e per lo concepito fervore, più generosa che cauta,*"*—for they were in a state of excitement similar to that which animated the first Crusaders. As gallant and enthusiastic as the conquerors of Jerusalem, they were quite as unable to understand or to obey the rules of political wisdom and prudence. Every earthly consideration seemed to them a presumptuous interference of earth with Heaven. Thus the same zeal which gave them their energies hurried them forward into the paths where those energies would be more mischievous than useful. Instead of letting Heaven dictate their end, and leaving earthly prudence to preside over their choice of the earthly means to their heavenly end, they obliterated all distinctions, and considered ends and means to lie alike within the supernatural sphere; and they were convinced that for every fresh danger that threatened them God had a new miracle in store to deliver them.

Pounde's reckless enthusiasm in challenging the ministers, and petitioning the Bishop and Council, had the effect of convincing the queen's ministers that a conspiracy was on foot. Pounde soon felt the consequences. The Bishop of London removed him (Sept. 18) from his companions in the Marshalsea, and sent him, heavily ironed, to solitary confinement in the then half-ruined episcopal castle at Bishop's Stortford. Pounde therefore, on the eve of his departure, either delivered Campion's paper to the keeping of some one even less retentive of a secret than himself, or else communicated it through an unwillingness to be checkmated by the Bishop of London, whose conduct he regarded as a mere dodge to stop all mention of a public discussion, or from a conviction that Campion's challenge was much more calculated to embarrass the council than his own had proved to be. Actuated by one of these motives, Pounde communicated the paper to his neighbour Titchbourne,† Titchbourne to William Horde, and Horde to several others, and especially to Elizabeth Sanders,

* Inghilterra, p. 107.

† They were both Hampshire men.

a nun, sister to Dr. Sanders, who was at this time with the Italian expedition in Ireland. Upon all these people John Watson, the Bishop of Winchester, laid hands on the 18th of November or thereabouts, committed their bodies to the house of correction at Winchester, confiscated their "lewd and forbidden books," and sent up to the Lords of the Council a copy of the "seditious supplication, protestation, or challenge," which, he added, seemed "very plausible" to the people in his part of England.* About the same time, another copy was discovered and sent up to the council by the Sheriff of Wilts. And from this time it became well known all over England, and many persons got into trouble for circulating copies of it.†

Pounde was right in the importance he attached to public disputation. It soon became one of the chief weapons of the Jesuits, whose unexampled dexterity in wielding it is thus described by a Protestant traveller, Sir Edwin Sandys :‡

"As for the controversies themselves, the main matter of all other, therein their industry is at this day incomparable ; having so altered the tenures of them, refined the states, subtilised the distinctions, sharpened their own proofs, devised answers, that in affiance of this furniture, and of their promptness of speech and wit, which by continual exercise they aspire to perfect, they dare enter into combat even with the best of their oppugners ; and will not doubt but either to entangle him so in the snares of their own quirks, or at leastwise so to avoid and put off his blows with the manifold wards of their multiplied distinctions, that an ordinary auditor shall never conceive them to be vanquished, and a favourable shall report them vanquishers.

Whereupon they now, to be quit with their adversaries, and by the very same act to draw away the multitude, cry mainly in all places for trial by disputations. This Campion the Jesuit did many years since with us. This, as I passed through Zurich, did the Cardinal Andrea of Constance and his Jesuits with their ministers. . . . Not long before, the same was done at Geneva ; and very lately the Capuchins renewed the challenge. In which parts I observed this discreet valour on both sides, that as the Romanists offer to dispute in the adversaries' own cities, which they know their magistrates will never accord, so the ministers, in supply thereof, offer to go to them

* State-Paper Office, Dom. Eliz. vol. cxliv. no. 31. There is a biographical notice of Pounde in the *Rambler* of July and August 1857, vol. xx. pp. 24 and 94. The challenge and petitions of Pounde are in the State-Paper Office, Dom. Eliz. vol. cxlii. no. 20.

† *E.g.* a number of young Irishmen, or rather English of the Pale, Fitzsimons, Richard Talbot, Walter Sutton, James Luttrell, and John Finglas, were examined on this point in January 1581. Their letters, which make mention of Mr. P. (Patrick, *i.e.* Campion), may be seen among the Domestic Papers of Feb. 17, 1581, in the State-Paper Office.

‡ *Europæ Speculum*, p. 94: "Of their offers of disputation."

to their cities, and that now is as much disliked on the other part ; each side being content that the fire should be kindled rather in his enemies' house than in his own."

The council soon knew of Campion's departure from London, and sent pursuivants into most of the shires of England with authority to apprehend him and Parsons wherever they could find them. But the Jesuits were diligently warned by the Catholics, and easily avoided their pursuers.

"They lost their labour" (says Parsons), "and we had three or four months free to follow our business, in which period, by the help and direction of the young gentlemen that went with us, we passed through the most part of the shires of England, preaching and administering the sacraments in almost every gentleman's and nobleman's house that we passed by, whether he was Catholic or not, provided he had any Catholics in his house to hear us.

We entered, for the most part, as acquaintance or kinsfolk of some person that lived within the house, and when that failed us, as passengers or friends of some gentleman that accompanied us ; and after ordinary salutations, we had our lodgings, by procurement of the Catholics, within the house, in some part retired from the rest, where, putting ourselves in priests' apparel and furniture,—which we always carried with us,—we had secret conference with the Catholics that were there, or such of them as might conveniently come, whom we ever caused to be ready for that night late to prepare themselves for the sacrament of confession ; and the next morning, very early, we had Mass, and the Blessed Sacrament ready for such as would communicate, and after that an exhortation ; and then we made ourselves ready to depart again. And this was the manner of proceeding when we stayed least ; but when there was longer and more liberal stay, then these exercises were more frequent."

The government had hitherto contented itself with issuing proclamations,—a second was published against harbouring Jesuits on the 3d of July,—and with searching for the missionaries. But when Pounce's challenge put it upon the false scent of a plot to stir up rebellion by promulgating the Pope's "Bulls and messages," and especially when this false opinion was corroborated by the dispersion of Campion's challenge, very different measures seemed necessary. When we consider the state of England and Ireland at the time, these fears do not seem utterly unreasonable. The measures which they prompted were both energetic and comprehensive. They amounted to a plan for putting all the Catholic gentry of England under surveillance, and for confining all the most energetic of them either to prison or to very narrow limits. First, certain castles in various parts of England were selected for the custody of the recusants, and a keeper and two super-

intendents appointed for each. Wisbeach Castle, which had been already selected in 1572, on account of its solitary site, and as a place where the chief recusants should be imprisoned and made "to live at their own charges,"* was now made the prison for such of "the capital doctors and priests" as were found "busier in matters of state than was meet for the quiet of the realm."† Sir Nicholas Bacon was appointed keeper; and Michell and Carleton, the latter a sour Puritan, were to be the resident superintendents.‡ Banbury was apportioned for the recusants of Warwick, Oxford, and Northampton; Tremingham for those of Norfolk and Suffolk; Kimbolton for those of Huntingdon, Buckingham, and Bedford; Portchester for those of Surrey, Hants, and Sussex; Devizes for those of Dorset, Wilts, and Somerset; Melbourne for Stafford, Derby, Leicester, Lincoln, and Nottingham; Halton in Cheshire, for Lancashire, Cheshire, and North Wales; Wigmore, in Montgomeryshire, for Hereford, Monmouth, Worcester, and South Wales. Those proposed for the north were, Middleham, Knaresborough, Durham, and Barnard Castle. The instructions to the keeper of Wisbeach Castle§ will serve as a specimen of the rest. Besides the usual rules of close confinement, a minister was to be appointed, to have "his charge of diet and other necessities by the contributions of the recusants;" and the keeper was to see "that due exercise of common prayer be observed every day, and preaching twice in the week at least." At this the prisoners were to be present, or, if they refused, they were to be fined at the pleasure of the Bishop of Ely. Each prisoner, moreover, was to be, "twice in the week at least, conferred with, as well by the minister as by other learned men sent by the bishop, or that voluntarily of themselves should come for so charitable a work." But the prisoners were to have no conference with each other but at meal-time, and then there was to be "no speech of any matters in controversy." Those who conferred with the minister were to have more liberty than those who did not. But none were to be allowed to have any books except a Bible, the works of the Fathers, and books licensed by the minister.

To this place, to this discipline, the government banished Watson, the Bishop of Lincoln; Feckenham, the Abbot of Westminster; and other dignitaries,—who up to this time had been allowed a certain amount of liberty.

* Letter of Council to Cox, Bishop of Ely, March 1572; Kennett's Collection, vol. xlviii.; Lansdowne Mss. no. 982, fol. 6.

† Burghley's Execution of Justice, p. 11 (reprint of 1675).

‡ Harleian Mss., no. 360, fol. 65.

§ Ibid. fol. 5.

"In their old age" (writes a priest from London to Father Agazari, rector of the English College at Rome*) "they are sent to Wisbeach Castle, a most unhealthy place, under the orders of a sour Puritan. It is certain they cannot live long there. Over and above the miseries of imprisonment, they are shamefully treated by their keeper. All books but a single Bible are taken from them, nor are they allowed any papers of their own writings, or notes. Conceited ministers are let in upon them without warning, with whom they must argue without preparation, or endure their insults. The most false and ridiculous libels upon them are published, and even printed, in order to lessen the consideration in which they are held. Last month† an immodest woman was shut up without their knowledge in one of their chambers, to give a handle for a false charge of incontinence. No access is allowed, and we are obliged to use tricks to communicate with them. When any one wants to give them an alms, he walks in the neighbouring fields the day before, and cries out as if he was looking for game. At this sign, one of them looks out of window, and learns by signal that there is something for the prisoners. The next night, when every body is asleep, the sportsman cautiously creeps up to the wall, and one of the prisoners lets down a basket from the window whence the sign was given, and draws up what is put into it. The same plan is generally adopted for the other prisons; but the variety of places requires a variety of methods, and the zeal, charity, and bravery of the Catholics is greatly conspicuous in designing and accomplishing these dangerous services."

After the coast had been somewhat cleared by confining the "capital doctors and priests" in Wisbeach, and the other recusants, already committed, in the other castles, the council undertook a general raid against all the Catholics of England. The chief of them were sent for to London, to answer before the council. Letters were directed to the Bishops to summon and commit those who were not summoned to London; but they were told to be careful not to permit them "to come many together at a time," for fear they should know their strength.‡ Those who appeared in London had first to give bonds for their appearance, and were then committed, some as prisoners to their own houses, some to those of their Protestant friends, and others to the castles prepared for them.

Father Parsons quotes a long string of names of persons committed. The following were the chief of them. The Earl of Southampton, Lord Herbert, Lord Compton, Lord Paget, Sir Thomas Fitzherbert, Sir John Arundell, Sir Alex-

* Transcribed in Sanders, *De Schismate*, lib. iii.

† This letter is dated July 1581.

‡ Harleian Mss., no. 360, fol. 65.

ander Culpeper, Sir John Southworth, Sir Nicholas Poyntz, Sir Thomas Gerard, Sir George Peckham, John Talbot of Grafton, William and Richard Shelly, Ralph Sheldon, Thomas and Francis Throgmorton, John and Edward Gage, Nicholas Thimbleby, William and Robert Tirwhit, Richard Culpeper, John Walker, Mr. Towneley, Mr. Guilford, Robert Price, Peter Titchbourne, Erasmus Wolseley, John Gifford, Brian Fowler, Thomas Cross.* Both of these events, the proclamation and the persecution, were described by Dr. Allen, who wrote as follows to the Cardinal of Como from Rheims, Sept. 12 (N.S.), 1580 :†

“ MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND REVEREND LORD CARDINAL,—Not long ago I sent your eminence the late proclamation of the Queen of England against the Catholics of her dominions; not, indeed, professedly against their religion, but against their suspected treason and conspiracy with the refugees. In it she tells her subjects, that the Pope and the King of Spain had been long and earnestly entreated by her enemies and the refugees to make war against her; she boasts that she is quite prepared for it, and that she fears no foreign forces; she commands her subjects to stand fast in their duty and fidelity; and she says she fears neither rebels within, nor the land or sea forces made ready without. Moreover, she declares that in future she means to deal more sharply than her habit or her nature inclines her with those of her subjects who are guilty of any conspiracy with the refugee rebels. Soon after the publication of this edict, by crier, through the whole realm, she orders that in each county all the more powerful and notable Catholics should be apprehended, and committed either to prison or to the custody of heretics. This was immediately, almost suddenly, put in execution; at the same time the strictest search was made for priests, particularly for two lawyers whom we sent over this summer, and for the Jesuits. But the Catholics take such pains, and use such care in concealing them, that up to this time very few have fallen into the enemies' hands. They have only taken two priests of Rheims and one of Rome.

The number of gentlemen now in prison is so great that they are obliged to remove the old prisoners for religion—the Bishop of Lincoln and several other ecclesiastics—to other strong places far distant from the city, to make room for the new prisoners. The same thing had already been done at York. But many think that the reason of this was, that the priests kept prisoners in those cities were converting all the chief citizens and many of the nobility, and persuading them by their life and example to persevere. Those

* This list I have compiled from Parsons, and from an official list of prisoners, Harleian Mss., no. 360, art. 1. Several of the persons named by Parsons, such as Lord Vaux, Sir Thomas Tresham, Sir William Catesby, and Sir Robert Dymock, the champion, were committed at a later date. The two latter were not yet Catholics in July 1580.

† Theiner, *Annales*, vol. iii. p. 215.

gentlemen are treated most severely who are known to have sons in the seminary of Rome or of Rheims. This persecution is heavier, and extends to more persons, than any of those before it. For before this they never committed any of the nobility ; who, however, are not in prison, but only given into the custody of heretics.

It is supposed that they do all this to prevent any Catholics joining the enemy, if there is to be any ; for they are horribly afraid of what is to be. And perhaps they have made quite sure of those whom they have shut up, whatever turns up. But as for the rest, who escape the present danger by dissimulation or other shifts, they are rather provoked and irritated to make some attempt, when God gives opportunity, not only to deliver their own souls, but their friends' also, who are so unhandsomely imprisoned.

And certainly the whole Catholic population, afflicted in soul and body by this disgraceful tyranny of one woman, beseeches God with unspeakable yearnings to grant some redemption. For this we exiles cry out to our most holy Father, the highest minister of justice upon earth ; for this the prisoners groan to him ; for this innumerable afflicted souls, his own sheep, stretch forth their hands to him. Not that we doubt that the well-known compassion of the most holy Gregory can do more than it does ; or that he, our only father upon earth, can wish us better or greater things than he does ; but that we may at least somewhat relieve our most just sorrow for our people by communicating our calamities to our most holy Lord and loving Father, and to your kindness. Certainly, all thinking men prognosticate that this new cruelty will do hurt to our enemies. Whether they intend to do more than imprison is as yet uncertain ; further measures are expected after the meeting of Parliament, which is supposed to be soon about to take place. Our religion is only exalted above its condemners by this persecution, and by the admirable constancy which it calls forth. And it is made clear to all, that the question now is not about religion,—of which our enemies have not a bit,—but about the stability of the empire, and about worldly prosperity. May the Lord Jesus long preserve your lordship to be our great defence !

Your Eminence's most humble servant in the Lord,

WILLIAM ALLEN.

Rheims, 12 Sept. 1580.

P.S.—I have sent you a page of the English Calendar, that you may see how solemnly the festival of Elizabeth's birthday is kept on the 7th of September, so as totally to eclipse that of the Blessed Virgin on the 8th, which is omitted. See the pride of the queen, who is not content with the festival of her coronation, but must have her birthday kept besides."

Neither Parsons nor Campion, who were on the spot, describe this persecution with so much bitterness as Dr. Allen at Rheims. This was partly through a generosity of character, to which it is more painful to see others suffer

than to suffer oneself; partly through a consciousness, which Allen could not but have felt, that the persecution was in some measure to be attributed to himself and the foreign meddlers who were perpetually interfering in the political affairs of England, with the object of restoring religion there. In spite of the laboured attempts of Parsons to prove the contrary, it is abundantly clear that Allen was deeply implicated in the plots of the day. The last part of the foregoing letter would have been treasonable in the eyes of all lawyers, especially when we connect his passionate appeal to the Pope with the Papal expedition against Elizabeth which at the very time had descended upon the coast of Ireland, and about which the nuncio at Paris had just sent off this news to Rome: "The Earl of Desmond, and Dr. Nicholas Sanders, and all the Catholic army, are still encamped in their old place—a strong position. They were, at the date of my advice, waiting for foreign aid, without which they can do little or nothing. But we heard yesterday by letter and authentic report that five great ships full of soldiers and munitions of war—sent, it said, by the Holy See—reached in safety some port in Ireland a few days ago."*

The Jesuits were satisfied with the fruits of this first expedition. They found the country people more inclined to be Catholics than the inhabitants of the towns,—“the infection of ministers bore most rule with artisans and merchants;” but the best part of the nobility and gentry, who dwelt on their estates, together with their tenants and dependents, remembered the virtuous life and just proceeding of those of the ancient religion, especially when they saw and felt the present contrast. It was a comfortable thing, says Parsons, to see the universal inclination of so infinite a people to the Catholic religion; but an incredible sorrow to witness the rents and breaches, the wrenches and disjointures, which the preaching of new doctrines for twenty years had made in the consciences and belief of that good people, which had lived so many ages in one faith. The breach between the Protestants and Puritans was already of many years’ date. But this year Puritanism had given birth to a new development, that of the “Family of Love,” which had already gained several of the queen’s household, and especially of her guard, and against which she published a proclamation, dated Richmond, October 3, in this year. The peasant

* Theiner, *Ann.* iii. 217: “News from Ireland,” early in August 1580. The letter goes on to describe the terror of the English Jezebel and her court of heretics, and the measures of precaution she was adopting.

mind had already begun to ferment. In May, Hammond, the plough-wright of Hethersett, had suffered the loss of his ears for blaspheming the queen and council, and was afterwards burnt in the castle-ditch at Norwich, for saying that the New Testament was a fable; that Christ's blood is not necessary for salvation; that He neither rose again nor ascended into heaven; that there is no Holy Ghost; and that there are no sacraments. Parsons maintains that this denial of all Christianity was a logical development of the principle which renounced the authority of tradition to determine the canon of Scripture and explain its meaning; rejected all merit in order to amplify God's mercy; denied Christ's descent into hell, and the assistance of general councils by the Holy Ghost; and prepared the way for rejecting all the sacraments by rejecting five of them.

But where the fermentation did not drive men into these sloughs, it led them to repair to the Jesuits to be resolved of their doubts and scruples. For, besides the open and obstinate heretics, there were many who were only verging to that state, unable by themselves to solve the arguments of the minister, but easily kept right by the priest. Parsons gives several examples. Anne Dimocke, a maid of honour to the queen, a great follower of the court preachers, had learnt from them that there was no hell, "but only a certain remorse of conscience for him that did evil, which was to be understood for hell, and that all the rest were but bugbears to fright children." To solve this doubt, she applied to Father Parsons, under whose instructions she at once became Catholic, and afterwards left the court and the world, and, with one of Lord Vaux's daughters, followed Parsons to Rouen, where she entered a convent.

Sir Robert Dimocke was another great hearer of sermons, and had been led into such a maze by them, that he had come to doubt whether there was any God. His friends therefore procured a secret interview between him and Father Parsons; and the first point which had to be discussed between them was the existence of God. Parsons, during a ride of a few hours, convinced him on this point; but as Sir Robert was still a Protestant, the father did not dare trust himself with him in any town or house. However, Dimocke afterwards sent for Campion, who finished his conversion, and took him into the Church.

These examples Parsons gives to show how those farthest gone out of order were reduced; how those who were going were stayed; how doubters were resolved; how the cold and negligent were warmed; how those whose good desires were

paralysed by fear were put in heart ; and how those who were good were confirmed.

The venture prospered,—to use the mercantile phraseology they affected in order to conceal their meaning from the uninitiated ; though many slighted their wares, and many defamed them, there were no few buyers and more admirers. Among the Protestants there was vast talk about the Jesuits, who were as much befabled as mythological monsters. There were tales, no more consistent than dreams, current about their origin, their life, their rule, morals, doctrine, designs, and actions. Almost all agreed, however, that they were spies of the Pope, or agents of treason and sedition.

The general tenor of the conduct of the Catholics who received the Jesuits gladly may be learned from the letter to Father Agazzari already quoted : “ When a priest comes to their houses, they first salute him as a stranger unknown to them, and then they take him to an inner chamber where an oratory is set up, where all fall on their knees, and beg his blessing. Then they ask how long he will remain with them, and pray him to stop as long as he may. If he says he must go on the morrow, as he usually does,—for it is dangerous to stay longer,—they all prepare for confession that evening ; the next morning they hear Mass and receive Holy Communion ; then, after preaching and giving his blessing a second time, the priest departs, and is conducted on his journey by one of the young gentlemen.”

The hiding holes had become known, by means of searchers and false brethren, by the middle of 1581 ; so that even thus early the Catholics were compelled, when there was a night alarm, to betake themselves to woods and thickets, to ditches and holes. “ Sometimes when we are sitting merrily at table, conversing familiarly on matters of faith and devotion (for our talk is generally of such things), there comes a hurried knock at the door, like that of a pursuivant ; all start up and listen,—like deer when they hear the huntsmen ; they leave their food, and commend themselves to God in a brief ejaculation ; nor is word or sound heard till the servants come to say what the matter is. If it is nothing, they laugh at their fright.”

“ No one is to be found in these parts who complains of the length of services : if a Mass does not last nearly an hour, many are discontented. If six, eight, or more Masses are said in the same place, and on the same day (as often happens when there is a meeting of priests), the same congregation will assist at all. When they can get priests, they confess

every week. Quarrels are scarce known amongst them. Disputes are almost always left to the arbitration of the priest. They do not willingly intermarry with heretics, nor will they pray with them, nor do they like to have any dealings with them. A lady was lately told that she should be let out of prison, if she would once walk through a church; she refused. She had come into prison with a sound conscience, and she would depart with it, or die. In Henry's days, the father of this Elizabeth, the whole kingdom, with all its Bishops and learned men, abjured their faith at one word of the tyrant. But now, in his daughter's days, boys and women boldly profess the faith before the judge, and refuse to make the slightest concession even at the threat of death."

In October, when Michaelmas term began, Campion and Parsons returned towards London to meet and confer once more, and to compare the results of their labours. The two letters in which they give an account of their doings will fitly conclude this chapter.

"The heat of the persecution now raging against Catholics throughout the whole realm is most fiery, such as has never been heard of since the conversion of England. Gentle and simple, men and women, are being every where haled to prison, even children are being put into irons; they are despoiled of their goods, shut out from the light of day, and publicly held up to the contempt of the people in proclamations, sermons, and conferences, as traitors and rebels. It is supposed that the reasons of this great persecution are, first, the ill-success of the English in Ireland; next, the demonstration made last summer against England by the Spanish fleet; and lastly, the coming of the Jesuits into the island, and the great number of conversions made by them, which has so astonished the heretics that they know not what to do or say. They are most troubled about a certain protestation of their faith and religion, and of the reasons of their coming into England, which they wrote and signed with their names, and placed in the hands of a friend, for fear that, if they were cast into prison, the heretics might pretend, as is their usual custom, that they had recanted. This protestation was communicated by the man who had charge of it to another, and by him to a third, and it soon came into the hands of an immense number, and even of the queen's councillors.

We hear that one month since more than fifty thousand names of persons who refused to go to the heretical churches were reported. Many more, I fancy, have been discovered since.

The heretics, when they throw the Catholics into prison, only ask them one thing,—to come to their churches, and to hear sermon and service. It was even lately proposed to certain noblemen to come, if it were only once a year, to church, making, if they pleased, a previous protestation that they came not to approve of

their religion or doctrines, but only to show an outward obedience to the queen; and yet all most constantly refused. A certain noble lady was offered her choice, either to stay in prison, or simply to walk through the church without stopping there, or exhibiting any signs of respect; but she declared that she never would. A boy, of, I believe, twelve years, who had been bamboozled by his friends into walking to church before a bride (as the custom here is), and had been afterwards blamed by his companions, was perfectly inconsolable till he found me a few days after, when he threw himself down at my feet, and confessed his sin. A thousand similar instances might be given.

We, although all conversation with us is forbidden by proclamation, are yet most earnestly invited every where; many take long journeys only to speak to us, and put themselves and their fortunes entirely in our hands. It is therefore absolutely necessary that more of our Society should be sent, if possible—not fewer than five: one Spaniard, one Italian, and three Englishman, who must be very learned men, on account of the many entangled cases of conscience, which arises from no one here having ample faculties, and from the difficulty of consulting the Holy See, which is treason.

There is immense want of a Bishop to consecrate for us the holy oils for baptism and extreme unction, for want of which we are brought to the greatest straits; and unless his Holiness makes haste to help us in this matter, we shall be soon at our wits' end.

The adversaries are very mad that by no cruelty can they move a single Catholic from his resolution, no, not even a little girl. A young lady of sixteen was questioned by the sham Bishop of London about the Pope, and answered him with courage, and even made fun of him in public, and so was ordered to be carried to the public prison for prostitutes.* On the way she cried out that she was sent to that place for her religion, and not for immodesty.

A certain English gentleman-pirate lately returned with a booty of more than two millions, taken in the West Indies. The Spanish ambassador reclaimed the spoil in the king's name; but the queen gave the shuffling answer, that the King of Spain had given harbour to the Pope's ships on their passage to Ireland. She asked, moreover, why the Pope, without being harmed, attacked her kingdom in this way. He answered, that he rather wondered that the Pope did not attempt to do more against her, who had treated him so abominably, not only in refusing him all his ecclesiastical rights, which from the most ancient times were allowed to the Holy See by the kings of England, but also by libels, sermons, lewd pictures, and many other ways, by which his authority was defamed and brought into contempt. He said more to the same effect, and the queen was silent then; but afterwards said to a nobleman that the Pope had written to her that he was prepared to approve the whole Protestant service, if she would restore him his

* Bridewell.

title of supreme head of the Church. But in these parts there is often talk of this kind of pretended letters.

I keep myself safe here in London by frequent change of place ; I never remain more than two days in one spot, because of the strict searches made for me. I am quite overwhelmed with business, to which I am obliged to devote the whole day, from early morning till midnight, after I have said Mass and office, and preached, sometimes twice in the day. Therefore I hope for reinforcements, both from our Society and from the Pope's college.

All Catholics here lift up their hands and thank God and his Holiness for founding such a college at Rome, beyond all their hopes ; and they beseech his Holiness, by the bowels of the mercy of our Saviour, to defend the college, and to enlarge it for the needs of the present time.

Two days ago a priest called Clifton was led in chains through the streets, and he walked with so cheerful a countenance that the people wondered. When he saw this, he began to laugh heartily, at which the folks were still more struck, and asked him why he was the only one to laugh at his own sad case, for which every body else pitied him. He answered, it was because he was the gainer in the business. In the beginning of this persecution, there were some people in a certain county who were frightened, and promised to go the Protestant church ; but their wives stood out against them, and threatened to leave them if they, for human respect, left off their obedience to God and the Church. Many like things have taken place among boys, who for this cause have separated themselves from their parents."*

Campion's letter describes the passages of his career since he last wrote from St. Omers. The events to which the first paragraph refers have already been related ; but it will do no harm to repeat them in his own words. The rest refers to his experience during his first journey through England.

"Having now passed, by God's great mercy, five months in these places, I thought it good to give you intelligence by my letters of the present state of things here, and what we may of likelihood look for to come ; for I am sure, both for the common care of us all, and special love to me, you long to know what I do, what hope I have, how I proceed. Of other things that fell before, I wrote from St. Omers ; what has sithence happened, now I will briefly recount unto you. It fell out, as I construe it, by God's special providence, that, tarrying for wind four days together, I should at length take sea the fifth day in the evening, which was the feast of St. John Baptist, my particular patron, to whom I had often before commended my cause and journey. So we arrived safely at Dover

* Theiner, vol. iii. p. 216 : "Robert Parsons, from London, 17th September 1580." Theiner has mistaken the date. It should be October, as Parsons was not in London in September. Bartoli quotes it as written November 17th.

the morrow following, very early, my little man and I together. There we were at the very point to be taken, being by commandment brought before the mayor of the town, who conjectured many things,—suspected us to be such as indeed we were, adversaries of the new heretical faction, favourers of the old fathers' faith, that we dissembled our names, had been abroad for religion, and returned again to spread the same. One thing he specially urged, that I was Dr. Allen ; which I denied, proffering my oath, if need were, for the verifying thereof. At length he resolveth, and that it so should be, he often repeated, that, with some to guard me, I should be sent to the council. Neither can I tell who altered his determination, saving God, to whom underhand I then humbly prayed, using St. John's intercession also, by whose happy help I safely came so far. Suddenly cometh forth an old man,—God give him grace for his labour!—'Well,' quoth he, 'it is agreed you shall be dismissed ; fare you well.' And so we to go apace. The which thing considered, and the like that daily befall unto me, I am verily persuaded that one day I shall be apprehended, but that when it shall most pertain to God's glory, and not before.

Well, I came to London, and my good angel guided me into the same house that had harboured Father Robert [Parsons] before, whither young gentlemen came to me on every hand. They embrace me, reapparel me, furnish me, weapon me, and convey me out of the city. I ride about some piece of the country every day. The harvest is wonderful great. On horseback I meditate my sermon ; when I come to the house I polish it. Then I talk with such as come to speak with me, or hear their confessions. In the morning, after Mass, I preach ; they hear with exceeding greediness, and very often receive the sacrament, for the ministration whereof we are ever well assisted by priests, whom we find in every place, whereby both the people is well served, and we much eased in our charge. The priests of our country themselves being most excellent for virtue and learning, yet have raised so great an opinion of our Society, that I dare scarcely touch the exceeding reverence all Catholics do unto us. How much more is it requisite that such as hereafter are to be sent for supply, whereof we have great need, be such as may answer all men's expectation of them ! Specially let them be well trained for the pulpit. I cannot long escape the hands of the heretics ; the enemies have so many eyes, so many tongues, so many scouts and crafts. I am in apparel to myself very ridiculous ; I often change it, and my name also. I read letters sometimes myself that in the first front tell news that Campion is taken, which, noised in every place where I come, so filleth my ears with the sound thereof, that fear itself hath taken away all fear. My soul is in mine own hands ever. Let such as you send for supply premeditate and make count of this always. Marry, the solaces that are ever intermingled with these miseries are so great, that they do not only countervail the fear of what punishment temporal soever, but by infinite sweetness make all worldly pains, be they never so great, seem nothing. A con-

science pure, a courage invincible, zeal incredible, a work so worthy the number innumerable, of high degree, of mean calling, of the inferior sort, of every age and sex.

Here, even amongst the Protestants themselves that are of milder nature, it is turned into a proverb, that he must be a Catholic that payeth faithfully what he oweth, insomuch that if any Catholic do injury, every body expostulateth with him as for an act unworthy of men of that calling. To be short, heresy heareth ill of all men; neither is there any condition of people commonly counted more vile and impure than their ministers, and we worthily have indignation that fellows so unlearned, so evil, so derided, so base, should in so desperate a quarrel overrule such a number of noble wits as our realm hath. Threatening edicts come forth against us daily; notwithstanding, by good heed, and the prayers of good men, and, which is the chief of all, God's special gift, we have passed safely through the most part of the island. I find many neglecting their own security to have only care of my safety.

A certain matter fell out these days unlooked for. I had set down in writing by several articles the causes of my coming in, and made certain demands most reasonable. I professed myself to be a priest of the Society; that I returned to enlarge the Catholic faith, to teach the Gospel, to minister the sacraments, humbly asking audience of the queen and the nobility of the realm, and proffering disputations to the adversaries. One copy of this writing I determined to keep with me, that if I should fall into the officers' hands, it might go with me; another copy I laid in a friend's hand, that when myself with the other should be seized, another might thereupon straight be dispersed. But my said friend kept it not close long, but divulged it, and it was read greedily; whereat the adversaries were mad, answering out of the pulpit, that themselves certesse would not refuse to dispute, but the queen's pleasure was not that matters should be called in question being already established. In the mean while they tear and sting us with their venomous tongues, calling us seditious, hypocrites, yea heretics too, which is much laughed at. The people hereupon is ours, and that error of spreading abroad this writing hath much advanced the cause. If we be commanded, and may have safe conduct, we will into the court.

But they mean nothing less, for they have filled all the old prisons with Catholics, and now make new; and, in fine, plainly affirm that it were better to make a few traitors away than that so many souls should be lost. Of their martyrs they brag no more now; for it is now come to pass, that for a few apostates and cobblers of theirs burnt, we have bishops, lords, knights, the old nobility, patterns of learning, piety, and prudence, the flower of the youth, noble matrons, and of the inferior sort innumerable, either martyred at once, or by consuming prisonment dying daily. At the very writing hereof, the persecution rages most cruelly. The house where I am is sad; no other talk but of death, flight, prison, or spoil of their friends; nevertheless they proceed with courage. Very many,

even at this present, being restored to the Church, new soldiers give up their names, while the old offer up their blood ; by which holy hosts and oblations God will be pleased, and we shall no question by Him overcome.

You see now, therefore, reverend father, how much need we have of your prayers and sacrifices, and other heavenly help, to go through with these things. There will never want in England men that will have care of their own salvation, nor such as shall advance other men's ; neither shall this Church here ever fail so long as priests and pastors shall be found for their sheep, rage man or devil never so much. But the rumour of present peril causeth me here to make an end. Arise God, His enemies avoid. Fare you well.—E. C.*

R. S.

Correspondence.

THE DANGER OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

SIR,—As I entirely agree with your view of the respective importance of the physical and moral sciences to religion, which is attacked by your correspondent "D. N.," perhaps I may be allowed to explain the nature and the points of our difference. By touching on a variety of interesting topics which do not directly affect the argument, your correspondent proves that he is animated by a sincere desire to promote the truth, and does not merely seek an occasion of controversy. I will endeavour to follow him over some of these remoter questions.

Strictly speaking, the discussion might be brought to an end in the second paragraph of his letter, where he says that the physical sciences "cease to be physical, and become moral, when they are directed to the proof of a God," &c. This is perfectly true, and it is virtually a concession of the truth of the statement impugned. Physical science has no weapons of its own by which it can assail religion, for it deals only with facts. Now, between the facts of the material creation and the truth of revelation no antagonism is possible or conceivable. They cannot approach each other without the intervention of theories, or conclusions borrowed from another branch of knowledge, and involving the moral sciences. The facts alone cannot contradict religion, and the Church cannot defend herself against them ; for as she possesses no authority to test their truth, she is unable to deny them.

* This is either a contemporary translation from Campion's original Latin, or, if he wrote in duplicate, in English and Latin, according to the rule (*Constitutiones*, part viii. cap. 1, § 9), it is his own. It is exactly like other specimens of his style. The real date is in October, for the Latin has "*quintum mensem*," the fifth month after his arrival in June. It was probably written at the same time as Father Parsons's letter, on the 17th of that month N.S., or 7th O.S.

In the next paragraph, it is a grievous error to say that moral science is atheistical because it "strives for truth in its own order, and for that alone." The confinement of each science to those inquiries which belong exclusively to its sphere, and to that method of investigation which is supplied by itself, is the best security, next to universal faith, for religious as well as scientific truth. It is by overstepping its proper boundaries, and seeking conclusions derived from another order, that science goes astray and becomes adverse to religion. Unless it labours impartially to discover all the truths that lie within its reach, and furnishes its own explanation of as many phenomena as possible, it would be hard to separate religion from superstition and error. Truth would stand on a basis of falsehood, and would learn to rely on arguments liable to be exploded at any moment, and sure to bring down contempt on religion by their ruin.

Again : it is altogether untrue that the opposition of moral science to religion, when it does oppose, "is always rather rhetorical than logical." Is this the case with inquiries into the history of the Church, the continuity of tradition, the consistency of doctrine with the text of Scripture, the rule of faith, the immortality of the soul, the nature of sin? Moral science has something to say to each of these fundamental questions ; and the Church could not survive a single breach such as Strauss, or the school of Tübingen, or the speculations of Spinoza, Condillac, or Hegel, would, if they succeeded, open in her most important defences ; and these points, which to her are essential, and which require the light of the sciences to demonstrate, are innumerable. They include the whole of the doctrine of the Church, which is open to philosophical discussion ; her history, which must encounter the scrutiny of critics ; and the monuments of revelation, which are elaborately dissected by the new philology. A single defeat on this wide expanse, and her authority would be at an end. The danger from moral science, and the necessity of preserving its alliance, extend, therefore, universally over every portion of Christian doctrine ; and every failure must be decisive, every injury mortal.

Physical science, on the contrary, can hardly bear on dogma in any intelligible way. The eternity of the world, the mortality of the soul, though sometimes assumed by natural philosophers, are matters beyond the reach of their experiments. Perhaps the only dogma the proof of which could be imagined to depend on natural science is the dogma of original sin. We must carefully eliminate from the number of those things which physical science can "smash hopelessly and entirely" all those which it cannot attack without invoking the aid of metaphysics, or borrowing hypotheses that are not its own ; and all those which are matters not of faith but of opinion, and which belong not to religion but theology, or to the human, not to the divine element in the Church. It will be found that the majority of instances in which physical science has been used to subvert the faith of individuals, or has been rebuked by

ecclesiastical authority, belong to one or other of these categories. The one problem which could by material possibility be left to the naturalists to solve, that of the unity of the human race, is not one of those on which infidel science has most relied. But by every other question on which science has been victorious religion has been the gainer.

I come to the point on which I differ most strongly from "D. N.," and on which his error, if error it be, seems to me most portentous. He gives a list of opinions in which he was brought up, but which science has gradually proved to be erroneous; and religion, he says, has received rude shocks from their weakening or demolition. It is astonishing to me that any Catholic should mix up religion with such ideas as are here recited, though I can easily believe that the faith of a Protestant in his religion might be shaken by the progress of science on these points. I trust it may be to experience of this kind your correspondent alludes, and that there is no reason for the suggestion implied, that Catholics are so imperfectly instructed as to place the chronology of the Hebrew Version, the universality of the Deluge, and the habits of carnivora, among the tests of infallibility, and the articles by which the Church must stand and fall. Protestants occupy towards the letter of the Bible a position different from our own. Having no authority to define and explain the portions which are of doctrinal importance, they are unable to distinguish between the authority of different passages. If the literal interpretation of one text is shaken, there is nothing to protect any other from the same result, and there is no refuge against the invasion of a dissolving criticism. But the Catholic avoids a collision between creation and revelation, because he possesses a criterion which separates in the Bible its natural and its supernatural character, and informs him of those things which it teaches, and which belong neither to history nor to physical science. The doctrine of his Church is not mixed up with the explanation of passages that do not affect religion. With reference to these things, a current opinion prevails in every age; but it is always formed according to the measure of the knowledge of that age; it consequently varies, and cannot afford any support to religion. The only thing which is invariable about it is the certainty that knowledge of this kind cannot be trusted by faith. The normal condition is not harmony, but a perpetual disharmony between faith and knowledge, a constant alteration of the data on which the comparison rests, a successive surrendering of established positions, and modification of theologumena founded upon them. Religion profits by the abandonment of every opinion of this kind that is abandoned. It purifies belief by removing from it the contamination of error, and strengthens it by taking away a threatening occasion of doubt for those who are imperfectly educated in religion or in science. Your correspondent confounds truth with faith, and speaks of religion when he means in fact theology. It is true that almost every step taken by the Church in the establishment of her doctrine has been

accompanied by a loss of souls, and that heresy is often, as it were, the signal of development. But to say that religion suffered by the confutation of false opinions, is to assume that she has to dread the discovery, and is in league with error for its preservation, not with truth for its advancement.

Neither religious nor scientific knowledge is stationary or complete, but the laws which regulate their increase are different. Religion has a normal development; the progress of science is erratic; the convictions of one age become superstitions in the next, and at last absurdities. The movements, therefore, do not correspond; the course of the two kinds of knowledge are not parallel, and they do not tend to approach each other. If our faith was entire and our knowledge complete, there could be no discord between the interpretation of Scripture and the interpretation of nature. But as the advancement of knowledge is not destined to be complete on earth, this harmony can never be attained. As the progress of secular knowledge is not regular, and each new discovery gives rise to new problems and obscurities, its apparent divergence from religion may actually increase, and the difficulties may be multiplied by its growth. The increase of light, instead of dispelling the darkness, may only make it more visible.

In this way those conflicts are brought about which, by making more distinct than ever the difficulty of reconciling religious with profane knowledge, accelerate the advancement of both. They give an impulse to speculation and research, because, although the whole truth is not of this world, we cannot give up seeking for it, or consent to stagnation. It is a religious duty as well as an intellectual necessity to strive continually to bring existing faith into agreement with increasing knowledge, to reconsider old solutions in obedience to new problems, and to penetrate further into the depths of divine truth which none can fathom. Thanks to this constant alternation of difficulties and answers, religious ideas expand and science advances. The natural desire of harmony, and its necessary absence, are among the chief incentives both to theological research and to physical and metaphysical inquiry.

Whilst these conflicts proceed from inadequate information in one department or the other, and therefore from an external, involuntary defect, there is an antagonism of another kind, which has its cause not in the science but in the man, and is at the root of heresy and of speculative unbelief. Here a new error rises up against a known truth. But in the questions raised by the progress of science a new truth is resisted by an old error. Theology advances by its victory in one case, and by its defeat in the other. In the first, the adversary draws his weapons from the moral sciences, and he must be repulsed, or religion would not be true. In the other, the attack comes from physical science, and may succeed, for it is directed, not against divine truth, but against errors mixed up with it. By this antagonism science renders an essential service to the Church, because it acts as a solvent. A religion that depends on false scientific premisses cannot resist it,

but the true religion is made to triumph by the dissipation of surrounding error ; and the more strenuous and severe the assault, the better. If you wish to find out which is the king's son, you must have a ferocious lion ; a tame beast will treat all alike.

The argument that physical science is dangerous because its methods are inapplicable to moral science, immediately followed by the statement that when so applied its methods are pernicious, does not appear to me a serious one. If its methods are inapplicable, the fault lies in him who inaptly applies them, and does not prove that they are wrong in themselves. But I do not think them so entirely inapplicable as "D. N." supposes. The lesson taught by the physical sciences has borne valuable fruit in the moral. The application to history and politics of that method which inquires after the properties of things has been the source of the greatest modern discoveries. It has demolished the practice of treating history as a series of accidents, or as an arbitrary process, and the habit of dealing with abstractions and ignoring facts. From the naturalist we have derived the notion of growth and development, and the notion that God manifests Himself in the regularity of His laws more than in their interruption. If the materialists make no allowance for free-will, their adversaries formerly had no room for providence ; and for this reason Mr. Buckle's method, though founded on a false hypothesis, is a move in the right direction. In history the subject is not man, who is governed by free-will, but certain moral aggregates, nations, classes, states, cities, doctrines, whose existence is regulated by the laws of their nature. It is in these things, in this historical or political physiology, that we discern the hand of God overruling the actions of men, whose freedom He does not restrain, otherwise we must write history, like biography, with men for its heroes, and can allow no divine action except in the shape of an arbitrary interference. If materialists confound design with fate, power with necessity, and dream that that which is natural is implicitly not divine, the reason is that they are materialists. Their method is incomplete, but it is necessary for those who would recognise the divine influence in the life of mankind.

Your correspondent concludes with a piece of advice to the Academy from which, as I have disputed so many of his opinions, he will not be surprised that I dissent. I cannot think physical science a suitable subject of discussion for the members of that society. In meetings of this kind, whose purpose is not the general advancement of learning, but a particular application of it, the special danger is dilettantism. People are tempted to discuss, for the sake of religion, and from a Catholic point of view, subjects of which they possess no real scientific knowledge, and thus gain hasty victories over difficulties which they have not mastered. Knowledge obtained at secondhand is enough for this purpose in presence of an audience not more deeply versed in the question than the speaker, and in which there are no competent judges. Even one who thoroughly knows his subject will suffer by the

ignorance of his hearers ; instead of being sustained by a wholesome fear of criticism, he will endeavour to avoid obscurity and tediousness by accommodating his language to the measure of their knowledge. Now secondhand information in matters of science is an evil, inevitable it is true, but still so dangerous that it ought not to be encouraged. It seduces men from the habit of serious study, makes them superficial in other things, and accustoms them to form rapid conclusions. In all cases it is a thing which sensible people keep to themselves, and which it is the business of a learned society to suppress. Now in natural science it is exceedingly common, especially among Catholics. Few men besides those whose regular or professional employment it is pursue physical science with original, independent research. Men of ordinary education cannot discuss medicine on equal terms with the doctor, anatomy with the surgeon, or chemistry with the apothecary. But the ordinary education, interests, and occupations of well-informed men prepare them to form opinions in the moral sciences, furnish them with much preliminary knowledge, and give them a general view of the subject. Classical studies naturally embrace a considerable portion of history, philosophy, and politics. In these branches, therefore, men familiar with the earliest historians, the greatest philosophers, and the fathers of political wisdom, are competent to judge, and often to speak with authority. The apprenticeship to these pursuits is served at college. Later on the classics of our own country cultivate the same faculties, and the great works of our native literature improve the powers which a classical training has developed. Among Catholics there is an additional reason which makes a difference between their physical and moral knowledge. They, and in particular the clergy, in making themselves masters of the religious ideas of their Church, are driven to study both history and philosophy, without which, for them, there is no theology. Now, the history and philosophy which serve theological studies are necessarily Catholic in character and result. They must actually contribute to the completeness and certainty of the religious system, and cannot be indifferent or merely negative, like physical science, which is not required to do services of this kind, and supplies no essential materials to the fabric of religious truth. There must be, and has always been, a Catholic history and a Catholic philosophy ; but Catholic geology or Catholic physiology is both useless and impossible. For the doctrine of the Church is ascertained and elucidated by historical and metaphysical inquiries, and her divines are necessarily historians and metaphysicians. But they are not naturalists, because physical science is not a part of the foundations of their system. While moral science must, so far as it goes, positively sustain religion, and confirm the history of revelation, and the progress of dogmatic definition, natural science need bear no such testimony, and can furnish no evidence so direct to the truth of religion.

The real danger of physical science is not its godlessness, but its popularity. It has become a subject of entertainment to those who

have no means of judging of its bearings, or of comparing it with other knowledge. It comes in the shape of definite results, and with the charm and presumption of novelty, to people whose religious instruction is so imperfect that they cannot overcome the apparent discrepancy ; whilst, having had no glimpse into the workshop of science, they know nothing of its conditions, cannot estimate its uncertainty, and are not warned of its immaturity, and of its instability. Their faith has not been strengthened, nor their vision sharpened, by the study of the moral sciences, and they cannot therefore resist the arguments of the physical. Knowledge, indeed, heals the wounds which it inflicts ; but the uneducated are unable to cultivate it so far that out of a danger it may become a remedy.

There are three things which every body should bear in mind who embarks in these discussions. First, that if physical science is really hostile to religion, it will exhibit that character most distinctly in its greatest masters ; secondly, that the most advanced stage of knowledge, the most recent discoveries, will constantly increase the force and the hostility of its arguments ; thirdly, that the hostile character and the adverse facts must be admitted by all who make any pretension to scientific eminence. Each of these conditions is necessary. They are all of them wanting.

The great naturalists of past ages were not carried away by their science from religion ; many have pursued science from the impulse which religion gave them to seek in the works of God the manifestations of His wisdom and power. Those whose discoveries were thought to affect religion most profoundly were zealous Christians. In the period of the Renaissance, when great progress was made in the knowledge of nature, and when faith had fallen low, even among divines, there was no branch of learning so Christian as natural science, and no class of learned men so religious as natural philosophers. Long after the decline of Christian philosophy in the seventeenth century, physical science preserved its reverent and pious character. But when an irreligious philosophy began to prevail, it carried the naturalists along with it ; and then, like other things, natural science became a weapon which was used against religion. It was not the cause of the change, but followed in the wake of the moral sciences, on which it depended for its position towards religion. The general character of the heroes of inductive science has been more religious than that of learned men in other branches. It is not from them that their followers have derived their irreligious tone.

Even in this century, when Protestantism has so generally declined into infidelity, the great men who represent the most advanced phase of natural science are more favourable to religion than the second rank, whose view is more circumscribed. I might illustrate this by a long series of those names most familiar to us in England, in geology, astronomy, chemistry, physiology, &c. But there are two important things to be remembered with reference to science in this country. The first is, that here, as in northern Germany, men

of science are Protestants by birth. Now, the habits of independent, faithful investigation are not favourable to submission to an arbitrary system supported by no religious authority. The character of mind which is developed by scientific study is exactly opposite to that which Protestantism requires. In particular points, moreover, of Scriptural interpretation, the naturalists may arrive at results incompatible with the opinions of divines, and a distrust of the whole system necessarily ensues. It is not therefore to be wondered at, and strengthens rather than invalidates my argument, that Kepler, Leibnitz, or Newton, should have laboured under grave suspicion of heterodoxy, or that there should not be a cordial understanding between English natural philosophers at the present day and the divines of the Established Church. I am quite ready to admit that science does not harmonise well either in its spirit or its results with the Protestant system; but the infidelity of scientific men in Protestant countries is no proof of antagonism between the truths of science and of revelation.

The second point on which we should be misled if we confined our view to the state of scientific knowledge in England is, that for obvious reasons Englishmen are somewhat behindhand in working out those results of science which interfere with the established religion. The union of Church and State is not favourable to the proclamation of unbelief by men who are in public stations, or even by men who fear the judgment of society. It is many years since things which are now startling novelties here have been published, believed, and in many cases refuted, on the Continent. Until all the political and social hindrances to the public avowal of infidel opinions are removed, we must expect that they will be constantly on the increase, or at least that they will increase in boldness and in confidence. As things now are, we cannot judge of the tendency of the last results of scientific discovery by what we observe at home. It often happens that at the moment when we are gradually approaching a tremendous conclusion, a reaction has already set in against it in the more free atmosphere of Germany. In general, this is now the case with physical science. Here, as in philosophy, divinity, history, the period of reaction has commenced, and in each of these sciences men are beginning to restore and reconstruct; for they have exhausted the possibilities of negation and destruction. I cannot expect that "D. N." will take my word for this; I may therefore refer him to the work of one of the first philosophers in Prussia, *Gott und die Natur*, by Dr. Ulrici, where the present condition of natural science, and its teaching on all questions with which religion is in any way concerned, are exhibited in a manner which must be as satisfactory to the naturalist as to the Christian.

As to the third point, I need only say that it is notorious as a matter of fact, that all naturalists are not agreed in accepting as certain conclusions all or any of those things which a Christian would be unwilling to believe. It is obvious, also, as an inference; for if it were otherwise, men of science would be not sometimes but always unbelievers. As long as there is no argument in

physical science which obliges all its professors to renounce their religion, there is no reason for those to be uneasy who obtain their knowledge from them; and we must attribute the infidelity of those who are infidels, not to the influence of their particular studies, but to another cause.

I remain

Your obedient servant,

N. N.

Literary Notices.

The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India. Vol. I. containing "The Acquisition and Administration of the Punjab." By Edwin Arnold, M.A. (London: Saunders and Otley.) As this volume contains but a fragment of a history, it can only be criticised in its details. It contains an account of one act of Lord Dalhousie, the conquest and administration of the Punjab. This act was not altogether a voluntary one on his part. It was forced upon him, not only by the audacity of the Sikhs, but also as a necessary consequence of the Affghan war, which he inherited. As an isolated act, therefore, it stands apart from the other annexations of Lord Dalhousie; and though it may explain, it does not necessarily justify a general policy which, to use the grandiose words of Mr. Arnold, brought about "the assumption of four kingdoms (Pegu, Nagpore, Oudh, and the Punjab), and the abolition of three thrones."

The first part of the volume narrates the conquest, the second the organisation, of the Punjab. In the first part, the writer, after proving that the war was a natural consequence of Lord Auckland's mistakes, and of Lord Palmerston's alarms about Russia, goes on to describe the military operations. The whole of this part is more like a speech than a history, mouthed rather than written, in a style cumbrous, antique, sententious, and rounded; studded with words picked for their hardness and roughness, and occasionally with no-words, such as "statesmanly." Mr. Arnold exhibits more labour than taste, and writes as if he felt himself an advocate rather than a historian.

The history of the organisation and administration of the Punjab, is a practical lesson upon the duties of the English Government to its Oriental possessions. We have to accomplish a change both in the State and in society; to supersede the traditional government and the traditional civilisation. Indian culture, though it was developed by the same Aryan race to which our own civilisation is indebted, has been arrested in its progress. Its law has been identified with its religion, and therefore religion has tied down the people to the social usages and opinions which were current when the laws were first reduced to a code. The religion and manners of the Orientals mutually support each other; neither can one be changed without the other. Hence the pioneer of civilisa-

tion has to get rid of the religion of India to enable him to introduce a better culture, and the pioneer of Christianity has to get rid of the Indian culture before he can establish his religion. Thus the future progress both of Christianity and of civilisation demands that the Oriental career of England should not stop short at the point of contact with Eastern kingdoms and governments, but should go on to deal with Eastern society.

The transformation is difficult; but the ancient world has witnessed a similar one. The early law of the Italians was very like that of the Indians, and Mr. Maine has shown how it was gradually developed into the refined and ethical jurisprudence of Rome. The Roman legists never sought to introduce violent changes into their law: their ideal law of nature was not an independent legal utopia, but a system which their laws were supposed to express, however imperfectly; hence it was the expression, not the intention, of their laws which they sought to improve. The intention was supposed to remain the same, the legal forms were preserved; and the ideal "law of nature," to which they ever tried to bring their law into greater conformity, was not a system imported from without, as Plato's "laws" might have been, but it was supposed to be the original intention and meaning of their law, at first clumsily expressed, but gradually cleared and enucleated. The perfect legislation of Rome grew naturally out of just such a system as prevails in India; not by violent changes, but by judicious developments. Just so is our work in India to be accomplished; and administrators like Lord Dalhousie, Sir Charles Napier, and the Lawrences, either by nature or by art, have been led to adopt the Roman method. They have imported no new laws or institutions; they have violently suppressed nothing by their extrinsic and arbitrary power. But they have systematically selected those elements of Indian legislation and custom which were capable of developments in the right direction; and by fostering the growth of these elements, they have already managed to choke all life out of some others which were most opposed to the new civilisation. It is thus that infanticide, suttee, and thuggism have been supplanted, and have disappeared from the Punjab. It is thus also that, though no open attack has been made on the Brahmins, their caste has already lost much, and is daily losing more, of its old religious influence on politics and on society. And, indeed, the Brahmins seem to feel that the day of their old supremacy, as a religious caste, is past. But this vigorous race, the parent of Indian civilisation, does not despair. It is now foremost in appropriating to itself all the advantages of Western knowledge, in order to secure by its literary and scientific preëminence the same supremacy which it once held by religious imposition upon the superstition of the inferior races.

Thus the Punjab is exhibiting the first indications of that transformation of society which it ought to be our aim to effect in our Oriental empire. The change is being brought about, not by violent suppression, nor by forcible introduction of unknown usages, but by the careful development of elements already existing among

the Indians. If the English Government could do the same for the rest of India, it would soon be on the way to give a satisfactory answer to the common question of Continental critics,—“What evidence of its empire does England expect to leave behind it in India?” If our empire lasts a century longer, we may leave behind us a society freed from the fetters of superstitions which have checked its growth for ages; and ready, perhaps, to accept the teaching of a race more faithful than ours, who will then be able to make Indians Catholics, without incurring the suspicion of too great complaisance for Indian superstitions. As it is at present constituted, the social system of India cannot be made Christian, though individual Indians may become very sincere and good converts.

The Chapel of St. John; or, a Life of Faith in the Nineteenth Century. By K. Digby. Mr. Digby's later books are personal to a degree which is embarrassing to criticism, and yet they are so inlaid with quotations as to have something the appearance of a commonplace book. On the other hand, there is so much antique simplicity in his character and mode of writing, and he views so much the whole of human nature in the individual, that it would be difficult to name a less really egotistical writer; while the narrative in which he weaves so many of the thoughts of others contains here and there original passages of such beauty, that it would be unjust in the extreme to regard him as a mere collector of extracts.

The Chapel of St. John is a sort of “In Memoriam” of the author's wife; and the combination of nineteenth-century ideas involved in the wish to commemorate her virtues in print, with the ideas of the old faith contained in the suggestion of a mortuary chapel, gives the key to a work in which past and present meet on ground common to both. Mr. Digby believes in the unity of human nature, and sympathises with its diversity; and this gives his books an indulgent and peaceful spirit which fits them to be enduring friends in those “serene hours” he is so fond of painting. It is not without importance that this aspect of Catholicity should be represented in an age and country where the attitude of Catholics is naturally apt to partake of the controversial and combative character, and where their literature, therefore, is likely to suffer from an aggrieved and restless spirit. That calmness which is so much wanting in modern literature generally is in no way opposed to earnestness or active exertion. For there is a limit to all healthy human capacities of exertion; and, as Ravignan well says, “Il faut beaucoup de force pour être doux.” Nothing is more weakening than the aimless indignation and restless irritability in which so many modern books leave one; and to those who suffer from this cause we may fairly recommend Mr. Digby's *Life of Faith in the Nineteenth Century*.

The Life of Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Bentham, K.S.G. By his Widow, M. S. Bentham. (London: Longmans.) Samuel was the brother of the more celebrated Jeremy Bentham, and applied

the same kind of mechanical and technical genius to the details of naval administration and architecture as his brother applied to law and politics. He first learned his profession in a naval dockyard, then practised it on a large scale in Russia, and at last, in spite of prospects of high advancement in that country, felt obliged by his patriotism to return home, and devote his talents to bettering our dockyards and their products. This he did, in spite of routine, the opposition of interested persons, and, at times, such a neglect on the part of the Admiralty as makes one suspect that his brother's opinions reflected some unpopularity upon him. But his widow does not once allude to this, or any other subject connected with English politics. Her biography is a remarkable proof of the effect of Benthamite philosophy over a woman's mind; she applies herself exclusively to facts, and passes over feelings, opinions, and beliefs, as if they were not only worthless but contemptible. For all this, she cannot conceal her conviction that in many instances her husband was unjustly treated. She always, however, defends him on technical grounds, and gives materials to engineers to form a contrary judgment, if the facts of the case seem to require it. Altogether the book may be pronounced a model in its peculiar line, however narrow and unethical that line may be.

The Remains of the late Mrs. Richard Trench. Edited by her Son, the Dean of Westminster. (London: Parker.) Melesina Chenevix, of French extraction and Irish birth, was married at the age of eighteen to Colonel St. George, and was a widow at two-and-twenty. She afterwards married Mr. Trench, and was detained in France with her husband by Napoleon, after the breach of the peace of Amiens, till 1806. She then returned to England, and died in 1827, in her 60th year.

The recollections of her widowhood are the most amusing part of her *Remains*. Feeling her loss most acutely, she yet knew how to grind her sorrow into colours, and to paint pictures of it for her friends. Then she wore it jauntily, and stuck a feather in it. She travelled in Germany with the best introductions; and her beauty and her tongue received princely flattery at all the German courts. At this period of her life she was a merciless critic, as is proved by her satire on Lord Nelson and the Hamiltons. Mrs. Siddons fared no better at her hands. There was but one kind of exception permitted. The keen edge of her satire was never whetted against royalty, except when some personal affront was offered to herself, and then the prince easily became "a little fiend." The way in which she falls on her knees before the head and heart of Prince Augustus, who is very attentive to her, contrasts delightfully with her dainty and squeamish manner of plucking holes in *parvenus*. As she grew older she grew juster, and judged people by a better standard. But she always remained essentially the same woman. A converser, who at first owed as much to her beauty as to her wit, and was therefore less considered when she had grown old and fat; a woman who put a fine point on her feelings, and always studied to say something pretty to her husband when she wrote to

him, nay, when she had found something very pretty, to say it not to him only, but to her other friends besides. It is not often that a woman overwhelmed with the first burst of woe after losing one of her children can coolly compose such elegant sentences as these : "A daughter is a benignant star, shining through the clouds of adversity, and embellishing every scene of joy ; her mother's companion in sorrow, her ministering angel in sickness. It is on her a mother relies to close her eyes, and to cherish her remembrance, which the scenes of busy life may soon efface from the breast of man ;" and then can more coolly copy them into other letters, and send them off, with variations, for her different correspondents to cry over. In spite of such defects, Mrs. Trench must have been a very agreeable person, and not averse to a little Platonic love-making, which she defends in a letter to her husband (p. 384). She wrote graceful verses occasionally, the best of which are in p. 434. We will give the four opening lines :

"Their eyes have met ! The irrevocable glance
 Stamped on the fantasy of each a face,
 That neither weal nor woe, nor meddling chance,
 Shall ever pluck from its warm resting-place," &c.

Compare this with another woman's lines on love at first sight in *Aurora Leigh* :

"A face flashed like a cymbal on his face,
 And shook with silent clangour brain and heart,
 Transfiguring him to music," &c.

But Mrs. Trench never pretended to a name in literature ; and her journals and anecdotes are more interesting than her compositions.

Current Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

Naval and Military Service.

THE Navy Estimates for the year 1862-63 were introduced on the 24th of February, and speedily passed. They provide for a total force afloat of 19 line-of-battle ships, 2 iron-cased frigates, 90 sloops, 38 frigates and corvettes, and 11 coast-guard ships,—making in all 160 ships. A reduction of 2,200 on the establishment of last year brings the number of men and boys to be maintained to 76,000 ; and the total estimated expenditure is 11,794,305*l.* The Estimates for 1861-2 amounted altogether to 12,640,588*l.*, including the supplementary vote for the expenses of the North-American reinforcements. The net decrease,

therefore, on the current year is 846,283*l.* A similar reduction of 600,000*l.* appears on a comparison between the Army Estimates for 1861-62 and those for the present year. These latter provide for a force of 145,450 men, and an expenditure of 14,572,000*l.* ; or including, as we ought to do, the Indian depôts, a force of 153,092, and an expenditure of 15,302,000*l.* Of this sum, however, upwards of 1,000,000*l.* is taken for stores supplied to the Admiralty by the War Department, and must therefore be subtracted from the Army Estimates, and added to those for the Navy, before we can duly apportion the expense of the two services. When this is done, it may

be said, in round numbers, that the Navy costs us 13,000,000*l.*, and the Army 14,000,000*l.*,—making a total of 27,000,000*l.* for the Naval and Military Service for the year. And as our whole national expenditure is about 70,000,000*l.*, of which 26,000,000*l.* goes in payment of interest on the National Debt, we have just 17,000,000*l.* left free for the remainder of our annual expenditure.

In moving the Army Estimates, on the 3d of March, Sir George Lewis entered into a comparison between the totals of men and money voted for the army in the years respectively preceding and following the war of the French Revolution and the Crimean War. In round numbers, we had in 1789, when the French Revolution broke out, an army of 44,000 men, for which we paid 3,000,000*l.*; and in 1818, when our establishments had settled down again, after the peace, into a normal state, we had 88,000 men, at a cost of 10,000,000*l.* In other words, the French War just doubled our army, while it more than tripled its cost. During the long peace which followed, there was a gradual increase in the number of men, with a gradual decrease in the ratio of their cost; so that in 1852 our establishment amounted to 119,000, and the expenditure to only 9,021,000*l.* A comparison of these figures with the 153,000 men, and the 15,000,000*l.* of the Estimates for the present year, will point the moral of the Crimean War, so far as it concerns the shortcomings of our former military system, and illustrate the effect which has been produced throughout Europe by the reëstablishment of Napoleonism in France.

Scarcely had the Estimates been passed, when news arrived from America of the singular battle of Hampton Roads. On the 8th of March, the *Virginia*, an iron-plated frigate belonging to the Confederate States, attacked the *Cumberland*, *Congress*, *Minnesota*, and *Roanoake*, four wooden frigates of the Federal fleet. Without herself receiving the slightest injury from the constant and heavy fire to which she was subjected, she ran down the *Cumberland* and drove the *Congress* ashore, and ultimately burnt her. She then withdrew for the night, but returned the next morning to

attack the *Minnesota* again. Here, however, her successes were interrupted by the sudden appearance of the *Monitor*, a new iron vessel belonging to the Federal States. The two iron ships now engaged one another, and fought for an hour and a half, when they parted without any decisive result; though it is said, on the one hand, that the *Virginia*, "evidently suffered to some extent," and, on the other, that she "completely riddled" the *Minnesota*. As far as the question of naval construction and gunnery is concerned, the only two important inferences to be drawn from this engagement are, (1) that iron ships can easily destroy wooden ones, and (2) that the Dahlgren guns, with which the *Virginia* was armed, are powerless against five-inch iron-plates. Both these facts had long been well known when the battle of Hampton Roads took place; and the events of that battle therefore afforded no especial ground for excitement or alarm in this country. When the news arrived, however, the public instantly jumped to a conclusion that iron ships were proved to be invulnerable, and that consequently fortifications on land could be no real defence against an invading fleet. It was in vain that Sir George Lewis and Lord Clarence Paget, on the 31st of March, and the Duke of Somerset, on the 3d of April, exposed the fallacies which had become current on the subject. The popular excitement was fed continually by the press; and, on the 4th of April, Mr. Bernal Osborne, making himself its organ, moved in the House of Commons, "that it is expedient to suspend the construction of the proposed forts at Spithead until the value of iron-roofed gun-boats for the defence of our ports and roadsteads shall have been fully considered." The first object of the Government being to prevent any irrevocable action on the very inconclusive data which had overpowered the public mind, Lord Palmerston, in reply, made a temporising speech, and it was agreed that the whole matter should be brought again under the consideration of the House of Commons, after the Easter recess.

By this means, time was given for a practical disproof of the alleged invulnerability of iron-plated ships, by

some experiments which took place at Shoeburyness, on the 8th of April, with a new 300-pounder Armstrong gun. The *Warrior* is the strongest ship afloat; and it was against a target made exactly of the same materials and strength as her broadside that the new gun was tried, at a distance of 200 yards. "The first shot, a 156-pounder," says the *Times* account, "was fired with a charge of 40 lbs. of powder. . . . This solved all doubts. With an indescribable crash that mingled fearfully with the report of the gun, the shot struck upon a comparatively uninjured plate, shattering the iron mass before it into little crumbs of metal, splintering the teak into fibres literally as small as pins, and though not passing quite through the side, yet bulging and rending the inner skin of the ship in a way that would have rendered it almost impossible to stop the leakage. The second shot (still with a 40-lb. charge) struck close by the side of the first, making the previous damage tenfold worse, if possible. To those who did not actually see the experiments it would be difficult to describe the manner in which the iron opposite the missile was broken into minute fragments like glass; how the teak was so utterly disintegrated that it more resembled tangles of fine twine than even the remains of wood-work; and how, above all, the inner iron skin was ripped into gaps like torn paper. These two shots were quite conclusive as to the power of the gun. Had they struck an iron frigate at the water-line, no means could have prevented her from sinking in half an hour. Still, however, the shot had not gone completely through the side, which it was the great object of the experiments to accomplish. The charge of powder was therefore increased from 40 lbs. to 50 lbs., and the gun levelled at the uppermost plate of the target, which had been left untouched in previous tests. On this plate a white spot was painted to guide the artillerymen; and so true was their aim,—so exactly was the centre of the mark struck,—that every vestige of the paint was obliterated. With this increased charge the shot passed, not only through the armour-plate, teak, and inner skin, but buried itself in the massive timbers that sup-

port the target, and even loosened the blocks of granite by which the whole is backed up. Had it been the side of the *Warrior* against which this missile was directed, it would not only have gone through the side, but nearly through the opposite side as well. Another white mark was then made on the lowest plate of the target, and again the artillerymen hit it with the same marvellous precision, and with the same result. The shot went through every thing; and even the fondest believers in the invulnerability of our present ironsides were obliged to confess that against such artillery, at such ranges, their plates and sides were almost as penetrable as wooden ships are now to the plain old-fashioned long 32's." It is true that all these experiments were made at the short range of 200 yards; but, on the other hand, the shot fired in each case was only a 156-pounder, while the gun from which it was fired was made for a 300-pounder; and the probability is that a shot of that weight, at 400 yards, would have a momentum sufficient to produce the same result as the lighter shot produced at 200 yards. The precise value of that result has been more clearly shown by some later experiments undertaken in order to test the power of the new gun. In the course of these experiments, a trial was made with a 50-lb. charge of powder against an iron target of three five-inch plates bolted together, being in all nearly four times the thickness of the *Warrior's* plates. "Two or three shots were fired against this, and each broke all three plates, crushing the first, ripping and splitting the second, and ripping the third in such a way as to show that even fifteen inches of metal was an insufficient protection against ordnance of this description at close ranges."

The actual superiority of the gun over the plate must now, therefore, be considered as fully vindicated. Its eventual superiority can hardly be doubtful; since, in the nature of things, there is a limit to the thickness of the iron armour in which a ship can swim, and there is no such perceptible limit to the possible development of the power of artillery. Six-and-a-half inch plates are at present held to be the utmost that any ship can carry; while, without making

the most of the artillery we already possess, we are able to pierce a target of fifteen inches. These are facts which Mr. Osborne will find it difficult to bend; and as it appears, in addition, that the abandonment of the plan of defence recommended by the Royal Commissioners would not make any money available for the immediate construction of gun-boats, it is probable that, on reconsidering the subject after the Easter recess, the House of Commons will not judge the battle of Hampton Roads to be a sufficient reason for dispensing with the fortifications in progress at Spithead.

Maritime Law.

On the 11th and 17th of March, the House of Commons discussed the following resolution, which was moved by Mr. Horsfall, and ultimately withdrawn: "That the present state of international maritime law, as affecting the rights of belligerents and neutrals, is ill-defined and unsatisfactory, and calls for the early attention of her Majesty's Government."

All the speakers in the debate started, though in opposite directions, from the text of the Declaration of Paris. It was generally admitted that a very serious injury has been inflicted on our shipping interest by the acceptance of the doctrine that free ships make free goods; but while Mr. Walpole and Mr. Disraeli urged the Government to obtain the consent of the other subscribing powers to a reconsideration of this clause in the Declaration, Lord Palmerston, following Mr. Bright, pointed out that, if the Declaration of Paris had never been agreed to, the same considerations which induced England to suspend the right of seizing enemy's goods in neutral ships at the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, would have operated in the same direction at the commencement of every subsequent war. Since the growth of the enormous mercantile navy of the United States, the interests of neutrals are too important to be disregarded, except at the risk of converting them into belligerents. And, after all, the injury done by the concession has perhaps been overrated. It is true that the carrying trade of the country is, in a great measure,

transferred in time of war to neutral ships; but if neutrals had remained liable to capture, belligerents would not be any the less so. It is hardly conceivable that we could be at war with France without an entire suspension of our trade in British bottoms. So that the change operates rather as the temporary creation of a new carrying trade than as the diversion of the old one.

If, however, this were not the case, it would still be impossible to accept Mr. Horsfall's proposition. We are told that it is the logical consequence of the Declaration of Paris. The answer to that is, that the process involves the introduction of a term in the conclusion which was not in the premisses. The clause in the Declaration of Paris exclusively affected our relations with neutrals; its supposed consequence affects our relations with belligerents; and it is hard to see how a concession to powers with whom we are at peace can necessitate a like concession to powers with whom we are at war. Such a change, if consistently followed out, must ultimately lead to the abolition of naval warfare altogether. The right of blockade would have to be given up, as Mr. Cobden has since proposed that it should be. For a blockade is as much a destruction of trade, and an interference with private interests, as the capture of merchant ships on the high seas; and it would operate with peculiar hardship upon England, because the Continental powers might evade a blockade of their own ports, by sending their ships into neutral harbours, and thence conveying their cargoes by land transport,—an advantage which would not be shared by an insular nation. Then, when blockades were once abolished, there would remain little reason for keeping up a navy, except in the form of a number of floating batteries. And how far such a change would affect the maritime supremacy of England the representatives of the shipping interest do not inform us. Nor, indeed, is it likely that, when once these reforms were introduced, either the ship-owners or the mercantile classes generally would be content to subordinate the general interests of trade to the prosperity of their own country. The merchants of England are by no

means an unpatriotic class ; but, to quote the words of the Solicitor-General, "Under what system was the patriotism of English merchants fostered and maintained? Was it under the system of political wars and commercial peace, or under a system that in war bound them up together with their Government, which made them fellow-sufferers in its reverses, partners in the common stake, and looking to its success as the source or return of their own prosperity? I venture to say that the patriotism of the mercantile class would be placed in danger if in time of war their interests were separated from the general interests ; if they were indemnified against the consequences of war ; if they were deprived of their general interest in the maintenance of peace."

Education.

After several preliminary discussions in both Houses of Parliament, the opposition to the Revised Educational Code was brought to a point by Mr. Walpole, who moved, on the 25th of March, that the House of Commons should go into committee, in order to consider certain resolutions antagonistic to the Code, which he had previously laid upon the table. The Government did not resist this motion, but the debate on it was adjourned to the 27th ; when Mr. Lowe vindicated the scheme of his department in a speech of extraordinary ability. The Code, however, was doomed ; and on the next evening it was announced in general terms that the Government were prepared to make certain concessions. It was promised that a substantial portion of the grant to each school should be given on the general report of the inspector ; that the principle of grouping by age should be abandoned ; that pupil-teachers should be fully secured in their pay for the whole of their terms ; and that future revisions should be more formally submitted to the House. These modifications are extremely important. They meet every expectation which could reasonably be entertained by the opponents of the Code, and there is no doubt that they will involve a very considerable expenditure of public money for educational purposes be-

yond the limit which the new scheme was designed to fix. The subject now stands for discussion on the 5th of May. Meanwhile the following official document has been issued, showing in detail the changes proposed to be introduced into the Code as last printed. The parts printed in brackets are changes introduced since the announcement of the 28th of March :

"ARTICLES PROPOSED IN PLACE OF ARTICLES 40-48, BOTH NUMBERS INCLUSIVE.

"[40. The managers of schools may claim at the end of each year, defined by Article 17: (*a.*) The sum of 4s. per scholar according to the average number in attendance throughout the year at the morning and afternoon meetings of their school, and 2s. 6d. per scholar according to the average number in attendance throughout the year at the evening meetings of the school. (*b.*) For every scholar who has attended more than 200 morning or afternoon meetings of their school]: 1. If more than six years of age [8s.], subject to examination (Article 48, *infra*). 2. If under six years of age [6s. 6d.], subject to a report by the inspector that such children are instructed suitably to their age, and in a manner not to interfere with the instruction of the older children. [(*c.*) For every scholar who has attended more than 24 evening meetings of their school, 5s., subject to examination (Article 48, *infra*).]

"[41. Attendance at a morning or afternoon meeting may not be reckoned for any scholar who has been under instruction less than two hours, nor attendance at an evening meeting for any scholar who has been under instruction less than one hour and a half.]

"[42. Evening attendances may not be reckoned with morning or afternoon attendances in making up the prescribed *minimum* of 200 or 24 attendances.]

"43. Evening attendances may not be reckoned for any scholar under 12 years of age.

"[44.] Every scholar [attending more than 200 times in the morning or afternoon for whom 8s. is claimed] forfeits [2s. 8d.] for failure to satisfy

the inspector in reading, [2s. 8d.] in writing, and [2s. 8d.] in arithmetic [(Article 48, *infra*).]

"[45.] Every scholar [attending more than 24 times in the evening for whom 5s. is claimed] forfeits [1s. 8d.] for failure to satisfy the inspector in reading, [1s. 8d.] in writing, and [1s. 8d.] in arithmetic (Article 48, *infra*).

"[46. Every scholar for whom the grants dependent upon examina-

tion are claimed must be examined according to one of the following standards, and must not be presented for examination twice according to the same or a lower standard.]

"[47. Under any Half-Time Act, 100 attendances qualify scholars for the grant: (a.) Upon examination. (b.) Without examination, after they have passed according to the highest standard, but continue to attend school under the Act.]

48.	Standard I.	[Standard II.]	Standard III.
Reading . .	Narrative in monosyllables.	[One of the narratives next in order after monosyllables in an elementary reading book used in the school.]	A short paragraph from an elementary reading book used in the school.
Writing . . .	Form on blackboard or slate, from dictation, letters, capital and small manuscript.	[Copy in manuscript character a line of print.]	A sentence from the same paragraph, slowly read once, and then dictated in single words.
Arithmetic .	Form on blackboard or slate, from dictation, figures up to 20; name at sight figures up to 20; add and subtract figures up to 10; orally, from examples on blackboard.	[A sum in simple addition or subtraction, and the multiplication table.]	A sum in any simple rule as far as short division (inclusive).
	Standard IV.	[Standard V.]	Standard VI.
Reading . .	A short paragraph from a more advanced reading book used in the school.	[A few lines of poetry from a reading book used in the first class of the school.]	A short ordinary paragraph in a newspaper, or other modern narrative.
Writing . . .	A sentence slowly dictated once, by a few words at a time, from the same book, but not from the paragraph read.	[A sentence slowly dictated once, by a few words at a time, from a reading book used in the first class of the school.]	Another short ordinary paragraph in a newspaper, or other modern narrative, slowly dictated once by a few words at a time.
Arithmetic .	A sum in compound rules (money).	[A sum in compound rules (common weights and measures).]	A sum in practice or bills of parcels.

"49. The grant may either be withheld altogether or reduced for causes arising out of the state of the school.

"50. The inspector does not proceed to examine scholars in reading, writing, and arithmetic for the grant, until he has first ascertained that the state of the school does not require it to be withheld.

"51. The grant is withheld altogether,—(a.) If the school be not held in a building certified by the inspector to be healthy, properly lighted, drained, and ventilated, supplied with offices, and containing in the principal schoolroom at least 80 cubical feet of internal space for each child in

average attendance. (b.) If the principal teacher be not duly certificated (Article 61), and duly paid. Teachers certificated before March 31, 1864, and who have not otherwise agreed with their employers, are duly paid if they receive not less than three times the grant allowable upon their certificates in Article 64-5 of the Code of 1860, and they have a first charge to the extent of this grant, being one-third of such due payment, upon the money received by the managers, under Article 40, *supra*. (c.) If the girls in the schools be not taught plain needlework as part of the ordinary course of instruction.

(d.) If the registers be not kept with sufficient accuracy to warrant confidence in the returns. (e.) If, on the inspector's report, there appears to be any *prima facie* objection* of a gross kind. A second inspection, wherein another inspector or inspectors takes part, is made in every such instance, and if the grant be finally withheld, a special minute is made and recorded of the case. (f.) If three persons at least be not designated to sign the receipt for the grant on behalf of the school.

"52. The grant is reduced,—(a.) By not less than one-tenth, nor more than one-half in the whole, upon the inspector's report, for faults of instruction* or discipline on the part of the teacher, or (after one year's notice) for failure on the part of the managers to remedy any such defect in the premises as seriously interferes with the efficiency of the school, or to provide proper furniture, books, maps, and other apparatus of elementary instruction. (b.) By the sum of 10*l.*, if after the first 50 scholars in average attendance there be not either one pupil-teacher fulfilling the conditions of Articles 75-83 for every 40 scholars, or one certificated or assistant-teacher fulfilling the conditions of Articles 61 and 85-7 respectively for every 80 scholars in average attendance. The forfeiture is reduced from 10*l.* to 5*l.* if the failure to comply with these articles be confined to the examination of a pupil-teacher (Article 82); but this reduction is made only once for the same pupil-teacher, and not in successive years for the same school. (c.) By its excess above: 1. The amount of school-fees and subscriptions; or 2. The rate of 15*s.* per scholar in average attendance in the year defined by Article 17.

"53. If the excess of scholars over the ratio of 40 to every pupil-teacher has arisen from increased attendance of children since the last settlement of the school-staff (Articles 56, 57), the forfeiture prescribed by Article 52 (b), *supra*, does not accrue.

"[54. Pupil-teachers admitted before the 30th of June 1862, and the

masters and mistresses by whom they are instructed, have a second charge for their several stipends and gratuities, so long as their service fulfils the conditions prescribed by the Code of 1860, upon the money received by the managers under Article 40, *supra*; and in case the money so received shall not be sufficient to meet the second charge upon it, the Committee of Council will add the sum requisite to make up the deficiency.]

"ARTICLES PROPOSED IN PLACE OF ARTICLES 136-7.

"[136. In January of each year, if the Code be revised, or any material alteration in it be necessary, it shall be printed in such a form as to show separately all articles cancelled or modified, and all new articles.]

"[137. In the event of such revision or material alteration as mentioned in the last foregoing article, it shall not be lawful to take any action thereon until the same shall have been submitted to Parliament, and laid on the table of both Houses for at least one calendar month.]"

Finance.

The Budget, introduced on the 3d of April, takes its tone from the uncertainty of American affairs, and involves no great question either of principle or policy. The actual expenditure of the year just passed was 70,838,000*l.* against an estimated expenditure of 71,374,000*l.*; and the actual revenue was 69,674,000*l.* against an estimated revenue of 70,283,000*l.* There is therefore a saving of 436,000*l.* on the estimated expenditure, and a loss of 609,000*l.* on the estimated revenue, *i. e.* a loss of 173,000*l.* on the whole estimate. Between the actual expenditure of 70,838,000*l.* and the actual revenue of 69,674,000*l.* there is a difference of 1,164,000*l.*, which is the actual deficit on the year. For 1862-3, the estimated expenditure is 70,040,000*l.*, and the estimated revenue 70,190,000*l.*, which would leave a surplus of 150,000*l.*

The deficit of last year is due to a single cause. "Every thing else," says Mr. Gladstone, "is rising, growing, flourishing; but America, both as to trade, and still more as to the supplies of raw material for our manufacturing industry, exercises a de-

* In Church-of-England Schools the Order in Council of August 10, 1840, and the instructions to inspectors relative to examination in religion, which are founded upon it, are included under this paragraph.

pressing and lowering influence upon the vital circulation of capital and labour in this country." The results of this influence have been greatly mitigated, as far as our exports are concerned, by the operation of the French treaty, which appears to have increased the export of British produce to France by something like 150 per cent; and the trade with America itself shows symptoms of revival, the value of our exports to that country during the six months from September to February having been: in September, 483,000*l.*; in October, 709,000*l.*; in November, 739,000*l.*; in December, 805,000*l.*; in January, 1,086,000*l.*; and in February, 1,253,000*l.* But it is the failure of the cotton supply for our manufactures, not of the export trade, which is the real cause of embarrassment and apprehension; and the extreme doubtfulness of this question has determined the character of Mr. Gladstone's financial arrangements. "I have referred," he said in his statement, "to the one threatening and ominous circumstance in our position, viz. the deficient, the increasingly deficient supply of cotton. No surplus that we could ask for from the House would enable us to encounter the evils that may arise from a great further privation of that supply; and therefore if, on account of the prospect of that deficiency, we made a demand upon the House, even if we succeeded in obtaining that demand, we still could not feel the slightest confidence that we had made an adequate provision for the deficiency that might be impending. Considering, therefore, that, on the one side, if that cause of difficulty be removed, we have not the slightest reason to despond or to fear the ample sufficiency of our means; and considering, on the other hand, that any provision which we could in propriety and decency ask for from the House might fail to meet the contingencies which connect themselves with that one particular difficulty, her Majesty's Government have come to the conclu-

sion that it is not their duty to ask the House to impose any new taxes; at the same time, in the event of a great change, and a great aggravation of a pressure which is now tolerable, reserving to themselves discretion to consider in what mode it may be right to meet the exigencies of the public service, according to the circumstances which may then present themselves."

In this position of affairs, there can, of course, be no remission of taxes, in the proper sense of the term. But Mr. Gladstone's scheme commutes the hop-duties for a readjustment of the scale of brewers' licenses, on the principle of including in them the charge in respect to hop-duty, from which the brewers will be released. Threepence a barrel is the minimum of hop-duty now paid, and this sum therefore is to be added to the cost of the license; and as it would be a grievance to the regular brewer if he were required to pay hop-duty in this form while the private brewer was exempt from it altogether, every one inhabiting a house of a certain value, and under certain conditions, is to be bound, if he intend to brew, to take out a twelve-and-sixpenny license. This is the most important change contained in the budget. The next in value is an alteration in the rates of wine-duty, which are to be reduced from four to two. All wine up to twenty-six degrees of strength is to be admitted at a shilling duty; from twenty-six to forty-two degrees, it is to pay half-a-crown; and after that there is to be a prohibitory duty of threepence for every additional degree. The only other changes are the reduction of the duty on playing-cards to threepence, in order to prevent evasion; a slight modification of the inventory duty in Scotland; the imposition of a charge of one-eighth per cent on foreign and colonial bonds and loans; and the grant of supplemental licenses to permit publicans to supply their commodities at fairs and public gatherings.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Italy.

The chief weakness of the new Italian kingdom is the want of statesmen with great personal authority. The popularity of Cavour enabled him to achieve wonders—to restrain the ardour of the republicans, to sacrifice provinces to France, and to administer very deplorably ill. His successor had not the same power, and, although supported by majorities in the Chamber, could not preserve his office. Ricasoli was not an enterprising minister. He had neither the diplomatic influence necessary to involve the Powers in a great intrigue, nor the popular address which would have enabled him to use the enthusiasm of the patriots. For the solution of the Venetian problem, both these faculties are required, and therefore it slumbered under his administration. The attention of the minister was chiefly directed towards the Roman question, which was better suited to his character, to his religious sympathies, and to his desire to postpone the war with Austria. The presence of the King of Naples, and the constant disturbances in that kingdom, where the failure of the government to suppress resistance fettered its power, while the means it employed tarnished its honour, urged the immediate settlement of the claim which France has so long denied. Between a minister who directed his policy chiefly to the acquisition of Rome and the Emperor Napoleon no good feeling could exist.

On the 25th of February Ricasoli gained his last victory in the Chamber by conciliating the Left, with the declaration that he would not prevent the meetings and proceedings of the revolutionary party. The right of association, he said, was secured by the constitution, and should not be infringed. There may have been in this declaration something of the liberal, aristocratic spirit, and of that disposition to allow a free and unrestrained action without the intervention of the state, which was shown, or at least implied, in the fa-

mous proposals to the Holy See, and in which it is apparent that Ricasoli contrasted very advantageously with the despotic Cavour. But it was opposed to the spirit of the Piedmontese laws, and to the policy of the minister himself, who dreaded the movements of the revolutionists; it was considered a sign of weakness, and proved to be a moral defeat. The Baron himself afterwards declared that the vote which he obtained by this concession was hollow and unmeaning. The revolutionary party regarded the event in the same light. The alliance of the Tuscan statesman with the Mazzinists was involuntary and unnatural. They were united in several points of policy. The revolutionists, in whom animosity against the Church is strong, are naturally more eager for the conquest of Rome than of Venetia; they are also filled with hatred of Napoleon. Ricasoli, therefore, in his resistance to the French influence, and in his preference of the Roman to the Venetian question, followed the same practical end as the men to whom in principle he was most widely opposed. On the other hand, the Piedmontese party, who are attached to the throne, and desire its greatness more than the fulfilment of any theory, and who hold at Turin the reins of centralisation, which they might lose by being transplanted, dread an impolitic quarrel with France, look for its support in conquering Venetia, believe that they can obtain more of the Pope by patience than by any compromise, and hope to disable Austria by means of disturbances on the Danube. This is the disposition of the king, who is unable to master the intricacies of negotiation with Rome, and is frantic still at the peace of Villafranca.

Under the auspices of this combination Ratazzi came into office, when, on the 1st of March, Ricasoli with his colleagues resigned. Raised to power by a disreputable intrigue, without a parliamentary majority or a definite policy, suspected by a large party for his connexion with France,

and for his intention of letting the Roman question drop for a time, his position was difficult at first. The great meeting of the revolutionary party was about to take place at Genoa, and the new minister, who did not intend to attack Austria immediately, had to avoid being committed by the meeting to a policy not his own, and to prevent the rise of a patriotic excitement which he could not withstand. He overcame the difficulty by a politic use of Garibaldi. The new ministry was hardly appointed when Garibaldi appeared. He was won over by Ratazzi and the king, and induced to accept the presidency of the meeting at Genoa.

On the 9th of March the *Provedimento* Committee met, and Garibaldi presided. They adopted resolutions for the conquest of Rome, for the national armament, and for the recall of Mazzini. Garibaldi spoke for the government, and endeavoured to divert attention to Venetia. He deprived the assembly of its democratic character at home, while appealing to other nationalities for their sympathy and alliance. Whilst Garibaldi endeavoured to muzzle the revolutionary committee by his influence, Ratazzi warned it to be more guarded, and threatened to dissolve it if it failed to obey. In the Chamber he declared that his predecessor had misunderstood the law, that the right of association did not exclude the right of government intervention. It was his intention, he said, to carry out the law on the national armament, and he would not allow an association to organise a military force.

On the 21st of March Garibaldi set forth on a tour through the provinces, to keep alive the warlike spirit of the population, and to inspire them with confidence in the new administration. He was received with enthusiasm in the towns of Lombardy, and exhibited the strongest desire to promote the cause of the king. His republican friends calculate that the excitement of the national movement will at last carry the government along with it. But Italy is still in such a condition that a premature attack on Austria without aid from France, or from a revolution in Europe, would be fatal to the new state. Only those

portions of the army which served in 1859 are really fit to cope with the armies of Austria; and they have been diluted with new materials, as it has been the policy of the Piedmontese to give their regiments no local character, but to mingle in each the men of different provinces. This has been done in particular with the 20,000 Lombards who formerly served in the Austrian army. About 1800 of these have deserted; the rest are excellent soldiers, accustomed to discipline even more severe than that of Sardinia, and may often be recognised among their comrades by their stiff and erect bearing. Very few officers exchanged the Austrian for the Sardinian service. The whole number of Lombards in the army is 28,000. In the duchies about 10,000 old soldiers have been obtained, but few officers. The recruits of Romagna make fine soldiers, but the conscription is in many cases resisted. Of the 140,000 men who served under Francis II. of Naples, hardly 30,000 have entered the Piedmontese ranks, and 20,000 men have been added by conscription. Part of this force cannot be trusted, and the state of the country obliges the government to keep from 30,000 to 40,000 reliable soldiers in Naples. In case of war the danger would increase, and it would be necessary to strengthen this garrison. The annexation of the Two Sicilies has diminished, therefore, the military resources of Victor Emmanuel. In 1859 he took the field with an army of 80,000 men, drawn from his own dominions only, and a reserve of 30,000. He could now bring against the enemy an army of 120,000 infantry of the line, tolerably well officered, and 16,000 or 20,000 Bersaglieri, the best soldiers in Italy, but deficient, like all Italians, in the use of the rifle. The cavalry is extremely weak; for it is generally of little use in an Italian campaign, from the nature of the country. At the present moment the Sardinian cavalry does not exceed 8000 men, well mounted on Neapolitan horses. The artillery amounts to 40,000 men, and is highly efficient in the field. But they are unequal to the task of battering the great fortresses of the quadrilateral, which the Italians only hope to reduce by famine. There

is a force of 16,000 Carabinieri, employed as gendarmes, and a national guard of 80,000. Neither of these could face a regular army, and they are wanted at home. The force of volunteers who might follow Garibaldi, if war broke out immediately, is estimated at 30,000 men. Thus the whole available force for a war on the Mincio this year is about 200,000 men, whom it would not require more than 130,000 Austrians to hold in check before their strong positions. In a few years, if the Sardinians, as they hope, succeed in consolidating their kingdom, they might also succeed in organising a force twice as numerous, and more than twice as effective as the present.

Ratazzi has had great difficulty in composing a ministry. The politicians of most weight have refused to join him. Garibaldi, acting in alliance with the government, has spoken in the most violent terms against the Holy See, the position of which does not appear to have been improved by the change at Turin. The result of it is, that the Pope is more than ever at the mercy of the Emperor of the French, and more than ever enveloped in his toils.

On the Feast of the Annunciation, the 25th of March, Pius IX. delivered an address at the Church of the Minerva, in which he touched upon his present troubles. The Bull which was rejected by the King of France, and afterwards withdrawn, in which Boniface VIII. undertook to demonstrate the authority of the Church over the State, adopted the words of theologians of the greatest name in France itself, St. Bernard and the school of St. Victor, in order that no national prejudice might be awakened against the Ultramontane view. We are reminded of this precaution by the resemblance of the terms used by the Holy Father, in speaking of the present importance of the temporal power, to the language of Dr. Dollinger in his book on the same subject. The positive conclusions of the statesmanlike divine appear to have found no response in Rome; but the limits by which he has defined the importance of the Roman sovereignty for the freedom of the Church are not ex-

ceeded by the public declaration of Pius IX. The position thus taken up by the Holy Father is identical with that of a party hitherto believed to be a minority among Catholics, and his words, therefore, are in no danger either of being misinterpreted or of failing to command the hearty assent of men who have dreaded those extremes to which a good conscience and the horror of wrong sometimes betray the champions even of the most righteous cause. Occupying this vantage-ground, he is enabled to accomplish that which to all authorities, but more especially to ecclesiastical authority, has ever been a most difficult task: he sets a limit to the aspirations of his more ardent and impetuous supporters at the very moment when he is rebuking the treason and hypocrisy of those who wish to rob the Holy See of its rights, and who, he affirms, "will fall into an abyss from which it is almost impossible they should ever escape."

The most important part of the address is directed against an ecclesiastic who has written to express his alarm lest at the approaching assembly of the Bishops, at Pentecost, the temporal power should be declared a dogma of faith. To this Pope Pius replies: "The Holy See does not maintain the temporal power as a dogma of faith, but it declares that the temporal power is necessary and indispensable, as long as the present order established by Providence shall endure, to sustain the independence of the spiritual power." It is certainly difficult to understand how the expectation which is here rebuked, how either hopes or fears of the promulgation of such a dogma as the necessity of the temporal power, could be entertained by an educated Catholic.

It is perhaps with reference chiefly to the approaching meeting that this discourse has been delivered. Although it surrenders nothing, it is yet so framed as to dissipate some of the expectations which the invitation to the Bishops has awakened. By stating the temporary and conditional character of the earthly sovereignty of the Head of the Church, and marking a limit beyond which its sacredness must not be insisted

on, or its absolute utility upheld, the Pope confutes the apprehensions of the Powers which have forbidden the journey of the Bishops to Rome; for those Powers acted on the supposition that their subjects would be led to take part on that occasion in some act committing them more thoroughly and irrevocably than heretofore to the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty, by which act the difficulty of a change would be increased.

The canonisation of a saint is one of the loftiest prerogatives of the Holy See. It is a solemnity so splendid and so uncommon that it has ever been an epoch in the reign of the the Pontiff who has granted it. No more fitting opportunity could be devised to point the contrast between the temporal calamities and the unshaken spiritual authority, or to prove to the world that the loss of territory and of political power, the hostility of Italy, the protection of France, and the disloyalty of Rome, do not deprive the Pope of the reverence or of the rights which he enjoys as the Vicar of Christ, and that persecution does not dissolve the communion of the militant and the triumphant Church.

So far as the mind of the Holy See influences the sentiments of Catholics, or the will of the Pope governs their acts, the declaration of March 25th adds nothing to the authority of those which have gone before it. The awe inspired by the voice of the Supreme Pontiff and the terror of excommunication have done their work already, and have had their weight in the deliberations of those who have been compelled to cast their lot with one side or the other. No man can be supposed ignorant of the penalties incurred by those who despoil the Holy See of its rights. They were imposed, not by the Pope himself as an act of defence in the circumstances of the time, but by the permanent law of the Church, as a standing menace to those who may assail her temporalities, and a lasting defence of rights which prescription does not invalidate, and which suffer nothing from the lapse of time. The recent declaration, though adding nothing to those which went before, and fall-

ing short of many which did not so distinctly provide against the errors of a pious zeal, differs from others in the character of the argument. At the outbreak of the present troubles, the perils of the temporal power came from the Revolution, from a movement politically false, and hostile to religion. Our defence, then, was to appeal to the right of the Church, to claim for the Pope the inviolable sanctity possessed by all constituted authorities, to identify his cause with that of order, property, and civil society, and while proclaiming the punishments which the Church has appointed for her assailants, to rely on the principle of legitimacy. As things went on, this principle exhibited its impotence. The monarchy with whom the papal dominion had allied itself fell; the Catholics of the universe were not Legitimists; some of them, on the principle of national independence, rejoiced at the expulsion of the Austrians; others, out of hatred for arbitrary power, triumphed in the fall of the Neapolitan throne; others, again, like the English, the Americans, and the Belgians, were committed to the belief that the rights of authority are not unconditional. The Roman government, on the other hand, was not in a position to allow any verification of the rightfulness of its own nature, or of the legality of its action. Every successive publication of documents and of conversations showed that, if it were judged by its merits, it could not endure any of the tests which are admitted by free nations. Accordingly, the political defence, the argument founded on right, failed. The argument from expediency then took its place. This argument is adopted by Dr. Döllinger in his recent book. In this work he collects the proofs of the real character of the Roman government, and argues that its existence has been injurious to religion; but nevertheless he comes to the conclusion that the Church requires for her freedom, under the present circumstances of the world, a real sovereignty in Rome. The declaration of the Pope, in like manner, puts prominently forward the interests of religion, and claims for them precedence over all considerations derived from a different

sphere of ideas. The question of right has given place to the question of expediency.

The perplexities of Catholics are not diminished by the change. We cannot hold that religion may be served by doing wrong; or that its interests suspend the obligations which in other cases are supreme; or that the canons of morality which rule both public and private life may be dispensed with for the good of the Church; or that the end justifies the means. The real defence of the papal right hitherto has been the infamy of the policy by which the Pope is assailed. Against the just discontent of the subjects of arbitrary power the monarch has no legitimate defence; but against an unjust invasion any monarch is in the right. We cannot defend the pontifical sovereignty on the principle of the indefeasible right of kings, because we believe in a Divine right which supersedes the right of kings. We cannot defend it as a government which deserves absolutely to be defended, because we do not believe that it fulfilled the legal conditions of a good government. But we may defend it on the ground that its faults disappear beside the iniquity of the Piedmontese intrigue; and this is the source of no small part of the sympathy which it still commands.

The view which has been repeated on three occasions by Dr. Döllinger, and which is identical with that expressed in the late discourse of the Pope, appears to us hardly consistent with another memorable passage in his book. We are told that temporal sovereignty is essential to the freedom of the Holy See, because, as things now are, it is impossible to find any other security for it. But we are reminded in the same paragraph, that it is not for men to set bounds to the wisdom and the power of Almighty God, that His resources are not exhausted within the limits of our horizon, that the future belongs to Him, and that His Spirit will not depart from the Church. It behoves us not to be solicitous, therefore, about that which is to come, or anxious lest events should be too powerful for Him to guide, or lest evils should grow beyond His skill to remedy, or crimes beyond His

power to baffle or avenge. The welfare of religion, though the first of our hopes and prayers, is not the rule which guides our consciences. For there is a standard of right and wrong, independent of the standard of religious expediency, and independent of the occasional utterances of ecclesiastical authority. However certain the loss to ourselves, however apparent the peril to souls, whatever the risk of trouble to the Church, we are bound to consider not advantage but right, not attachment but duty. Christians are bound to obey certain rules, which they may not transgress for any object, however holy. They must submit to the worst evils, and tolerate things which are most injurious to religion, because they cannot do wrong that good may come of it. But Almighty God brings a remedy, and effects a change in which His own servants cannot be His instruments. Evil men, guided by evil intentions, who would not follow good impulses, or act if they foresaw the end, in pursuing their own objects perform those things from which the just are bound to refrain, but by which their cause is benefited. The desire of good would be impotent to obtain many ends which God compasses by overruling the actions and designs of wicked men. The safety of the Church cannot be involved in wrongdoing, and the advancement of political right must supersede the prospect of religious advantage. The Church has never permitted insurrection against a just authority for her own sake only. She can never enjoin, for her own sake, resistance to a just demand. The keeper of the truth must be the keeper of the right, and the right is not always with authority. It is necessary, therefore, that the question of political right should be decided before the argument from religious expediency can be heard. Unfortunately, that is a question which the ecclesiastical authority cannot discuss, for the inquiry is one in which it does not occupy the position of a judge, nor even that of an advocate. In the work of the German prelate the advantage to religion is used as the final argument after the political defence has been practically refuted by

the facts which he has told; but it appears to us that such an argument cannot be admitted until the plea of misgovernment has been answered, and the doubt of possibility removed.

What is the character of the present order which is the reason of the temporal power? It is the character of revolution, of the insecurity of right, of the suppression of freedom. Constitutional states and despotic states, liberals and absolutists, vie with each other in their disposition to centralise, and in their jealousy of self-governing bodies. Men had believed for ages that the sovereign power could be neither limited nor resisted, and for near a hundred years the theory of the absolute right of kings has been encountered by the theory of the sovereignty of the people. The conflict has not produced freedom, because the popular theory borrowed from the other the centralisation and absolutism of the state, and with it the doctrine that the supreme power can do no wrong. But yet out of the contests of this revolutionary age peace must ultimately proceed; out of the modern theory of the right of kings, and the ancient theory of the rights of man, the medieval idea of the rights of God, which is identified with neither and holds the balance between them, must revive again, as the only solution of the present troubles in Church and State. In that new condition of civil society, the Church will be the greatest gainer: she is the greatest sufferer by its absence—she must be the foremost agent in producing it. She cannot be alone prosperous and free. She prospers by the freedom of all, and suffers by the general disease. Where other rights are oppressed, hers cannot be respected. The welfare of the Church is the welfare of all; her liberties are bound up with all other liberties; between her cause and that of justice, right, and freedom, there is a constant alliance and an unswerving sympathy. If her liberty is imperilled now, so are all other liberties; when they are recovered, she will recover hers.

Prussia.

The present situation of the Prussian monarchy differs in an essential

point from that of all other States which are distracted by the almost universal conflict between conservatism, reform, and revolution, and is unintelligible if we apply the ordinary tests which may safely guide our judgment in Central and Southern Europe. In all those countries which submitted to the supremacy of the first Napoleon, the old *régime* was swept away, and a new order of things was established on the model of the French administration. Herein lies for Europe in general the great importance of the wars of the Empire. All those countries south of the Sarmatian plains, which formed in the middle ages the Christian Republic, are so intimately connected by a common history, by the unity of their civilisation, the similarity of national elements, the connexion of their religious traditions, and even by geographical arrangement, that a certain resemblance in their social and political character is unavoidable. This resemblance, secured of old by the predominance of the Church, afterwards found its visible expression in the system of international law which was founded on a certain community of political principles, and a certain harmony of national interests and motives in every part. Two things handed down from earlier times, the recognition of the ethical precepts of Christianity, and of the principle of legitimate authority, were assumed as the basis of the system. If, therefore, any nation should repudiate every acknowledgment of moral obligation, the restraint of objective law, and the securities which a graduated and therefore unequal aristocratic society affords against the abuse and the instability of power, the convulsion which effected the change at home must necessarily extend to the rest of Europe. The new element would be inconsistent with the surrounding mass, the balance of power, the faith of treaties, the existing distribution of territory would be at an end, the independence of States would be threatened by the policy of the new neighbour, every authority and every institution would be imperilled by its example.

On this account, all Europe, impelled by the voice of the greatest of statesmen, took up arms, in successive

coalitions, against the French republic. Other confederacies and alliances had been formed against the power of France. This was essentially though not expressly a war against French society; a war of principles rather than of national interests or dynastic ambition. And when revolutionary France had compelled all Europe to recognise it, a new series of efforts began under the Empire, in which Napoleon sought to secure the new order of things by assimilating to it the institutions of the neighbouring States. No peace could be permanent between the new system in France and the Europe of the old *régime*. The harmony of government and the analogy of society had not been restored by the attempt to bring back France to her old condition; the attempt to restore it by imposing on other countries the innovations of the French revolution succeeded for a time, and carried into many lands elements of further change, which so often shook the thrones in the last generation, and still play an important part in the troubles of the Continent, especially in Belgium, in Western Germany, in Southern Italy, and in Spain. In all those countries which were nearest to the frontier of France, governments were introduced in conformity with the new order of society, whose most marked characteristics were centralisation and secularisation. In all the common result was the destruction of all coördinate or intermediate authorities; the ruin of the Church and of the aristocracy as political powers; the abolition of the feeble remains of local autonomy which had survived the levelling policy of modern absolutism. In all those States, therefore, there is an absence of continuity in the development of freedom, and a deficiency of the most important materials in the organisation of self-government. They are deprived, though not in equal measure, of those mediators which intervene between arbitrary power and lawless resistance, which moderate the exercise and temper the effects of sovereign power, which arrest the action of tyranny, prevent misgovernment, divert popular anger, and anticipate rebellion. Consequently they suffer under two great practical evils, on the side of authority, and on

the side of liberty. There is on one hand an inevitable tendency to aggravate the royal authority, as the crown, destitute of the support of kindred and coeval powers, has nothing to rely on but itself and its instrument, the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the parliament, as the only popular institution, independent of the administration, tends to absorb all power in its own hands, and is as jealous as the crown of every other authority, because such authority might be used as a weapon for its control. Centralisation carries this curse with it—that it interests both the royal and the liberal party alike in its preservation, and disinclines both to educate the people in the principles of freedom.

From this revolution, which was accomplished in all the smaller German States by the ministers of petty despots without popular disorders, Prussia remained free. Alone among continental European States she has escaped the evil of revolutionary change. During the supremacy of France after the peace of Tilsit, the social and political condition of the country underwent a vast reform, which, if it had been continued, would have fulfilled all the just requirements of modern society, and have satisfied those claims which give to the revolution elsewhere somewhat of moral justification, and still more of the excuse of that necessity which knows no law. But the reforms of Stein, wise and admirable so far as he was able to accomplish them during scarcely a year of power, were called for by peculiar temporary circumstances, and aimed at a particular momentary purpose. This purpose and these circumstances obtained for them a general support, to which they owed their success; but the completeness of the success exhausted the desire for reform, and the edifice which had been begun so happily was left unfinished in the day of prosperity. The disastrous war of 1806 had exhausted and depopulated the country; it had estranged the different classes, by making the people jealous and suspicious of the nobles who had commanded the troops; it had imposed on the king the obligation of reducing his army to 42,000 men. Stein and Scharnhorst undertook, in the face of the French, to prepare the deliver-

ance of the country by means of internal reforms. In order to reconcile the classes, to promote prosperity, to encourage agriculture, it was necessary to emancipate the peasantry, to throw down the barriers to free competition, to allow the burgher to purchase land, and the gentry to embark in trade. A liberal system of provincial and municipal administration on the ancient foundation bound up the people more closely with the crown. As the army was limited by treaty, it was necessary to train greater numbers by shortening the time of actual service, whilst the State retained the right to call out those who had been once trained. This was the origin of the Landwehr, by which in the space of three years the country obtained an army of 150,000 soldiers without awakening the suspicions of the French, and by which in 1814 the Prussian people, alone among the continental allies identified in spirit with its king, took the foremost part in the destruction of Napoleon.

The old Prussian absolutism, broken up by Stein's reforms, returned after the war of deliverance. Under the dominion of the Hegelian system in the government and the universities, liberties were refused, but education was extended, and the material prosperity of the country increased rapidly. The reconstitution of the Prussian territory justified to some extent the predominance of the royal power. The newly-acquired provinces introduced an element of weakness in the state that could be compensated for only by strengthening the crown. Prussia was formerly an essentially Protestant state, and after the conversion of the electoral family of Saxony the protector of Protestantism in the Empire; it was, moreover, the only part of Germany in which a strong feeling of national connexion, the pride of military glory, the memory of splendid achievements, and the personal influence of a series of remarkable princes, sustained a sense of political unity and a vigorous patriotism. But those bonds, which had been strengthened by the sacrifices of the seven years' war, were loosened by the acquisitions which followed the war of deliverance. One-third of the inhabitants were Catholics, connected

by no traditions with their new sovereign. Rhinelanders, Westphalians, and Poles required delicate management. A territory so scattered and a population so heterogeneous, possessing neither local connexion nor internal affinity, but held together only by a common allegiance to the same sovereign, did not possess the indispensable elements of a constitution of the modern type. No historical traditions—no imperial policy—no public opinion founded on identity of interest and supported by an equally distributed education, supplied that unity which a national parliament requires. Strength was needed in the sceptre which ruled such a discordant state. Yet the old traditions of Germany and the reforms of 1808 supplied a foundation on which a system of self-government might have been gradually developed. The provinces had, at least in name, local assemblies for the discussion of provincial affairs. The towns enjoyed the management of considerable property. There were the materials for provincial and communal autonomy, by promoting which the possibility of a free national representation might be secured. For only those who administer at home their own local affairs are competent to join in parliamentary government. The habits of liberty are matured only in the narrow circle of the parish and the *commune*. Where local as well as national concerns are administered by officials who hold their commission from the supreme and central power, the deputies who at home are in the habit of being governed go to the capital with the desire of governing. The less freedom they have known, the less they will be inclined to give; and by not governing themselves they have acquired the belief that they are to govern others as absolutely as possible. A parliament of that sort is very likely to abridge to the utmost the royal authority, and to use brave words about national independence and resistance to tyranny. But liberty and self-government it will never promote or even tolerate, and all that it takes away from the influence of the crown will go to increase the power of the state. The concession of a constitution and national representation is therefore the

greatest obstacle to the growth of freedom in a country without local self-government, for the habit as well as the theory of freedom is essential to its success. Herein lies the value of corporations in a representative system. They are a security for the existence of the right and practice of self-government in spheres where authority is not derived from the state or exercised by its ministers. To a healthy constitutional system, therefore, there is no support more important than the existence of provincial, municipal, and corporate assemblies. To a centralising constitutionalism nothing is more hateful.

In this direction it behoved the Prussian Government, after 1815, to proceed. But the doctrines of the Holy Alliance prevented this policy from being pursued. A machinery of official administration, a system of bureaucracy, was organised, skilful, intelligent, and upright beyond any other on the Continent, but despotic, infidel, meddling, and calculated to smother among the people the notion and the habit of providing for themselves. The material results of this period were splendid. The population increased from 10,400,000 in 1816, to 17,740,000 in 1858. The production of the soil, which was insufficient for the population of ten millions, is now in excess of the consumption of eighteen millions. Education is so general that 2,764,691 children attend at school, and only 5 per cent of the recruits can neither read nor write. The revenue increased from 50,000,000 dollars in 1821, to 135,341,701 in 1861. The debt, which at the end of the war amounted to 217,845,558 dollars, was reduced in 1847 to 139,884,581; it has now risen again to 247,641,481 dollars.

Until the accession of the late king nothing was done for constitutional development, and when under the influence of Radowitz he undertook to establish a system of liberties, the consequences of the delay made themselves felt. The impatience of the educated class at the absolute conservatism of the former reign had given currency to many false theories, and the extreme of repression had led to an extreme of liberalism. The sense of duty, which is the safeguard of

right, the reverence for the sovereign, which sustains authority, had been very generally subverted. Whilst the horror of arbitrary power had faded away with the decline of the Christian religion, the eagerness to have a share in the exercise of power had taken its place. Whilst, therefore, the wish for representative government grew stronger, the idea of self-government was given up; and the more an abstract constitutionalism was desired, the more unpopular was the idea of raising to maturity the ancient institutions of the country. Both the extirpation of the faith of the people, and the ruin of its political faculties, was the work of the government, and the reforms of Frederic William IV. came too late. He combined the provincial estates in a central assembly at Berlin, and promised gradually to modify its constitution, in conformity with the wants of the time. But the troubles of 1848 interrupted the enterprise, the king displayed unexpected weakness, and a constitution of the usual kind was conceded, the provincial estates remaining in their former incomplete state. The new system was in contradiction with the views and convictions of the king; he continued thenceforth to occupy a false position, and his mind at length gave way beneath the burden. Whilst he lived it was the endeavour of the Manteuffel ministry and of the bureaucratic conservatives, by whom it was supported, to prevent the actual consistent completion of the constitutional system. Alarmed by the events and doctrines of 1848, they attempted an entire reaction, using the interference of the police and arbitrary interpretations of the law for the purpose of arresting liberalism and democracy. In a policy of this kind, so essentially tortuous and unpopular, no confidence and no security could be felt; and liberty itself was deliberately repressed out of fear of its abuse. The government was worse than the party. In theory they could say that they resisted arbitrary and lawless power, whether in the form of despotism or of revolution, but that, the danger of the moment proceeding from the latter, their efforts required to be directed for the time against that alone. They might add that the fullest develop-

ment of the constitutional elements consistently with the traditions and character of the state would not have conciliated the opposition. But practically their system was illiberal, repressive, and adverse to the settlement of those questions which are involved in the establishment of constitutionalism. Consequently, they compelled the real enemies of revolution, who oppose it as much in one shape as in another, and defend the right with the same spirit against the crown and the mob, to join in the opposition of the democratic party. It is this divergence of principle from those with whom they were often obliged to act that disposed the Prussian Catholics so long to insist on the necessity of a Catholic party which should defend the Catholic interests without regard to the common bond of political principles.

A new era commenced with the Regency. An administration of a more liberal character was appointed, which gained popularity by its foreign policy, and by encouraging the movement towards unity in Germany. But the ministry were not united: one portion were Conservatives of the aristocratic school; the others belonged to the liberal party, and favoured the Nationalists. The king, who was the most vehement adversary of the constitutional designs of his brother in 1845, and concerning whose efforts at that time unpleasant revelations have recently been made in the Diaries of Varnhagen, did not trust his advisers. He was supported by the consistent Conservatives, the party of the *Kreuzzeitung*, of the aristocratic monarchy; and with these men, who, as Legitimists and Lutherans, are zealous defenders of the temporal power of the Pope, the Catholics were inclined for a time to coalesce. The Prussian Conservatives are enemies of German as well as Italian unity, extremely hostile to France, and disposed to favour Austria. It was in strict harmony with their views that King William spoke at Königsberg, when he declared that he held his crown from God alone.

This famous declaration was no more than a repudiation of the ideas of French imperialism, and a recognition of the same principles on which the crown of Great Britain rests.

Monarchy by the grace of God is the only description of monarchy which gives security for right and law. The stability of the sovereign power is a condition necessary for its limitation. The safety and sanctity of freedom cannot exist if there is a power which is above the law, and no rule of authority secure from arbitrary change. This security and basis for liberty is obtained by the acknowledgment of divine, objective right, anterior to every human law, superior to every human will. Divine right is the only barrier against arbitrary power, which must otherwise inevitably prevail, either in the form of despotism or of an omnipotent Demos, in one of those forms, namely, in which will is uncontrolled by law, and has no bounds but the limit of its strength. Either of these forms of absolute government is positively immoral, and inconsistent with the principle of ethics and with the duty of a Christian. For the limitation of authority is a categorical requirement of morality. There is a sphere of action which requires imperatively to be exempt from the control of the civil power; and any state where that exemption is denied, and which is consequently absolute, is essentially criminal. No contract or artificial balance of forces can save the principle of liberty, for they both imply the existence of absolute power, unless there be recognised principles in the state which are the result of no contract, and an institution which no power could create or remove. Hereditary monarchy is not the only way in which the divine principle of authority can be preserved; but it is the simplest, easiest, and most perfect, for it is the only one supplied without variation by nature alone. As the king is the representative of the state, he is called king by the grace of God, in order to express the divine nature of authority and right. The reverence due to both cannot be separated. To sanctify authority alone would be to idolise power; to sanctify liberty alone would be to reject law. The divine sanction is given equally to both; the divine order is equally involved in their preservation.

There is something essentially mediæval and feudal, that is, Teutonic, in the words, *Dei gratia Rex*. In an

aristocratic society, the king inherits his domains and his crown as the nobles inherit their estates and coronets. They belong to him by no popular favour, but by right of succession; and he holds them by the same tenure on which all property rests, and which is the foundation of the whole society. An aristocratic country is the only one in which the sovereign power can be efficiently defined by constitutional laws, for it is the only description of community in which tradition maintains its authority. In a democratic country the king, or at least the dynasty, is necessarily the selection of the people, and the people can never consent to forego its sovereignty. The power, wherever it lies, will be almost necessarily absolute. The royal power cannot be limited unless the popular power is limited. If there is a barrier on one side, there must be a barrier on the other. A permanent sacrifice of power on the part of those whose power is unlimited, and who cannot therefore be coerced, is necessarily extremely rare. Democracies more readily submit to a dictatorship, and surrender the whole power to one man, from whom, in case of need, they can resume it undiminished, than consent to impair their own sovereignty by perpetual restrictions on its exercise. But in an aristocracy, where property, influence, political power, are unequally distributed, they are defined and limited, and the same exact precision is naturally extended to all authority. If the crown were absolute, there would be no gradations of political power; that is to say, there would be no aristocracy. For this reason also therefore, from the aristocratic character of both, monarchy by the grace of God is the only limited monarchy.

In the parliament which was elected in November 1861, the real constitutional battle was between parliamentary centralisation and the independence of local authorities. The development of the provincial institutions which the late king intended to carry out, as an antidote both to the ideas of 1789 and to the ideas of absolute monarchy, was interrupted by the revolution. The new constitution prevented the improvement of the old, and in the contest which fol-

lowed for the restriction of the power of parliament, the importance of the local authorities was lost sight of. The democratic party, at the time of its supremacy, in 1850, carried a law by which all local self-government would have been destroyed. It was rescinded in 1856, when the conservatives predominated, and the development of the provincial system was expressly promised. Nothing was done however, and the problem was still awaiting its solution when the late ministry succeeded to office. These provincial and municipal bodies are founded on the old system of estates and orders, and are therefore opposite in character and different in spirit from the representative parliament at Berlin. Forming a group of authorities independent of the parliament, they afford a basis for the influence of the crown by which, if they were efficiently reconstructed, the fear of democratic usurpation might be entirely removed. It is on them, therefore, that the aristocratic party relies for the preservation of the predominant influence of the throne, and for the same reason the radical party wishes to destroy their conservative and corporate character by re-modelling them in accordance with the atomic system of the parliament.

In this spirit the bill of Count Schwerin, Minister of the Interior in the late administration, was conceived, by which the provincial constitution of Prussia would have been entirely subverted. It aimed at restoring the harmony which had ceased to exist in the state since a representative constitution had been granted, and the old provincial system restored. The two elements actually exist in the constitution itself, which still retains a traditional character, and is capable either of being perfected in harmony with the old laws of the country, or of being entirely separated from its historical basis, and completed upon a foreign pattern. Before this great question was settled, on the 6th of March, the government was defeated in the second chamber, by 171 to 143, on a motion which it admitted in principle, but resisted as a proof of want of confidence,—that the budget should be submitted in detail to parliament. The position of the ministry could not be defended, and on the 8th of

March they tendered their resignation. The King refused to accept it, and on the 11th of March he dissolved Parliament. The Minister for Religious Affairs, Bethmann Hollweg, having opposed this measure, and recommended the immediate appointment of a thoroughly conservative ministry, which should be ready to resist the attacks of the opposition, and believing that a dissolution would not strengthen the royal party, immediately retired. Intellectually the foremost of the ministers, and one of the most learned historians in Germany, his defection was a fatal blow to his colleagues. The remaining conservatives then proposed that after the dissolution the ministry should be remodelled, and filled with their own friends. This advice prevailed; the liberal ministers retired, and their places were filled by men of the highest conservative opinions. The King was determined to show that he would not submit to a parliamentary majority.

On the 22d of March a circular was issued by the Minister of the Interior regarding the elections, which contains the programme of the new administration. According to this circular, the government stands on constitutional ground, allows to the representation of the people all its rights, and is resolved to proceed on liberal principles in developing the system of legislation. In so doing, it appeals to the support of all the conservative elements in the country. It will regard as its foremost duty the endeavour to maintain the rights of the crown, and not to tolerate that the vigour of the monarchical rule, on which the greatness and prosperity of Prussia depend, shall be diminished in favour of a so-called parliamentary government, which it is the object of the democratic party to establish. The battle of the elections is to be between the royal power and the democracy, and every thing must be done that is consistent with the freedom of election to secure a ministerial majority. All the servants of the state are expected to contribute to this result, and any Prussian official who should take a part hostile to the government in the elections will be deemed to have broken his oath of allegiance to the king.

VOL. VI. NEW SERIES.

It is certainly true that our English ideas of parliamentary government are not applicable to Prussia, and that to submit to a representative assembly in a centralised state, is to establish a new form of absolutism, and to betray the liberties of the nation. But it is a great error to make the crown an election cry, and to bring it into direct antagonism with the people. The new ministers have committed themselves to a principle which is fatal to the freedom of election, and to all representative institutions, by directing the whole army of officials in the service of the state to influence the votes of electors. This, however, is a fault belonging to the system of administration in Prussia, and every ministry is tempted to commit it. At the same time, great sacrifices are being made to obtain popularity. The expenditure will be reduced, the army diminished, and the very measure on which the late government were defeated and the parliament dissolved is to be conceded. The new ministers have this advantage over their predecessors, that they maintain intelligible principles, and are supported by an organised party. But they will be opposed not only by the majority which prevailed in the late parliament, but by the whole of the active and intriguing party, who, in and out of Prussia, hope to make Berlin the capital of Germany.

Mexico.

The civil war in the United States has given the signal for the commencement of the reaction of the European Powers on America. The defeat of the doctrine of manifest destiny has been shown both in the loyal sentiments of Canada and in the Mexican intervention, which opens a new phase in the long struggle of the Latin and Teutonic races for supremacy in the Christian world. The political disorganisation of the emancipated colonies of England and of Spain has reached its term in both at the same time; and the resistance of the Confederate States to the growing tyranny of democracy will be an epoch also in the history of Spanish America. The cause of decline lay in the nature of society in the South-American republics, and in the character of the institutions of those of

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North America. In the former it proceeded from natural causes, in the latter from political defects; and in one case was more a misfortune, in the other the fault of the people. Whilst, therefore, in the United States the reform, prompted by better knowledge, has been undertaken by the Americans themselves, and the patient ministers to himself the cruel remedy of civil war, South-American society, helpless to correct its own deficiencies or to overcome the difficulties of its position, awaits its deliverance and its cure at the hands of Europe. In Mexico especially, the political inferiority of the people to their Anglo-Saxon neighbours, and the almost unparalleled complication arising from the variety of separate races, render the country incapable of saving itself from the evils it has endured for the forty years of its independence.

The obstacles to Mexican prosperity are partly inherited from the ancient colonial system of the Spaniards, and are partly the result of the revolution. In the wonderfully elaborate policy by which the Spanish monarchy ruled the Indies for three hundred years, there was no provision for future autonomy or gradual emancipation. In accordance both with the spirit of absolutism and with the peculiar condition of the American natives, the system of paternal solicitude, of education and interference, was devised for perpetuity, and nothing was prepared with a view to a time when that system might become superfluous or disastrous. The defects of the policy insured its destruction, while its merits were of a kind which made it impossible that a salutary and durable settlement should succeed in its stead. Both these causes of subsequent failure were supplied by each of the three purposes which principally guided the colonial government of the Austrian dynasty—the security of the conquests, the enrichment of the treasury, and the conversion of the natives.

In order to prevent combinations and conspiracies among the inhabitants, the natives were separated as much as possible from the contact of Europeans, and the broadest distinction was made between the pure and

the mixed races, so that each caste was a check on the others, and regarded the crown as its protector against them. Thus the several races were prevented from mingling with each other in a common Mexican nationality, and a mutual hatred was kept alive among them, which made the intervention of the supreme power a permanent necessity. When the supremacy of Spain was destroyed, that distinction of races, which had been its chief security, became a fatal malady in the independent state, and made a republican government impossible. The Mexicans, therefore, whilst they have attempted to avoid a regular monarchy, have continually relapsed into transitory but vigorous dictatorships. In the intensity of dictatorial power they have found a substitute for a real authority, and in the frequency of change a consolation for the want of freedom. Nevertheless the separation of the Indians from the Europeans was, in its day, a wise measure. The influx from Europe could never become considerable, and the countries which Europeans could inhabit were thickly peopled with natives. If they had been mixed together, the native element would have overwhelmed the European, and the issue would have been a degenerate and sterile race.

The wealth which Spain derived from her colonies was sought in the mines, not in trade. Districts most admirably adapted for agriculture were entirely neglected. The Spanish people, indolent at home, where much of the soil was left without cultivation, were still less disposed to work in the tropics. Emigration was not encouraged by the government, foreigners were rigidly excluded from the colonies, and neither labour nor capital was imported. Nothing was done to facilitate communication and exchange. The trade with the mother country was confined to the periodical Plate-fleets; and the chief object of the colonial empire was to enrich, not the nation, a very small portion of which could take part in its benefit, but the crown. The colonies had therefore no means of developing their natural resources, no opportunity of selling their produce with advantage, and consequently no incentive to production. In conse-

quence of this short-sighted and selfish policy, which belonged to the proud and aristocratic character of the Spaniards, South America remained destitute of all appliances for the advancement of trade and culture, and the vast wealth which nature had bestowed on the country was neglected. In this respect a change had begun at the end of the eighteenth century; but its effects were hardly felt when they were cut short by the War of Independence.

The care taken for the instruction of the natives in religion and civilisation is the brightest point in the government of the Spanish colonies. The Indians were under the special guardianship of the crown, and were regarded as minors, incapable of making contracts, which would have enabled the whites to pillage and deceive them; incapable of bearing arms, which they would have been tempted to turn against each other; and forbidden to leave their new settlements without permission, lest they should relapse into savage life. This watchful care excluded freedom, and prevented advancement. The Indians obtained a certain civilisation, but the means of progress were denied them. They were educated up to a certain point, but then barriers were set to their further improvement. The privation of credit, the treatment of a native as a child in all commercial relations, necessarily prevented the accumulation of wealth. Yet the Indians were happy in their subjection to Spain, so long as it was accompanied by protection. But when that protection was lost, and subjection to Spain was exchanged for dependence on the very race against which Spain had so carefully protected them, the policy which had refused to teach them to stand alone and to act for themselves, and had thus disabled them from forming an integral part of colonial society, proved a grievous misfortune for them and for the country; they sank rapidly, and became savages once more, and enemies of the civilised people. This change had commenced before the revolution, when the Jesuits were suppressed. For the Church was the great instrument in the protection, the education, and the supervision of the Indian race; and among the Ame-

rican missionaries the Jesuits were far the first.

The position assigned to the Church in the colonies, which were the gift of the Holy See, has been one of the most injurious elements in the American republics. In the European dominions of Spain, the influence of the crown upon the Church was exorbitant, especially in consequence of the severance of the Holy Office from its connexion with Rome. But in America, where the services rendered by Spain to religion were so extraordinary, and where she promised to conquer for the Church a new hemisphere to redress the balance of her losses in the old, the prerogatives of the crown were still greater. The king enjoyed the patronage of all sees and of all benefices. No Papal Bull could be sent to America except through the Council of the Indies. No ecclesiastic could go there without the express permission of the king. Even the *Annatæ* and the proceeds of Indulgences flowed into the royal coffers. No Papal envoy could reach America but with the royal consent, and the Bull of Alexander VI. enabled the king to prevent any direct interference of the Pope in the government of the American Church. The religious orders in the colonies were dependent on the provincials in Spain, and did not communicate directly with Rome. The missions were generally in their hands, and in New Spain a mission was a government. The temporal as well as spiritual concerns were in the hands of the missionaries, and the population of a mission sometimes amounted to three thousand souls. So complete was the power of the priest that he could remove the mission with all its inhabitants, their herds and chattels, to another spot at his discretion. The missionaries were thus immediate officers of the government, discharging civil as much as ecclesiastical functions, and the condition of their enormous influence was naturally a complete subordination to the authority of the State. At the same time, in consequence of the remoteness of their settlements, and of the importance of their political position, their subordination to the ecclesiastical authority was not always so complete. The disorder which has succeeded the

seizure of the property of the missions proves how important were the services they rendered to the well-being of the colony. But to a Church richly endowed, possessing great political influence, and involved in all the changes and troubles of a distant country, the restriction of intercourse with Rome is an irremediable calamity. The natural consequences have exhibited themselves in ignorance, immorality, and in a spirit at once secular and intolerant. All these difficulties were handed over to independent America by the old Spanish domination. They have been most forcibly experienced in Mexico, the most prosperous of all Spanish colonies, and the most unfortunate of all American republics.

The colonial system of Spain seemed so secure that hardly any troops were kept in America. The day would assuredly have come when the immobility of that system would have brought on its ruin, but that day had not yet arrived when external causes led to the loss of America. The policy of the Austrian dynasty, under which the gigantic colonial empire had arisen, was gradually undermined and abandoned by the Bourbons. Towards the close of the eighteenth century, the ideas of centralisation, from which the rulers of that day expected the regeneration of mankind, began to show themselves in the administration of the colonies. The power which had till then been exercised by the viceroys on the spot, and by the Council of the Indies, was concentrated in the bureaux of Madrid. All appointments were now made by the king himself, no longer by the authorities in America; the local privileges which Philip II. had readily conceded were curtailed; and the council was placed under the control, first of all of one minister, and then of the respective ministers of each department. Still greater changes, and a greater mutability, ensued during these contests in the mother country, which were provoked by the French occupation and the constitutional movement. The unity and the traditional character of the colonial government were lost, the divisions in the country were felt in the system of administration, and extended to the colonies. The system was divided against itself,

and its administrators were opposed to one another. The councils of the rulers and the allegiance of the subjects were alike uncertain and disunited. Above all, the necessity of the English alliance for their safety at home threw down the barrier of exclusion which had so long been the cherished safeguard of the possessions of the Spaniards beyond the Atlantic. Humboldt's famous work on New Spain first laid before the world the condition of the country, and published the fact that only 80,000 Spaniards, without an effective army, held in subjection seven millions of native Mexicans.

The consequences of the Spanish policy of keeping the races separate by mutual hatred soon became evident, when the sceptre of the King of Spain was no longer powerful enough to preserve the balance, and to arbitrate between them. King Ferdinand was in captivity; King Joseph was cut off by the English from the Transatlantic dominions; the races were face to face in Mexico, and no supreme power intervened between them. The subject people had no longer a protector against the oppression of the dominant Spaniards; the Spaniards no defence against the hatred of the natives. In the movement that ensued, the foremost element was, therefore, the desire of national independence. For though a people may be justly and happily governed by a foreign state, and though a distant monarch may rule a country where various hostile races live together, yet the government of a foreign people is intolerable. The Mexicans had prospered under the Spanish crown; but when the crown was for them in abeyance, and the Spaniards who had been the instruments of the government became its masters, the political situation became as bad as that of Ireland. The paramount authority of the King of Spain was the keystone of the Mexican state, and the basis of its prosperity; when that failed, Mexico found herself in one of those positions which in all history have been the most unfailing occasions of tyranny, revolution, and extermination. But the animosity against the Spaniards was not accompanied by hatred of the King of Spain. The monarchy had not been unpopular,

and events proved that it was still essential. The actual independence of America was caused by the policy of the Cortes.

When the King of Spain was deposed by Napoleon, Mexico contributed 7,000,000 dollars to sustain the national cause. The Cortes, who were busy establishing a free constitution, refused equality of rights to the people of the colonies, and rejected the proposal of England to abolish the monopolies and throw open the trade of America. The insurrection in Mexico was begun by Hidalgo, a priest of mixed blood, with the cry, "Death to the Spaniards! Long live Ferdinand the Seventh, and our Lady of Guadalupe!" He was guided by hatred of the Europeans, by indignation at the policy of the Cortes towards America, and at the disloyalty of the Spaniards, who had joined the French, and by the alarm lest the unprotected colonies, involved in the European contest, should fall into the hands of an heretical power. Displaying the colours of the ancient empire of Anahuac, he gained over the Indian population to his side by abolishing the tribute to which they had been subject from the time of Cortez. Whilst the civil war went on, King Ferdinand was restored at Madrid, and the colonial insurrection became mixed up with the constitutional disputes at home. Imria, one of the liberal leaders, landed in Mexico with a small army, but was taken and put to death, like nearly all the Mexican leaders during the first ten years of the War of Independence.

In the year 1820 the whole country was all but pacified. Only one chief still held out on the Western coast; a force was sent against him under Colonel Iturbide, and the Viceroy wrote to Madrid that Mexico was subdued for ever. At the moment, this was welcome news to Ferdinand VII. The revolution had broken out in Spain, the expedition destined to reconquer America had been stopped by a mutiny, the constitution of 1812 had been restored, and the Cortes had issued decrees against religious bodies, and had assailed the ancient influence of the clergy. Ferdinand was in the position of Lewis XVI. in 1792, bound to a system which he hated, distrusted by his subjects, be-

trayed by his army, and seeking in vain to shelter himself behind insincere declarations. Like Lewis, he conceived the idea of making his escape and taking refuge in Mexico. There the Spanish constitution had been already proclaimed, and the Viceroy received orders to set it aside. It was too late. The clergy and the conservative party, who had supported the Spaniards in putting down the insurrection, had been already estranged from Spain by the decrees of the Cortes, and absolutists and liberals were now united in a common resistance to Spain. Thus it came to pass that the man who was chosen by the Viceroy to restore the royal power, taking advantage of the confidence he enjoyed, became the author of the independence of Mexico. Iturbide had constantly opposed the revolutionary movement. He now put himself at the head of the combined parties of independence, came to an agreement with Guerrero, the leader of the insurgents, against whom he was sent, and proclaimed the independence of Mexico, at the head of the royal army, at Iguala, 24th February 1821. The details of this famous plan betray the influence of the coalition under which it was drawn up. Mexico was declared an independent empire; a constitution was to be given by a congress; the crown was to be offered first to the King of Spain, or to one of his brothers, or, if they refused, to another European prince; the Catholic religion was declared the exclusive religion of the State; the distinction of races was abolished; the army was declared the protector of the three guarantees, namely, the Independence of the State, the Unity of the Faith, and the Union of the Races. By this politic scheme, skilfully devised to prevent disaffection, and to unite all parties in the common cause, an almost bloodless revolution was accomplished, and the independence of Mexico assured. In the month of August 1521, Cortez had conquered Mexico; and in August 1821, the sixty-fifth Viceroy of New Spain accepted the articles of Iguala, and the Spanish dominion came to an end.

Whilst the Mexican Cortes was discussing the new form of government, the Spanish Cortes was dis-

cussing the measures by which the American empire might be preserved. But they were opposed to conciliation. The spirit of national greatness and of commercial egotism was strong within them. The government proposed to throw open the American trade, to modify the application of the constitution in the points in which it was unsuited to America, and to withdraw those laws against the monasteries which had thrown the weight of the clergy on to the revolutionary side. To this the Cortes refused to consent. The laws against the Church were the great triumph of the popular party, and they were filled with resentment against the American clergy, because they, from hatred of the Cortes, had turned the scale against Spain. Thus the treaty concluded between the Viceroy and Iturbide was disallowed at Madrid, and the plan of Iguala, by which Mexico might have become an appanage of the royal family of Spain, was rejected.

Iturbide and the republicans both rejoiced at the failure of negotiations. The moderate party in congress had been labouring to preserve the connexion with Europe by the execution of the scheme of Iguala, and the establishment of a constitutional dynasty. For a time they were supreme; but when Spain rejected the treaty they were defeated, and Iturbide, who possessed the military power, was proclaimed emperor. Unable to conduct a parliamentary government, he soon dissolved the congress. The republican party gained strength, Santa Anna proclaimed the republic, and the emperor surrendered without a blow an authority which he had acquired without violence and exercised with moderation, but which he proved incompetent to defend. The last hope of an hereditary monarchy was at an end, and the period of arbitrary schemes and rapid changes from democracy to despotism commenced. The first constitution was proclaimed in October 1824. The absurdity of instituting a republic in a country with a population like that of Mexico is apparent, if we consider the materials of which it is composed.

The population of Mexico, amounting to near 8,000,000, consists of four different races,—the Creoles, the Indians, the mixed race in which the white blood

prevails, and the mixed race in which the Indian blood prevails. The Creoles, or Mexicans of pure European descent, who form the aristocracy of the country, do not exceed 300,000. Under the old dominion they were looked upon by the Spaniards, from whom they sprung, with dislike and suspicion. The father was generally only a sojourner in the land; the son was a native, and therefore a stranger to him. In Europe, where the father hoped to return in order to enjoy the fruit of his American toils, there was no place for the son. Their interests and their characters were both dissimilar. The Creoles were not part of the Spanish nation, and were not trusted, therefore, by the Spanish government. Even in the Church they could not obtain advancement. Knowing nothing of the mother country, they did not care for the maintenance of her colonial empire, and they hated and despised the Spanish emigrants, by whom they were kept down. The revolution was chiefly their work, for they were the most polished and intelligent of the native inhabitants; and the hatred of the Spanish race was kept alive by them, for, as they were the most capable, they were also the most ambitious and the most envious among the native people. Whilst they were the most bitter enemies of the Spaniards, they succeeded to the position from which the Spaniards were expelled, and generally formed the conservative, centralist, or reactionary party. For many years they retained the direction of affairs.

At the other end of the social scale are the Indians, forming a majority of the whole population. The upper class of the ancient Aztec people was exterminated, and the lower orders alone remain, with their old language and a degraded civilisation. For them the protection which the Spanish system gave exists no more; and, though all but a few frontier tribes are Christians, they have little education, and the civilising efforts of the missionaries are no longer sustained by the state. That long minority beneath the Spanish rule inspired them with no energy and no activity, and gave them neither the faculties nor the aspirations of political life. They are still excluded from the army, and their social and intellectual condition excludes them from the body politic. Peaceable, ignorant, and poor, they

form the Mexican proletariat, and are hewers of wood and drawers of water for the upper race. But in the frontier states they have returned to savage life, and depopulate the country. Emancipation has been to them an unmitigated evil.

The numbers of those of mixed blood in whom the Indian element is slight, and who deem themselves equal to whites, is near 800,000. They mingle with the Creoles, and possess a superficial cultivation borrowed from France, but, having generally little property, depend on the state for support. Amiable, dissipated, indolent, and extravagant, their object is to obtain from the public service the means of enjoyment, by the multiplication of offices, by the spoliation of the public, and by frequent disturbances, which give an opportunity for pillage or promotion. They are very numerous in the army and in the Church, among the lawyers and officials.

The *Leperos*, in whom the European descent is almost washed out by the Indian or African blood, in number about a million and a half, are the most demoralised and dangerous portion of the community. They fill the ranks of the army, form the rabble in the towns, and live in dependence on the wealthy or laborious class as servants or as thieves.

The Spaniards were banished in 1829. It is out of these elements, therefore, that the political parties of Mexico have been constructed.

The parties which had been united by the desire of independence, and reconciled by the prospect of freedom combined with a Spanish dynasty, parted again when the definitive rupture with Spain ensued, and the imperial authority was abolished. Instead of the Spanish party, a new party was formed, including all the conservative influences in the country, the clergy, the army, those who had befriended Spain, and those who had supported the unity of Iturbide's government. These are the centralists, or absolutists, or Church party, who have generally predominated, with the exception of a few short intervals, until the accession of Juarez. They have fought under various leaders, and from time to time under different standards, as different interests prevailed or required to be placed in the van. First, having clung

to Spain until Spain abandoned them, and having resisted not the throne but the innovations of the Cortes, their purpose was to preserve as much as they could of the ancient system and tradition. They had lost the throne, but they retained a strong central power. They were cut off from the mother country, but they cherished institutions which the people of the mother country had abolished. They preserved all the privileges of the Church. They upheld the discipline of the army. All that made the existence of Mexico possible formed part of their programme. But in course of time their conservatism settled into resistance and stagnation. The dread of innovation and unbelief led them to seek to keep out foreigners, and thus to exclude trade and to arrest the development of the national resources. In their solicitude for religion, they gave to the Church a civil authority, and supported her with an intolerance which has helped to corrupt the faith and the morals of the people. While insisting on the necessity of a central authority, they have lost sight of the claims of freedom.

The liberal or democratic party were federalists. They broke up the unity of the territory, and converted the provinces into separate states. In this they were encouraged first by the example of the United States, which they endeavoured to imitate. To complete the revolution, they wished to obliterate the remains of the Spanish system, and to remove all that was handed down from it. Proceeding from abstract principles, they established an artificial system, without roots in the past or harmony with the nature of the country and its inhabitants. They desired to expel the Spaniards from the country, and were restrained for a time by the English agents. Most of the adventurers and men who had nothing to lose belonged to this section; the men of property and substance were on the other side. The liberals had the support of the foreigners, and especially of the United States. They are also the party of progress, anxious for the promotion of trade and the advancement of national prosperity, and hostile, by the nature of things, to the endowment of the Church.

Between parties such as these, identified with the difference of races, divided in every interest, and controlled by no common traditions and no common purpose, it is impossible that there should be any reconciliation or united action. Their struggles are for existence, their antipathy is mortal, and the existence of the state and of society is at stake in their contests. Whichever prevails, the other must become an enemy of the state. Their antagonism cannot find vent in words; their disputes cannot be settled by debate. Force is the only arbiter they can acknowledge. They cannot consent to be at peace; they could not, if they would, be the elements of the same political community. Therefore every change of government is a revolution; all opposition takes the form of civil war. Federalism, by multiplying the centres of an almost independent authority, increased the means of resistance and the occasions of disturbance. The discontent of any one state could at any time manifest itself by a *pronunciamento*, followed by civil war and a revolution.

The original system of federation lasted thirteen years. In 1837 a central republic was introduced, which made way in 1841 for the first Dictatorship of Santa Anna. At the end of three years the central republic was restored, and made way in 1846 for the federal constitution of 1824, which was reformed in 1847, and lasted till 1853. It failed so completely that a dictatorship was required, and, though the conservative leaders were none of them partisans of Santa Anna, they placed him in power, in spite of his great unpopularity, as the only man who could save the country. The ablest of the conservatives, the eminent historian, Lucas Alaman, explained to Santa Anna, in the letter by which he was recalled, the conditions of his restoration. "The revolution was occasioned by the governor of Michoacan, who attacked the faith with his abominable principles, sought to invade the rights of the clergy, and compelled the landowners, by his irritating measures, to rise up against him. . . . But the movement would have made no progress had not clergy and landowners taken your part. This favoured your recall, and the hope that you would put an end to the prevailing anarchy was

decisive, and was the sole ground of your recall into the bosom of your country. Our envoys are commissioned to lay before you the principles on which the conservatives have determined. The first point is the maintenance of the Catholic religion, in which, independently of our belief in its divine character, we see the only bond that embraces all the Mexicans, now that all other bonds are torn asunder. We are also convinced that the ceremonies must be kept up with splendour, and the ecclesiastical property secured; and it appears to us that the supreme power ought to prohibit writings directed against the Church," &c. Santa Anna appointed Alaman minister of foreign affairs. The minister had described as follows in his history the character of his chief: "In him good and evil qualities are combined: a clear natural understanding, without moral or intellectual cultivation; enterprise without plan or purpose; energy and talent for governing, obscured by great moral defects; skill in preparing revolutions and plans for battles, with more than unskilfulness on the field of battle itself, where he was never victorious. Ever surrounded with obedient scholars and numerous followers when he brought down calamities on his country, but accompanied by few or none of them when he had to meet the enemy, Santa Anna is unquestionably one of the most remarkable characters the American revolution presents."

During his administration of two years, supported by the conservative party, Santa Anna recalled the Jesuits, prohibited the North-American coin, that the people might not always be reminded of the United States, restored security on the high roads by shooting 1500 robbers, and introduced conscription. With the help of the army he endeavoured, after the death of Alaman, to emancipate himself from the influence of the conservatives. He was overthrown by the Indian general Alvarez, his decrees were rescinded, and the separate jurisdiction of the clergy and the army abolished. This measure hastened the catastrophe of the old system in Mexico. Comonfort took the place of the incapable Indian, and endeavoured to conciliate the conservatives; but at Christmas 1855 a revolution broke

out, supported by the clergy, for the privileges of the Church. From that moment to the end the conservatives became absorbed in the Church party, as the immunities of the clergy were the cause of the conflict. As the Church was now a political party, on behalf of which war was carried on, the spoliations began by a heavy exaction on the Church of Vera Cruz. The liberal congress meanwhile voted laws by which all the central authority would be destroyed; they forbade the civil power to enforce the observance of religious vows, altered the laws relative to marriage, and entered on the discussion of the most difficult and dangerous questions.

This attack on the position of the clergy, prepared and threatened for a long time before, is the decisive event in the history of the Mexican Republic. It was caused chiefly by the state of the finances, and justified by the state of religion. It is necessary, therefore, to explain how these were affected by independence—an inquiry in which the real value of Mexico for the political observer mainly consists.

Under the Spanish dominion the wealth of New Spain was proverbial. The revenue which it supplied to the exchequer was such that, after defraying the expenses of administration, there was a surplus of nine million piastres, which made up the deficit of the other American provinces, and left between four and five million piastres for export to Spain. During the last 25 years before 1820, the average value of the annual exports from Vera Cruz was 11,141,371 piastres; the imports, 16,093,100 piastres; and, including all the Mexican harbours, the exports were 13,360,000 piastres; the imports, 19,640,000. Even in the last few years of the Spanish power, after a long civil war, with a regular army of 41,000 men to maintain, and a local militia equally numerous, the revenue of Mexico covered all expenses. In 1856, the last ordinary year, the expenditure of the Mexican government amounted to 25,000,000 piastres; the income, to 15,000,000; the deficit, to near 10,000,000. At this time the regular army consisted of hardly 10,000 men.

The administration of the finances is always the worst part of the government in a country without public mo-

rality, and without a regular and fixed authority. The frequent changes of government, the constant disorder, the principle of popular sovereignty, and the claiming to equal shares of the public wealth and power, necessarily developed a boundless corruption after the strict discipline of Spanish control had disappeared. The pillage of the treasury became the object as well as the result of revolutions, and it happened accordingly that the ministry of finance changed hands more often than any other. An administration has lasted in Mexico on an average five months. The average tenure of the office of minister of finance is only three and a half months. In thirty-three years, from 1841 to 1854, it passed into new hands one hundred and twelve times. The consequence of this was a confusion which the minister described as follows to the chamber in 1852: "As to our finances, we have no real system of taxation. That which we have is a confused mixture of unconnected remnants, which have continued on the footing of the old colonial fiscal system, with a few later alterations, without harmony, connexion, or unity, and therefore destitute of the most essential qualities." Moreover each state had its own mode of taxation. They were not, however, equally capable of bearing their share of the public burdens, which were distributed, in obedience to the principle of equality, according to population. The Border States, exposed to the incursions of the Indians, were impoverished, and compelled to spend large sums in their own defence. The democracy, unable to admit any principle of technical inequality, by which a practical inequality would have been prevented, consistently preferred to exempt these states altogether, rather than adapt their contributions to their capacity.

The same democratic policy deprived the republic of three principal sources of revenue which had been enjoyed by Spain. The Indian tribute was abolished when the inferiority of the Indians ceased to be admitted. The percentage on the revenues of the clergy disappeared when the clergy were deprived of the right of enforcing the payment of dues. The enormous domains of the crown were also sacrificed by the republic. Under the

Spaniards this source of wealth had not been properly understood, and it was wasted by their successors. A Mexican statesman, De la Rosa, in his *Ensayo sobre la Administracion Publica*, 1853, writes on this subject: "Like our ancestors, we have squandered the national estates, the richest patrimony which they left us, without any notion of its value. All our arrangements with reference to the distribution of the public lands have exhibited one and the same character, namely, that of disposing of an object whose value was unknown. . . . We never even discovered that a proper and regular course in the sale of national property would have enabled us to pay our home and foreign debt more than three times over. And would to God that the privation of every profit had been our only loss! But we were so shortsighted that every concession of national property has always endangered the nationality and independence of Mexico." In general these lands have not been cultivated by the grantees. Where they have been inhabited and cultivated, they have become independent of the republic. For the Mexicans themselves have not the materials for establishing colonies, or bringing new territories under tillage. The Indian population is not civilised enough for the purpose. The Creoles are not laborious, and prefer living on the State as soldiers or employés. Foreigners cannot settle into contented and peaceful citizens under the present order of things. They are necessarily inclined to innovate, and are therefore hated by the natives. Consequently they have either kept aloof, or have sought to be annexed to the United States.

A bankrupt state must have recourse, sooner or later, to the property of the Church, which cannot escape the common fate of the community, and cannot continue rich when the state is poor. The spoliation of the Church is as natural an event in one period of society as her endowment in another, and the reasons of the alterations are secular rather than religious. Testamentary bequests for pious works are no more a sign of the morality and religion of an age in which they are frequent, than penance is a proof of virtue. The largest bequests belong to those ages precisely when the general demoralisa-

tion and despondency were greatest, such as the fourth century and the close of the tenth; and the motives of the donors did not correspond to the results which were produced by their acts. The same policy which encourages endowments at one time opposes them at another; similar objects are promoted under different circumstances in different ways, and a possession which is an advantage under certain conditions may become a danger when they are altered. Whilst, therefore, the canon law rejects every impediment to the freedom of pious donations at the moment of death for the good of the individual soul, the practice has in fact been regulated by considerations of public utility.

At a time when all wealth was in land, and even the state relied for revenue on its domains, the support of the clergy and the requirements of the churches could be provided only by means of landed estates. The Carolingian legislation fixes therefore a minimum of land which every church must possess. In those days there was no fear of an excess, and no inducement to fix a maximum. Two things, peculiar to the condition of society in the earlier middle ages contributed to increase the growth of the landed wealth of the Church, viz. the absence of any other medium of pious donation, and the interest of the state to strengthen to the utmost, by the only means by which political power is conveyed, the stability and influence of that institution on which it was compelled chiefly to depend. In those ages land could not be sold; nobody possessed any thing which could be exchanged for the fee-simple of an estate. It could change owners, and pass from the hands of the aristocracy into the use of a middle class, only by being given or bequeathed to the Church. In this way the increasing wealth of the Church broke down the exclusiveness of feudal property, and introduced a system of leaseholds long before they extended to secular lands; and thus many men who would otherwise have remained serfs were raised into a class of free tenants.

By commencing the mobilisation of real property, and consequently the division of labour and improvement of culture, on which economical progress is founded, the Church assisted the growth of the third estate, whilst she

continued, by the nature of her proprietorship, to be connected by the closest analogy with the aristocracy. During this period, therefore, her interests harmonised with those of both the other classes, and helped for a time to reconcile them. But when the progress of industry and the growth of money produced an antagonism between capital and land, and the long contest between the people and the privileged class commenced, the Church found herself in league with the nobility, and her benefices became heirlooms of the great families. Later on, when the democratic element had destroyed the feudal barriers, and the aristocracy had lost the right of primogeniture, and divided its property, its interests became identified with those of the people against the property of the Church, which alone cannot be divided, and which became a privilege hateful to both, but more particularly to that class which formerly enjoyed the same advantage. The fall of the feudal privileges of the aristocracy is necessarily followed by the secularisation of ecclesiastical property; for it converts the ancient ally of the Church into her most ardent adversary, and destroys the affinity which had linked them together. The political influence of the Church depends upon the analogy of her condition with the society which surrounds her.

The character of permanence and perpetuity which the property of the Church maintained, natural to an institution essentially changeless and immortal, belonged originally to private estates as well. But while the wealth of the Church could not properly be diminished, there was nothing to limit its increase. The first inducements to make pious bequests subsisted in all ages, and they were multiplied when new corporations arose, and presented new claims to confidence and new incentives to charity. It consequently follows that the property of the Church tended to accumulate indefinitely, that the clergy grew more numerous than religious vocations and the spiritual necessities of the people justified, whilst they assumed obligations which it was impossible that they should discharge. It is said that in Portugal the masses appointed were more numerous than the people of the kingdom could have said had they been all priests. In ge-

neral, the proportion of ecclesiastical property in every country has rarely exceeded one-third of the whole before secularisation, or at least restrictive laws, have been introduced.

In the ages when land was the only possible mode of endowment of the Church, it was conducive in another way to the wealth of nations. The clergy are, from their character and the nature of their avocations, not very energetic employers of labour. But when there was a scanty population, a very intense development of agriculture was neither desirable nor attainable, and the clergy, though not very exacting, were the most intelligent agriculturists. We know from *Doomsday Book*, that at the time of the Conquest the Church lands were the most highly cultivated parts of the country. The qualities which in those days were merits were converted by the natural advancement of things into defects. As population increases, the soil is required to produce more; but religious bodies have less encouragement than private owners to effect improvements, because they have fewer inducements of self-interest. Wealth has most attractions for those who have most wants and most means of gratification. In these the clergy are behind the laity. Even allowing for deficiencies in the religious spirit, and for a more worldly character, the instinct of self-preservation in an ecclesiastic is confined to his own lifetime; in a layman it embraces his posterity. Again, as money becomes more abundant, the immobility of land becomes an artificial obstacle to the growth of wealth. The exclusion of capital and labour from the acquisition of land has been the ruin of aristocracies, by combining in an alliance against them the opposite interests of the burgher and the peasant; and for the same reason it is a peril to the clergy. When, from the growth of the population, food rises in price and poverty is felt, the unnatural divorce of capital and land increases the misery of the people and the difficulties of the state. These are powers which in the long-run cannot be withstood. One of two things must ensue. Either the Church at once accepts a compromise, and surrenders the whole or part of her possessions, or she first, by an unsuccessful resistance, forfeits the attachment of the people, and loses

her influence before she loses her wealth. In the nature of things the last issue is the most frequent. The Church does not usually anticipate or prevent the necessity of change. It is only when the occasion presses that she defines or reforms. As heresies are the ordinary preliminary of dogmatic development, attacks and disasters are the almost necessary prelude to alterations which sacrifice the absolute invariance of her canon law, or the integrity of her property and privileges. Nor is it easy to ascertain the precise moment when change becomes needful. The need is first asserted in the form of opposition by those who actually suffer. The consequence of delay is, that the change is brought about by a defeat of the ecclesiastical interest, and by a revolution in the state.

The Mexican clergy were placed in a false position by the original constitution of the Republic, and the subsequent progress of events has been fatal to them. Democratic equality, and a priesthood privileged by the establishment of religious intolerance, contradict each other. It is impossible that they should subsist in the same community without a conflict, for they belong to two different orders of ideas and to different stages of civil society. In Mexico, this antagonism between the democratic principle, and the exclusion of every religion beside that of the state, was mitigated by the zeal for Catholic unity which had been inherited from the Spaniards, by the jealousy of foreigners, and by the political ignorance which disguised for a time the inconsistency of the institutions. But a party existed from a very early period whose design was to introduce toleration, and who wished, partly from hatred of religion, partly from contempt for the clergy, to deprive it of its privileges and its wealth.

The Mexican Church was so completely dependent on Spain and deprived of direct intercourse with Rome, that the separation from Spain led to an entire interruption of ecclesiastical authority, which it was not easy to restore. From the beginning of the revolution, under the cura Hidalgo, and under the cura Morelos, the clergy had actively supported it, and at length decided its success. The Spanish government sought the aid of the Holy See; and on the 24th September 1824,

Leo XII. solemnly condemned the Declaration of Independence. The Metropolitan and several of the chief dignitaries thereupon sought refuge in Spain; and they were soon followed by a large portion of the priesthood, who were persecuted as Spaniards, but who were, as Spaniards, the best of the Mexican clergy. In a short time, eight of the ten episcopal sees were vacant, as well as eighty-six canonries and one-half of the parishes. The republican government claimed the right of patronage which had been exercised by the crown of Spain, but which the Holy See denied. In the year 1837, Spain recognised the independence of Mexico, and friendly relations were renewed with Rome; but the right of patronage was still refused.

The minister for religious affairs, Fonseca, explained the state of things to congress in 1852. "The natural course of events, the long period during which the metropolitan see remained without a pastor, together with the disturbances in the country, which have generally demoralised the masses, and have impeded the action of authority, have likewise exerted their pernicious influence on the secular and the regular clergy of the republic. The former, though with many honourable exceptions, is very far from possessing that degree of education, of theological information, and of the qualities necessary for its sacred office, which would enable it to exercise over society a powerful and salutary influence. The religious orders have fallen much lower both in respect of morality and learning; and it is dreadful to contemplate the enormous difference that subsists between the monks of the present day and those who aided in the Spanish conquest, and who were animated with a truly noble and religious zeal."

In 1848, an envoy was sent to Rome for the purpose of regulating the disputed points, and of restoring discipline in the Mexican Church. The revolution followed soon after, and the congress sent a present of 25,000 piastres to the Pope at Gaeta. At length, in 1851, Monsignor Clements was sent to Mexico as apostolic delegate. For two years his faculties were not recognised; and when, under the last dictatorship of Santa Anna, he attempted to introduce reforms, he was met by the jealousy of the state against Papal inter-

ference, and by the reluctance of the clergy to submit to an authority from which it had for a whole generation been practically exempt. Beyond the introduction of the Jesuits, and the restitution of their former possessions in 1853, little was accomplished. But the Jesuits have returned in considerable numbers; and it is only through their example, and the restoration of the direct authority of the Holy See, that the condition of the Church can be reformed. It is on this that the revival of the Mexican nation principally depends.

There were at that time 13 bishoprics, 1222 parishes, and 4615 priests, of whom 1043 were religious, and 1484 nuns in 58 convents. This is scarcely more than half the number of the clergy at the beginning of the century. The higher orders of the clergy were rich. The payment of tithes and first-fruits ceased to be obligatory by law in 1833; but it continued to be made, with very little diminution, from the conscientious feeling of the country people. For the same reason, the parochial clergy had no difficulty in obtaining their dues. These revenues were estimated by the minister Lerdo de Tejada at 8,000,000 piastres. But these sources of wealth necessarily diminished with the declining prosperity of the land. The real property was at least equally productive. The official *Cuadro Sinoptico de la Republica* for 1850 says, "In the district of Mexico alone, in which the value of the land cannot be estimated at less than 50,000,000 piastres, the clergy is the owner of more than half. Adding to the revenue from land the tithes and parochial dues, the total income of the clergy of the republic must exceed 20,000,000 piastres." All these estimates are, however, vague and uncertain. It is more important to consider how the clergy exercised its rights in an ignorant and devout population.

"It is unquestionable," says De la Rosa, "that many poor persons who wish to marry sell themselves to personal servitude for a long period, in order to raise the money due to the priest for performing the ceremony, and during this time they have to suffer great privations. Most of our labourers, therefore, live unmarried, or they marry only at very great sacrifices. It is a general rule in the country, that a

labouring man who marries is ruined for the rest of his life by the dues, and brings his family into debt after his death by the expenses of his interment." De la Rosa was governor of Zacatecas, and he says that thousands of instances may be found in the account-books of estates. The authority of the priests over the Indians was such, that an Indian who was in arrear with his dues, or who had missed Mass, came to be flogged at the church-door.

In the year 1851, Don Guillermo Prieto, who was soon after made minister of finance, published a work entitled *Indicaciones sobre . . . las Rentas generales*. He gives the following description of the clergy: "Those who know the present condition of the Indian population, who have witnessed the exactions, and who are convinced, as I am, of the ignorance and bad example which many priests, with honourable exceptions, give to their flock, must admit that this condition is the chief element of immorality and barbarous superstition. These are not declamations proceeding from the spirit of a demagogue, and from slavish adoption of the miserable philosophy of the encyclopedists; on the contrary, he who writes these lines is a Catholic in the full sense of the term; but for that very reason he will not cease to inveigh against abuses which disfigure and degrade Christianity."

The Prussian resident in Mexico, Richthofen, confirms the truth of these accounts. He says that it was often customary for young women who were going to be married to repair for religious instruction to the house of the priest, and stay there several months, during which they worked in his fields, so as to earn the money which was to be his due. Sometimes twenty or thirty women were to be seen in the house of a priest at one time. These reports may be exaggerated by party spirit, or unfounded. They fall very far short of what is universally stated and believed, and they do not exceed what is to be expected of a clergy separated from the centre of the Church, living in a country in which civilisation is fading in every class, and in which the means of education are utterly deficient.

A well-organised system of popular instruction was the thing most required in a republic which had suddenly raised

a half-civilised race to a political equality with the whites; yet it has been generally neglected, and in a country so vast and so thinly peopled it presented extraordinary difficulties. Under the Spaniards it was chiefly in the hands of the clergy. But since the loss of the connexion with Spain, no intellectual influence from the mother country has conveyed to the Mexicans the nourishment which is lost by seclusion. The most highly educated portion of the clergy disappeared after the revolution. The Minister of the Interior declared in the Chamber, in 1835, "The want of schools corresponding to the requirements of the age, and to the liberal institutions which we have adopted, is the deepest source of the misfortune that we suffer." "Three-quarters of the whole nation," said Tejada, "do not know that there is such a thing in the world as ABC." The clergy could not escape the general decline of knowledge and morality; but there is no reason to believe that it has degenerated more rapidly, or fallen lower than the other educated classes, and it has suffered more than they from defects which are in the national character. It is still the protector of the Indians, and if its influence over them were to be removed, if that regeneration of the natives which has not succeeded in the hands of the clergy should be attempted without it, and the governing parties in the state should undertake to legislate for the inferior race, the ruin of the whole nation must ensue. In this position of things, the authority which the Church still possessed in the state was an intolerable anomaly. In no other country in the world did the clergy use the secular power to so great an excess. In 1852, a Frenchman who had been married according to the French law, by the Consul at Vera Cruz, was arrested by the Bishop of Puebla, and condemned to four years' imprisonment. An American physician married a Mexican lady in the United States, and returned to dwell at Guadalajara. The Bishop sent soldiers to carry off his wife, and it was with difficulty that the American minister prevented the use of violence.

On the 15th June 1856 a decree, drawn up by Lerdo de Tejada, deprived corporations of the right of holding real property. All Church lands were declared the property of the occupy-

ing tenants. The government gained little by this measure, but the political power of the clergy was destroyed. The new constitution was completed in a radical spirit, and accepted by Comonfort, the president, on the 11th of March 1857. But the conservative party was up in arms. The Archbishop of Mexico ordered that absolution should be denied to all who took the oath to the constitution, and it was refused by a great number of men in office. The civil war began. President Comonfort himself had no faith in the constitution which his partisans had made. In December 1857 he combined with the conservatives to upset it. In January 1858 the liberals made the Indian Juarez president, and the conservatives, distrusting Comonfort, elected their own leader, General Zuloaga, who was master of the capital. Juarez, supported by the democrats of the provinces, maintained at Vera Cruz the constitution of 1857. The commercial interest was with him, and the customs were in his hands; whilst the central government relied on the conservative party, on the wealth of the clergy, and the treasure of the churches. These resources were soon exhausted, and the clergy squandered to no purpose the wealth which it had taken centuries to accumulate. The government then had recourse to the seizure of property belonging to foreigners, by which the representatives of foreign states were driven into hostility. Till then the United States alone had recognised Juarez.

The three years' war which followed the constitution of 1857 was waged with a violence and ferocity never before seen in Mexican revolutions; for great principles were engaged in conflict, and the existence of the republic was at stake. For a long time the conservative general, Miramon, who became commander-in-chief at the age of 27, was victorious in every encounter. Fortune turned with the fall of Guadalajara, and on 25th December 1860 Miramon fled from Mexico. The revolutionary party was triumphant, and Juarez returned to Mexico in January 1861. He carried out at once the decrees of 1857. Most of the Bishops were exiled, the remaining property of the Church was confiscated, and civil marriage was introduced. The hopeless condition of

Mexico under this government, the dissolution of civilised society, and the refusal to fulfil national obligations, were the causes of the Intervention.

On the 12th of May 1861 Mr. Mathew strongly supported the cause of the new government in a despatch to Lord John Russell. "Two petty attempts to create disturbances in this capital were discovered and put down in time. In other respects public tranquillity has not been disturbed; and however faulty and weak the present government may be, they who witnessed the murders, the acts of atrocity and of plunder, almost of daily occurrence under the government of General Miramon and his counsellors, Senor Diaz and General Marquez, cannot but appreciate the existence of law and justice. Foreigners, especially, who suffered so heavily under that arbitrary rule, and by the hatred and intolerance towards them which is a dogma of the Church party in Mexico, cannot but make a broad distinction between the past and the present." A fortnight later Sir Charles Wyke, who had arrived on the 9th, reported in different terms. "Animated by a blind hatred towards the Church party, the present government has only thought of destroying and dissipating the immense property formerly belonging to the clergy, without, however, at the same time taking advantage of the wealth thus placed at their disposal to liquidate the many obligations which at present weigh them down and cripple their resources. The Church property has generally been supposed to be worth between 60,000,000 and 80,000,000 Spanish dollars, the whole of which appears to have been frittered away without the government having any thing to show for it. A considerable amount has doubtless been spent in repaying advances at exorbitant interest, made to the liberal party when they were fighting their way to power; but still enough ought to have remained after satisfying their creditors to have left them very well off, and in a better position as to their pecuniary resources than that held by any other government. . . . The religious feelings of a fanatic population have been shocked by the destruction of churches and convents all over the country, and the disbanded monks and friars wandering

about amongst the people fan the flame of discontent, which is kept alive by the women, who, as a body, are all in favour of the Church. . . . The constitutional government is unable to maintain its authority in the various states of the federation, which are becoming *de facto* perfectly independent; so that the same causes which, under similar circumstances, broke up the Confederation of Central America into five separate republics, are now at work here, and will probably produce a like result. . . . Such is the actual state of affairs in Mexico, and your Lordship will perceive, therefore, that there is little chance of justice or redress from such people, except by the employment of force to exact that which both persuasion and menaces have hitherto failed to obtain."

While England has desired only the payment of money due to her, and the maintenance of her influence, France and Spain have been pursuing more ambitious plans. In Mexico, as well as in Peru, a powerful party has long been anxious to take refuge in monarchy from the hopeless evils of democracy. This scheme was naturally favourable to the influence of the European powers and hostile to the designs of the United States. Mr. Seward, on the 4th December, informed the three Powers that the United States could not join their alliance, that they sympathised with Mexico as a republic, and would aid it in redeeming its obligations and preventing war. Meantime the Spanish advanced guard took possession of Vera Cruz on the 17th of December without encountering resistance. The Mexican army was concentrated on the road leading to the capital. England, threatened with an American war, sent a very small force of only 700 marines. France, in consequence of the promptitude and energy with which the Spaniards commenced operations, resolved, in the middle of January, to double her force in Mexico. The Emperor Napoleon, whose views extended far beyond the immediate and acknowledged objects of the expedition was anxious to subvert the existing government, and to occupy Mexico. Negotiations were opened with a view to place the Archduke Maximilian on the Mexican throne, and the Mexican emigrants in Rome obtained the earnest support of the Pope in this de-

sign. That accomplished and ambitious prince occupies an ambiguous position in Austria, where he lies under the suspicion of having desired before the Italian war to elevate his government of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom into a separate sovereignty, the appanage, like Tuscany and Modena, of a younger branch of the House of Lorraine. It is probable that the choice of this candidate cooled the eagerness of the Spanish government, which sought by the expedition to recover its prestige in America, not to raise up an independent potentate. The English government looked moreover with suspicion on any attempt to alter the form of government in Mexico which should not receive the free assent of the people. The attempt to form a coalition between the conservatives and the Spanish interest was defeated by the English. Miramon was sent from Havana to take the command of his party and renew the civil war; but he was arrested on the 26th of January by the English commodore.

Negotiations were carried on by the Spaniards with the Mexican government, which were encouraged by the English, and acquiesced in by the French commander. On the 19th February a convention was concluded at Soledad, in which the Mexicans declared that they required no interference in their own affairs, and would allow the allies to occupy certain towns until all should be arranged. The allies protested that they had no design to make any change in the government of the country, that the Spanish

and French troops then present should occupy the positions assigned to them, and that the English corps and the French reinforcement should leave the country. This convention, which the Spaniards must have been induced to accept by some private understanding with England, could not satisfy the Emperor Napoleon. On the 10th of March General Loremez, who had arrived with reinforcements in the Mexican waters, informed the Spanish commander that France refused to ratify the convention, and prepared, with 7500 men, to advance into the interior.

The Mexican expedition affords an opportunity of raising French influence in South America to a level with that of England. Spain is still hated with the bitterness which emancipated nationalities always entertain for the mother country. England is dreaded as a Protestant and Teutonic power. France appears, therefore, as a deliverer, preserving independence, protecting nationality, and restoring religion. It is in this last respect especially that the Mexican intervention can assist the policy of France in Europe. By becoming the arbiter of the religious restoration in the Western hemisphere, she adds vastly to the obligations of the Holy See towards her, and augments her influence over the Church. It is a new step in that policy of subverting the freedom of the Church by treacherous but important services which has guided the imperial government for several eventful years.

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